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Summary  
 This dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of proactive 
environmental strategies among small firms. Specifically, it seeks to answer the question 
“how can small businesses successfully implement proactive environmental strategies?” 
Proactive environmental strategies (PES) aim to minimize a firm’s negative impact and to 
maximize its positive effects on the environment, beyond what can be expected from a legal 
perspective or standard practice in the industry. As such, this dissertation is situated in the 
theoretical discipline of “strategy”, and the context of inquiry is “the natural environment” on 
the one hand, and “small businesses” on the other. A specific approach on proactive 
environmental strategies in small businesses is necessary for two reasons. First, although the 
impact of small businesses on the natural environment is estimated to exceed that of large 
businesses, most of the PES research has been limited to large businesses. Second, small firms 
possess characteristics that make them fundamentally different from large firms. Hence, this 
dissertation has the objective to address three questions that we found to remain unanswered 
in the current literature: 
1. What is the impact of firm size on the adoption of PES in smaller firms? 
2. What are the resources and capabilities associated with successful PES 
execution in small businesses?  
3. How can small businesses be successful in PES when the (institutional) 
conditions are against having one? 
In order to provide a basis and answers for these research questions, the dissertation presents 
both literature reviews and empirical research. Before summarizing the contributions of 
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 in answering these research questions, the attempts of chapters 1, 2 and 
3 to theoretically delineate and ground the research questions in the literature are briefly 
presented. 
 
Conceptual delineation of the research 
The discipline of “strategy” investigates organizational performance as a result of the 
complex interactions between the external environment on the one hand, and the internal 
possibilities of the organization to interact with it on the other. Although it is still debated 
whether it is the organization or the environment that ultimately determines the performance 
of an organization, scholars increasingly agree that theory-building exercises need to 
approach organizations both from the point of view of the organization (e.g resource-based 
Summary 
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view, dynamic capabilities), as well as from a contextual point of view (e.g. contingency 
theory, institutional theory). Hence, this dissertation followed an approach that combined both 
perspectives. Specifically, we present the resources and (dynamic) capabilities that aid small 
businesses to implement their proactive objectives towards the natural environment in their 
specific institutional and business environmental setting.  
It is important to view the natural environment as a specific influencing factor on 
strategy. The natural environment confronts organizations with particular challenges that can 
be summarized in three dimensions: market failures, social issues and paradigm shifts. 
1. Firstly, the natural environment induces market failures: the costs that are born 
by those that voluntarily engage in efforts to reduce their impact on the 
environment result in benefits that third parties can enjoy for free, without 
having to bear the costs of enjoying them. As a result, firms with proactive 
environmental strategies may have competitive disadvantages. 
2. Second, the natural environment also results in social issues. As a consequence 
of the market failures, third parties can also experience costs or disadvantages 
because of an organization’s activities. Organizations can therefore encounter 
social resistance as a result of such negative effects, but may also be rewarded 
in the event they display sensitivity to these social demands. 
3. Thirdly, the natural environment and its relation with businesses is currently 
undergoing a paradigmatic debate. Whereas organizational activities have 
been based on a worldview that sees the natural environment as a source of 
resources and a sink for waste external to the organization, this model is being 
questioned today. An alternative approach, based on the assumption that 
healthy businesses are only possible in a healthy natural environment, places 
organizations within the natural environment and gives businesses the 
responsibility to voluntarily care for the natural environment. Such a debate 
induces new questions for business and, hence, new strategic challenges. 
Businesses can respond in multiple ways to these challenges. Where one possibility 
would be to respond reactively, and to only take the natural environment into account as far as 
this would be required legally, the focus of this dissertation was on those firms that were 
proactively taking the natural environment into account in their activities. Throughout this 
dissertation, we used the following definition of PES as a beacon: 
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A proactive environmental strategy is the continuous process of resource building, 
selection and deployment for value creation and distribution, by navigating through 
and interacting with the structural and social conditions that influence their value, 
with the purpose to prevent negative effects, or create positive impacts on the natural 
environment, beyond what is legally required or accepted as standard practice. 
 After this conceptual delineation in chapter 2, chapter 3 synthesizes the current state-
of-the-art of the PES literature around the antecedents and consequences of PES. In this 
process, four influencing factors emerged: internal motivators, external motivators, internal 
facilitators and external facilitators. While the motivating factors provide the impetus to 
proactive environmental strategies, the facilitators acted as reinforcing of inhibiting factors for 
their implementation or in realizing improved environmental and financial performance. 
1. Internal motivators. The likelihood of finding PES in firms is higher when there is a 
sense of moral responsibility towards the natural environment in the firm, when there 
are opportunities from a competitiveness point of view, or when the firm wants to 
maintain its legitimacy in society.  
2. External motivators. PES are also more likely to be found when the institutional 
context pushes firms towards more voluntary attention to the natural environment. 
However, whereas some sources find that this institutional context is absolutely 
necessary, others find the opposite.  
3. Internal facilitators. The big constant in the literature is the finding that the larger the 
firm, the higher the likelihood of finding a PES. In addition, the availability of slack 
resources, often associated with larger organizational size, also has a positive effect. 
Other than that, a general strategic proactivity or international experience also play a 
role. Furthermore, the same factors also seem to impact the likelihood that a PES 
results in higher performance in economic and environmental terms. Theoretical 
closure is difficult, however, since for most general findings contradictory evidence 
can to be found.  
4. External facilitators. Finally, the likelihood that an organization has a PES diminishes 
with lower munificence, and higher complexity and uncertainty of the business 
environment. On the other hand, these same circumstances are predicted to have a 
positive effect on the impact of PES on financial and economic performance.  
In summary, the PES literature provides a similar conclusion as was promoted in the 
general strategy literature: in order to explain PES, it is necessary to simultaneously take the 
interaction between different motivators and facilitators into account. In order to contribute to 
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such a further refinement, this dissertation presents three studies that aim to uncover the 
interactions between the aforementioned factors in the specific context of small businesses, 
and which address the three research questions as mentioned above. 
 
What is the impact of firm size on the adoption of PES in smaller firms? 
 One inconsistency that emerged from the literature review in chapter 3 was the impact 
of firm size on PES. While large studies consistently find a positive correlation between firm 
size and PES, a growing number of anecdotal and case studies contradict that relationship. We 
therefore further explored the relationship between firm size and the ability and willingness of 
small firm size to realize PES. De most important findings of this dissertation in this 
perspective can be summarized in three points: 
1. Small businesses are not principally against having a responsibility towards 
social issues. Rather, small firms simply do not recognize many social issues 
as a result of their limited visibility and (perceived) impact on the natural and 
social environment. Hence, small firms pay attention mostly to their internal 
stakeholders (employees) and the opinions of peers, and less to external 
stakeholders and the natural environment. 
2. Besides limited recognition, it became clear that it is especially the 
implementation of proactive social and environmental strategies that is difficult 
for many small firms. For most small firms, proactive environmental strategies 
remain good intentions as a result of a lack of time, knowledge, financial 
resources and power. Some firms nevertheless seem to succeed, especially 
when firms possess the capabilities that can reduce these constraints (see 
research question 2) 
3. Small businesses, more than large firms, depend upon their environment to 
implement realize PES. A culture of shared responsibility, and an institutional 
and business environment that supports PES seems to be particularly important 
in this perspective. The findings in this dissertation show, however, that small 
firms can employ certain dynamic capabilities to also influence their 
immediate environment  (see research question 2 about how this was possible). 
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What are the resources and capabilities associated with successful PES execution in small 
businesses? 
The empirical research in this dissertation is an embedded in-depth case study research 
that was done among eight firms in the Belgian ornamental horticulture. An extensive 
methodological and contextual justification of this empirical study in chapter 5 demonstrated 
that firms that are member of VMS (Vlaams Milieuplan Sierteelt – Flemish Environmental 
Plan Ornamental Horticulture) have the intention to realize a PES despite a general lack of 
internal and external resources and institutional support. By comparing firms with high and 
low VMS scores, which signal whether a firm was capable of realizing its proactive 
environmental intentions or not, chapter 6 demonstrates that a successful realization of the 
firm’s environmental intentions depended on the ability of the firm to create a micro-
environment for the firm that mimicked the theoretical conditions favouring PES. More 
specifically, we identified “munification” and “organicity” as the two interacting and 
composite dynamic capabilities that enabled the firm to change its internal and external 
resource base.  
1. Munification was a composite dynamic capability with three constitutive 
elements: (1) the building and attracting of networks rich with existing 
complementary resources and capabilities; (2) collaborating for the joint 
development of lacking external resource and institutional capital; and (3) the 
institutional agency to create an institutionally enabling context.  
2. Organicity consisted of (1) bootstrapping (the ability to find and create pockets 
of resources in the organization), (2) focused adaptability (the ability to 
flexibly integrate emerging solutions to persistently realize set objectives) and 
(3) disciplined scrutiny (the ability to critically collect and assess internal and 
external information), together increasing the internal resource capital in the 
firm.  
In addition, we also found that both dynamic capabilities interacted with each other 
and further reinforced the potential of the firm to realize its objectives. The presence of 
organicity increased the effectiveness of munification in the firm, while the external resource 
conditions further increased the effectiveness of organicity in building internal resource 
capital.  
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How can small business be successful in PES when the (institutional) conditions are 
against having one? 
Given that organicity and munification helped the firm to realize its proactive 
environmental intentions when not only the institutional but all conditions were set against 
having one, chapter 6 helped to explain the third research question as well. Yet one striking 
observation in chapter 6 was that the firm’s PES went against institutionalized practices and 
prescriptions in their industry. Whereas PES are generally seen as an act of conforming to 
institutional pressures, the dominant institutional pressures in our study were strongly 
discouraging PES. As a result, achieving high VMS scores reflected an act of institutional 
non-conformity. Since current explanations in institutional theory offer contradictory 
explanations about how institutional non-conformity was possible in the small firms of our 
study, we therefore further explored how the capabilities as identified in chapter 6 helped to 
explain institutional non-conformity in small business contexts. As such, chapter 7 took an 
institutional theoretical lens to zoom in on how small businesses can be successful in PES 
when the institutional conditions were against having one. In this process, three factors 
predicted successful institutional non-conformity: 
 
1. Firstly, the successful firms’ particular network characteristics lowered their 
embeddness in the organizational field. By assuming multiple roles within the 
organizational field and by being exposed alternative institutional logics they were 
able to detach from institutionalized prescriptions in the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture sector.  
2. Second, whereas successful firms theorized the institutional non-conformity as an 
envisioned future, the unsuccessful firms saw the institutional non-conformity as an 
inevitable future or a potential trend. Importantly, the cognitive approach of the 
institutional non-conformity as a desired future resulted in flexibility to adopt 
alternative solutions to persistently realize their aspirations.  
3. Third, the successful firms seemed “immune” to the negative effects other firms would 
experience with institutional non-conformity. By drawing upon a business model that 
was not only deviating with regards to the PES, but was non-conforming in different 
perspectives and in a way that was conducive to realizing a PES, they became 
insensitive to the uncertainty and legitimacy risks that other firms perceived. 
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In conclusion 
Whereas most reports to date either describe how proactive environmental strategies 
can yield benefits to small firms, or in contrast how the small scale of small firms inhibits 
proactive environmental strategis among firms, this dissertation brings a more nuanced story. 
Proactive environmental strategies are not easy for most small firms, but not impossible. The 
contribution of this dissertation lies in the description of how this process is manifested. In 
addition, the process was described in a context were none of the environmental conditions 
yielded a direct benefit for firms with PES. Given that many firms are in such a situation, or 
perceive they are, we hope that our insights can inspire other firms to also reduce their 
environmental impact. 
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Samenvatting 
 Dit proefschrift wil een bijdrage leveren tot een beter begrip van proactieve 
milieustrategieën bij kleine bedrijven. Specifiek peilt het naar antwoorden op de 
overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag: “Hoe kunnen kleine bedrijven een proactieve 
milieustrategie uitvoeren?” Daarbij hebben proactieve milieustrategieën als doel de negatieve 
impact van bedrijfsactiviteiten op het milieu te minimaliseren en positieve effecten erop te 
maximaliseren, en bovendien op een manier die voorbij gaat aan wettelijke verplichtingen of 
aanvaarde standaardpraktijken. Het proefschrift situeert zich daarmee in de theoretische 
discipline “strategie”, en de context voor het onderzoek is enerzijds “milieu” en anderzijds 
“de kleine onderneming”. Een dergelijke specifieke benadering van proactieve 
milieustrategieën op kleine bedrijven is niet alleen opportuun, maar ook noodzakelijk. Hoewel 
de cumulatieve impact van kleine bedrijven op het milieu groter geschat wordt dan die van 
grote bedrijven, is het onderzoek over proactieve milieustrategieën tot op heden voornamelijk 
gericht op grote bedrijven. Bovendien bezitten kleine bedrijven een aantal kenmerken die hen 
fundamenteel doen verschillen van grote bedrijven. Dit proefschrift heeft daarom als 
doelstelling tegemoet te komen aan drie vragen die uit een overzicht van de relatief recente 
literatuur over milieustrategieën bij bedrijven nog onbeantwoord bleven: 
1. Wat is de impact van de kleine bedrijfsschaal op proactieve milieustrategieën 
bij kleine bedrijven? 
2. Welke zijn de hulpbronnen en bedrijfsvaardigheden die kleine bedrijven 
helpen om proactieve milieustrategieën te realiseren? 
3. Hoe kunnen kleine bedrijven proactieve milieustrategieën realiseren wanneer 
de institutionele context hen daarin beperkt? 
Om deze onderzoeksvragen te duiden en er antwoorden voor aan te reiken, werd er in dit 
proefschrift enerzijds gewerkt aan de hand van literatuurstudies en anderzijds aan de hand van 
empirisch onderzoek. Vooraleer over te gaan tot een samenvatting van de bijdragen van het 
proefschrift aan elk van deze onderzoeksvragen volgt eerst een samenvatting van de 
belangrijkste uitgangspunten waarop het onderzoek gebaseerd was. 
 
Conceptuele afbakening van het onderzoek 
De discipline van “strategie” bestudeert de performantie van een bedrijf als gevolg van 
de complexe interactie tussen de externe omgeving van een onderneming enerzijds en de 
interne mogelijkheden om daar mee te interageren anderzijds. Hoewel er in de sociale 
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wetenschappen nog steeds een debat wordt gevoerd over of het nu de organisatie zelf of de 
omgeving is die de uiteindelijke performantie van een bedrijf bepaalt, lijken verschillende 
theoretici het er over eens dat een benadering die zowel vertrekt vanuit het standpunt van de 
onderneming (bv. resource-based view, dynamic capabilities) als vanuit het standpunt van de 
interactie met de omgeving (bv. contingency theory, institutional theory) noodzakelijk is om 
zinvolle theoretische inzichten over strategie te construeren. In dit proefschrift volgen we 
daarom een benadering waarin beide perspectieven gevolgd worden. Specifiek beschrijven we 
de hulpbronnen en bedrijfsvaardigheden die kleine bedrijven kunnen helpen om hun 
proactieve doelstellingen ten aanzien van het milieu in hun specifieke institutionele en 
bedrijfscontext te realiseren.  
Het is belangrijk om het milieu als een specifieke beïnvloedende factor op strategie te 
onderzoeken. Het milieu stelt ondernemingen immers voor specifieke uitdagingen die kunnen 
samengevat worden onder drie noemers: marktfalingen, sociale kwesties, en paradigma-
verschuivingen.  
1. Ten eerste geeft het milieu aanleiding tot marktfalingen: de kosten die 
gedragen worden door de vrijwillige inspanningen van proactieve bedrijven 
om het milieu te verbeteren, resulteren in voordelen die derden gratis kunnen 
genieten zonder daarvoor de eventuele kosten te moeten dragen. Bedrijven met 
een proactieve milieustrategie kunnen daardoor concurrentienadelen 
ondervinden. 
2. Ten tweede is het milieu ook een sociale kwestie voor bedrijven. Door de 
marktfalingen kunnen derden ten gevolge van bedrijfsactiviteiten kosten of 
milieunadelen ondervinden. Bedrijven kunnen daarom sociale weerstand 
ondervinden ten gevolge van negatieve effecten, maar kunnen ook beloond 
worden indien ze gevoelig zijn voor deze sociale wensen.  
3. Ten derde woedt er omwille van deze sociale kwesties een paradigmatisch 
debat over hoe ondernemingen zich moeten verhouden ten aanzien van de 
natuur. Waar tot op heden bedrijfsactiviteiten gestoeld zijn op de 
veronderstelling dat bedrijven naast de natuurlijke omgeving staan en ervan 
gebruik kunnen maken als bron voor hulpbronnen en opvangcapaciteit voor 
afval, wordt dit model in vraag gesteld. Een alternatieve benadering, gebaseerd 
op de veronderstelling dat gezonde ondernemingen slechts mogelijk zijn in een 
gezond milieu, plaatst bedrijven binnen het milieu en legt een 
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verantwoordelijkheid bij bedrijven om er vrijwillig mee zorg voor te dragen. 
Een dergelijk debat roept nieuwe vragen op voor ondernemingen en dus 
nieuwe strategische uitdagingen.  
Ondernemingen kunnen op verschillende manieren reageren op deze uitdagingen. 
Daar waar één mogelijkheid zou zijn om zich reactief op te stellen en enkel het milieu in 
rekening te nemen voor zover wettelijk noodzakelijk, lag de focus van dit proefschrift bij 
bedrijven die in hun bedrijfsactiviteiten proactief rekening houden met het milieu op een 
manier die voorbij gaat aan wettelijke verplichtingen of aanvaarde standaardpraktijken. 
Doorheen het proefschrift werd daarom de volgende definitie als baken gehanteerd: 
Een proactieve milieustrategie is het continue proces van het ontwikkelen, selecteren 
en gebruiken van hulpbronnen om waarde te creëren en te verdelen, door te 
interageren met en te navigeren doorheen de structurele en sociale voorwaarden die 
de waarde van deze hulpbronnen beïnvloeden, met als doelstelling om negatieve 
effecten op het milieu te voorkomen en positieve effecten op het milieu te creëren, op 
een manier die voorbij gaat aan de wettelijke verplichtingen of aanvaarde 
standaarden. 
 Na deze conceptuele afbakening in hoofdstuk 2, volgde in hoofdstuk 3 een overzicht 
van de bestaande literatuur over proactieve milieustrategieën. Bij het in kaart brengen van 
deze literatuur was de aandacht vooral gericht op de antecedenten en de gevolgen van 
proactieve milieustrategieën. Daarbij kwamen de volgende beïnvloedende factoren naar 
boven: interne motivatoren, externe motivatoren, interne facilitatoren en externe facilitatoren. 
De motivatoren geven de impuls tot proactieve milieustrategieën, terwijl de facilitatoren 
werken als versterkende of verzwakkende factoren bij het realiseren ervan of het resulteren in 
financiële of milieuresultaten. 
1. Interne motivatoren. De kans om proactieve milieustrategieën terug te vinden bij 
bedrijven is groter wanneer er een morele verantwoordelijkheid ten aanzien van het 
milieu is, er kansen gezien worden vanuit concurrentiestandpunt of wanneer het 
bedrijf haar legitimiteit in de maatschappij wil behouden.  
2. Externe motivatoren. Proactieve milieustrategieën worden ook vaker teruggevonden 
wanneer de institutionele context bedrijven in de richting van meer vrijwillige 
aandacht voor het milieu duwt. Waar sommige bronnen vinden dat die context hoogst 
noodzakelijk is, vinden andere dan weer het tegendeel. 
3. Interne facilitatoren. De grote constante in de literatuur is de bevinding dat hoe groter 
het bedrijf is, hoe groter de kans dat er een proactieve milieustrategie is. Ook de 
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beschikbaarheid van overtollige hulpbronnen, vaak geassocieerd met schaalgrootte, 
heeft een positief effect. Daarnaast hebben een algemeen proactieve bedrijfsstrategie 
en de internationale ervaring een rol. Dezelfde factoren blijken ook een impact te 
hebben op de kans dat een proactieve milieustrategie tot hogere performantie op 
economisch en milieuvlak leidt. Voor de meeste bevindingen lijken er toch ook hier 
weer tegenstrijdige voorbeelden te bestaan, waardoor er nog geen sluitende 
voorspellingen kunnen gemaakt worden. 
4. Externe facilitatoren. Tenslotte neemt de kans dat een bedrijf een proactieve 
milieustrategie heeft toe naarmate de algemene bedrijfsomgeving meer vrijgevig is 
met ondersteuning en hulpbronnen, ze minder onzeker is en ze minder complex is. De 
kans dat proactieve milieustrategieën vervolgens in hogere economische performantie 
resulteren is echter omgekeerd. Hoe lager de vrijgevigheid en hoe groter de 
onzekerheid en complexiteit van de omgeving, hoe groter de kans dat een bedrijf haar 
proactieve milieustrategie in betere performantie kan laten resulteren. 
Over het algemeen lijkt de literatuur over proactieve milieustrategieën aan te sturen op 
een gelijkaardige conclusie als in de algemene strategische literatuur: om proactieve 
milieustrategieën te verklaren is het noodzakelijk om de interactie tussen de verschillende 
motivatoren en facilitatoren tegelijk in ogenschouw te nemen. Om aan een dergelijke 
verfijning een bijdrage te leveren, voerde dit proefschrift 3 studies uit die de interactie tussen 
bovenstaande factoren in de specifieke context van kleine bedrijven tracht bloot te leggen en 
een antwoord probeert te bieden aan drie voornoemde onderzoeksvragen. 
 
Wat is de impact van de kleine bedrijfsschaal op proactieve milieustrategieën bij kleine 
bedrijven? 
Eén inconsistentie die uit de literatuur naar boven kwam was de impact van 
bedrijfsschaal op proactieve milieustrategieën. Terwijl grootschalige studies steevast een 
positieve correlatie terugvinden tussen bedrijfsgrootte en de kans dat een bedrijf een 
proactieve milieustrategie heeft, lijkt een groeiend aantal casestudies en anecdotes die relatie 
tegen te spreken. In hoofdstuk 4 gingen we daarom dieper in op de specifieke relatie tussen 
bedrijfsschaal en de mate waarin kleine bedrijven proactieve milieustrategieën willen en 
kunnen realiseren. De belangrijkste bevindingen kunnen samengevat worden in 3 punten:  
1. Kleine bedrijven staan principieel niet weigerachtig tegenover hun 
verantwoordelijkheid ten opzichte van maatschappelijke kwesties. De beperkte 
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zichtbaarheid en impact van kleine bedrijven zorgt er echter voor dat vele 
kwesties simpelweg niet herkend worden. Bijgevolg wordt er meest aandacht 
geschonken aan de interne stakeholders (werknemers) en de meningen van 
collega’s en minder aan externe stakeholders en het milieu. 
2. Naast het beperkte herkennen van kwesties is het vooral duidelijk dat het 
uitvoeren van proactieve sociale en milieustrategieën voor vele kleine 
bedrijven moeilijk is. Bij de meeste kleine bedrijven blijven proactieve 
milieustrategieën bij goede intenties omwille van een pertinent gebrek aan tijd, 
kennis, financiële middelen en macht. Toch lijken sommige bedrijven er in te 
slagen, vooral wanneer het bedrijf over bedrijfsvaardigheden beschikt die de 
beperkingen verminderen (zie onderzoeksvraag 2). 
3. Kleine bedrijven zijn meer dan grote bedrijven afhankelijk van de omgeving 
om hun proactieve milieustrategieën uit te voeren. Een cultuur van gedeelde 
verantwoordelijkheid, en algemeen een institutionele en bedrijfsomgeving die 
ondersteunend werkt zijn hierbij van groot belang. Langs de andere kant toont 
het empirische onderzoek in dit proefschrift aan dat kleine bedrijven zelf die 
ondersteuning en bedrijfsomgeving in de hand hebben (zie ook hier bij 
onderzoeksvraag 2 op welke manier dit mogelijk was). 
Welke zijn de hulpbronnen en bedrijfsvaardigheden die kleine bedrijven helpen om 
proactieve milieustrategieën te realiseren? 
 Het empirische onderzoek van dit proefschrift is een ingebed diepte-onderzoek door 
middel van case-studies dat werd uitgevoerd bij acht bedrijven in de Belgische sierteelt. De 
methodologische en contextuele verantwoording van deze empirische studie in hoofdstuk 5 
toont aan dat sierteeltbedrijven die lid zijn van het Vlaams Milieuplan Sierteelt (VMS) 
proactieve milieu-intenties willen realiseren ondanks het feit dat de algemene 
bedrijfsvoorwaarden en de institutionele en marktomgeving dit eerder tegenwerken dan 
ondersteunen. Aan de hand van een vergelijking van bedrijven met hoge en lage VMS scores, 
dewelke aangeven of een bedrijf in staat was om haar intenties te realizeren of niet, beschrijft 
hoofdstuk 6 dat de succesvolle VMS bedrijven een micro-omgeving voor hun bedrijf 
gecreëerd hadden waarin de theoretische motivatoren en facilitatoren om proactieve 
milieustrategieën te realizeren desalniettemin aanwezig waren. Bovendien konden we op basis 
van een diepgaande analyse “munificatie” en “organiciteit” als twee “dynamic capabilities” 
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identificeren die hen in staat hadden gesteld om de interne en externe omgeving aan hun eigen 
noden aan te passen. 
1. Munificatie is een drieledige bedrijfsvaardigheid, bestaande uit (1) het bouwen 
van netwerken waaruit complementaire bestaande hulpbronnen en 
bedrijfsvaardigheden konden gehaald worden, (2) samenwerken voor de 
gemeenschappelijke ontwikkeling van ontbrekende ondersteunende 
hulpbronnen, bedrijfsvaardigheden en instituties, en (3) institutionele “agency” 
gericht op het bijsturen van de institutionele context. 
2. Organiciteit is eveneens een drieledige bedrijfsvaardigheid, bestaande uit (1) 
bootstrapping (de mogelijkheid om hulpbronnen aan te spreken en te creëren 
waar anderen dit onmogelijk achten), (2) gerichte aanpasbaarheid (het flexibel 
opnemen van oplossingen die zich aandienen in de omgeving om gericht het 
bedrijfsdoel te realiseren), en (3) gedisciplineerde beoordeling (de vaardigheid 
om op een nauwgezette manier interne en externe informatie te beschouwen en 
te beoordelen). 
Naast het individuele belang van deze dynamic capabilities in het realiseren van een 
voordelige micro-omgeving voor het realizeren van proactieve milieustrategieën, zorgde de 
interactie ertussen ook voor een versterkend effect. Enerzijds versterkte organiciteit de 
mogelijkheden van een bedrijf om munificatie om te zetten in een externe ondersteunende 
omgeving. Een bedrijf dat meer tijd en hulpbronnen heeft en deze op een kritische en 
flexibele manier inzet om mogelijkheden te vinden tot netwerken, samenwerken en 
institutionele agency, zal gemakkelijker externe bedrijfsvaardigheden kunnen creëren. 
Anderzijds zal een bedrijf dat meer hulpbronnen en ondersteuning uit de omgeving kan 
aanspreken haar organiciteit beter kunnen doen resulteren in het opbouwen van interne 
hulpbronnen en bedrijfsvaardigheden. 
 
Hoe kunnen kleine bedrijven proactieve milieustrategieën realiseren wanneer de 
institutionele context hen daarin beperkt? 
 De analyses uit hoofdstuk 6 gaven al aan welke de bedrijfsvaardigheden zijn die een 
bedrijf helpen om een proactieve milieustrategie te realiseren wanneer de (institutionele) 
context hen daarin beperkt. Noch de markt, noch de vakorganisaties, noch wettelijke 
bepalingen zorgden voor een stimulerende omgeving die hoge VMS scores faciliteerde. 
Organiciteit en munificatie vormen dus ook het antwoord op deze derde onderzoeksvraag. 
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Tijdens het iteratief proces van data-analyse en het vergelijken met bestaande literatuur werd 
het echter duidelijk dat onze bevindingen ingingen tegen gangbare literatuur, waar proactieve 
milieustrategieën meestal voorgesteld worden als een tegemoetkoming ten aanzien van 
institutionele verwachtingen. In ons onderzoek waren proactieve milieustrategieën echter 
eerder een institutionele non-conformiteit. In de literatuur vonden we echter geen sluitende 
verklaringen over hoe het proces van institutionele non-conformiteit loopt bij kleine 
bedrijven. Om een bijdrage te leveren aan de theorievorming rond institutionele non-
conformiteit onderwierpen we in hoofdstuk 7 de resultaten van hoofdstuk 6 aan een verdere 
analyse vanuit institutioneel theoretisch standpunt. Daarbij kwamen drie factoren naar voor 
die tot succesvolle institutionele non-conformiteit leidden: 
1. Ten eerste had de specifieke manier waarop het bedrijf door haar netwerk interageerde 
met het organizatieveld een impact op de inbedding van het bedrijf in dat 
organizatieveld. Door meerdere rollen op te nemen in het organizatieveld en door 
blootgesteld te zijn aan alternatieve institutionele logica’s waren de succesvolle 
bedrijven in staat om zich los te koppelen (en dus hun inbedding te verkleinen) van 
geïnstitutionaliseerde voorschriften in de Belgische sierteelt. 
2. Ten tweede was er een verschil in de manier waarop de succesvolle en onsuccesvolle 
bedrijven de institutionele non-conformiteit (proactief de impact op het milieu 
verminderen) cognitief benaderden. Daar waar de succesvolle bedrijven de 
institutionele non-conformiteit benaderden als een gewenste toekomst, zagen de 
onsuccessvolle bedrijven VMS eerder als deel van een onontkoombare toekomst of 
een potentiele trend. De cognitieve benadering van de institutionele non-conformiteit 
als deel van een gewenste toekomst resulteerde bij de succesvolle bedrijven in de 
flexibiliteit om alternatieve oplossingen te internalizeren en zo volhardend hun doelen 
te realiseren. 
3. Tenslotte leken de succesvolle bedrijven “immuun” tegen de negatieve effecten die 
andere bedrijven zouden ervaren in het geval van institutionele non-conformiteit. Door 
terug te vallen op een business model dat enerzijds niet alleen non-conventioneel was 
op het milieuvlak, maar ook op andere deelgebieden, maar anderzijds ondersteunend 
was aan een proactieve milieustrategie werden ze ongevoelig voor de onzekerheid en 
de legitimiteitsrisico’s die andere bedrijven ondervonden.  
 
 
  Samenvatting 
 
xxxi 
Tot slot 
Waar de meeste rapporten tot op heden ofwel beschreven hoe proactieve 
milieustrategieën voordelen konden opleveren voor kleine bedrijven, ofwel hoe de kleine 
bedrijfsschaal proactieve milieustrategieën bij kleine bedrijven onmogelijk maakte, brengt dit 
proefschrift een meer genuanceerd verhaal. Proactieve milieustrategieën zijn voor de meeste 
kleine bedrijven niet gemakkelijk, maar wél haalbaar. De bijdrage van dit proefschrift ligt in 
de beschrijving van hoe dit proces in zijn werk kan gaan. Bovendien werd het proces 
beschreven in een context waar de omgevingsvariabelen op geen enkele manier een direct 
voordeel voor proactieve milieustrategieën opleveren. Aangezien de meeste bedrijven zich in 
een dergelijke situatie bevinden of lijken te bevinden, hopen we daarom dat onze inzichten 
andere bedrijven zullen inspireren om ook hun milieu-impact te optimaliseren. 
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1. General Introduction 
1.1. Aims and scope 
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, the impact of business on the natural 
environment has been the object of growing debate. Despite the beneficial impacts industrial 
activity has yielded in terms of economic growth, employment, innovation and many other 
domains, industrial progress has induced a number of effects that have also endangered the 
carrying capacity of ecosystems and the vitality and health of biological – including human – 
life (WCED, 1987; Perman, Ma, McGilvray, & Common, 2003; Worldwatch Institute, 2003; 
World Resources Institute, 2005). Through a wide variety of consumption patterns and 
production emissions, these effects have been manifested as both local air or water pollution, 
biodiversity losses, soil degradation, waste accumulation, as well as global scale effects of 
climate change, desertification, flooding and resource depletion, among others. Besides the 
questions that environmentalist movements raised on the morality of such human and 
organizational impact on the natural environment and the losses of intrinsic value embedded 
in it, a number of economists have argued that these effects are also depleting the very 
resources our economies are dependent upon (Costanza et al.,  1997; Common & Stagl, 2005; 
World Resources Institute, 2005; Stern, 2007).  
Throughout the last century, both economists and sociologists have produced 
explanations that inform why firms have not responded en masse by voluntarily engaging in 
processes that curb the negative byproducts of their activities. While economists argue that 
internalizing environmental effects may put firms in a competitively disadvantageous position 
due to additional costs that other, less caring, firms do not have (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960; 
Hardin, 1968), sociologists argue that the voluntary adoption of environmental effects 
conflicts with the progressionist thinking and anthropocentric paradigm that has characterized 
Western societies since the Enlightenment (Gladwin, Kennely, & Krause, 1995; Purser, Park, 
& Montuori, 1995; Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999). In other words, firms that adopt proactive 
environmental strategies – going beyond legal expectations in taking the effects of their 
activities on the natural environment into account – will experience difficulties of both 
economic and social nature. As a result, such proactive environmental strategies have 
remained the exception rather than the rule.  
Given these substantial hurdles associated with proactive environmental strategies, a 
large portion of the scholarly “organizations and the natural environment” conversation has 
been dedicated to investigating the impact of social and environmental strategies on economic 
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performance. Despite some theoretical arguments that there are many positive effects related 
to such strategies (Shrivastava, 1995a; Porter & van der Linde, 1995b), reviews on the 
empirical link between proactive environmental strategies (PES) and financial performance 
have found positive, negative and inconclusive results (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Wagner, 
Schaltegger, & Wehrmeyer, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Gonzalez-Benito & 
Gonzalez-Benito, 2005c). A number of scholars have therefore introduced mediating and 
moderating variables that further refine the relationship between proactive environmental 
strategies and economic performance. For example, contributions in the tradition of the 
resource-based view of the firm have empirically proven that certain organizational 
capabilities and resources will aid in making a proactive environmental strategy a profitable 
endeavor (Hart, 1995; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Marcus & Geffen, 1998; Judge & 
Douglas, 1998; Sharma, 2000; Christmann, 2000; Chan, 2005; Bansal, 2005). Other studies 
have taken a more contextual perspective and have demonstrated how the firm’s institutional 
(Hoffman, 1999; Bansal, 2005; Clemens & Douglas, 2005) and external resource environment 
characteristics (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003) influence a firm’s 
willingness and ability to engage in PES. Taken together, these studies uncover that 
successful implementation of PES will involve a complex interplay of internal and external 
resource processes, as well as institutional influences. 
Despite the interesting findings this literature has thus provided, it has tended to focus 
on larger enterprises only. However, as small and medium-sized businesses easily surpass 
larger businesses in demographic terms, economic value added and employment (Observatory 
of European SMEs, 2003), their inclusion in the quest for a sustainable natural environment is 
paramount. Although no exact figures seem to exist, the cumulative impact of smaller firms 
on the natural environment is estimated to be bigger than the cumulative impact of larger 
firms (Hillary, 2000a). This makes the lack of specific research on smaller firms all the more 
perplexing. In addition, several empirical phenomena indicate that an inquiry into the 
specifics of small business environmental strategy is needed. First, empirical studies on 
proactive environmental strategies have mostly found a positive relation between firm size 
and the extent to which firms adopt and successfully implement such strategies (Aragon-
Correa, 1998; Judge & Douglas, 1998; Observatory of European SMEs, 2002; Chan, 2005; 
Bansal, 2005; Vives, 2006; Elsayed, 2006). Even if the same models apply in both small and 
large business contexts, such as recently found by Aragon-Correa and colleagues (2008), this 
empirical material invites a more detailed investigation into the reasons why they fail to be 
implemented among most small businesses. Second, the small business literature has 
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indicated before that large business models will not necessarily apply to smaller businesses 
(Dandridge, 1979; Welsh & White, 1981). A smaller firm size seems to impose specific 
constraints and challenges that restrain proactive environmental strategies. The research 
reviewed in this dissertation indicates that a lack of time, knowledge, (financial) resources and 
power are most commonly mentioned as barriers (Jenkins, 2004; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; 
Elsayed, 2006). Yet despite these constraints, there is ample anecdotal evidence of some very 
innovative and proactive small ventures around the globe (UNIDO, 2002; European 
Commission, 2003c), which are championing proactive environmental strategies even 
compared to larger businesses. Through “environmental entrepreneurship”, they have 
captured opportunities in environmental market failures, the exploitation of which alleviates 
the market failure and contributes to reducing the environmental degradation (Dean & 
McMullen, 2007). How small businesses overcome the constraints that discourage them to 
adopt PES and be successful in their implementation, however, is largely unexplored terrain 
and invites further research.  
Given the dearth of theoretical development on small business proactive 
environmental strategies, this dissertation presents an empirical attempt to answering the 
question “how can small businesses successfully implement proactive environmental 
strategies?”  
1.2. Structure of this thesis 
To provide the reader with a roadmap on the research covered in this book, this 
paragraph foreshadows the remaining chapters. In total, this dissertation consists of seven 
chapters which are structured in four parts. Figure 1.1 provides a visual overview of how the 
eight chapters are interrelated. 
In Part I, containing the current chapter, I introduce the general research question that 
has guided me throughout this dissertation and present the empirical context in which the 
research was executed.  
Part II, consisting of chapters 2 and 3, provides a theoretical background for the 
research in this dissertation. To this purpose, chapter 2 introduces the reader to a theoretical 
delineation of each of the semantic building blocks of “proactive environmental strategy in 
small business”. Next, the goal of chapter 3 is to develop specific research questions that are 
grounded in a state-of-the-art analysis of the general proactive environmental strategy 
literature. To this purpose, I first outline the methodology used in the review and then move to 
a thematic description of the antecedents and the consequences of PES that have been found 
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in the literature.  Using my observations of remaining questions and research gaps, I then 
formulate three research questions:  
RQ1: What is the impact of firm size on the adoption of PES in smaller firms? 
RQ2: What are the resources and capabilities associated with successful PES 
execution in small businesses? 
RQ3: How can small business be successful in PES when the conditions are against 
having one? 
Figure 1.1 - Overview of this dissertation 
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Part III, consisting of chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, represents the main body of this 
dissertation, as each chapter represents part of the exercise to provide answers to the 
aforementioned research questions. First, chapter 4 draws on an extensive literature review to 
explore the inconsistent empirical findings on the relationship between small firm size and the 
adoption of proactive environmental strategies. Given the scarce literature on small business 
proactive environmental strategies, the literature review is expanded to a broader, yet still 
limited, literature of social responsibility (including the natural environment) in small 
businesses. Using a generic framework of contextual influences on businesses, the literature is 
then reviewed in four parts: (1) issue characteristics, (2) personal characteristics, (3) 
organizational characteristics, and (4) context characteristics. The chapter concludes with the 
idea that the smaller size does incur a number of constraints that inhibit smaller firms to 
engage in social responsibility strategies, yet that a number of conditions can mitigate these 
constraints. In particular, our review hinted at the potential of capabilities within and across 
the boundaries of the firm to bring a more dynamic perspective of small business proactive 
environmental strategies. 
 Next, the cluster of chapters 5, 6 and 7 takes the reader to the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture industry, where the empirical data of this dissertation were collected. To this 
purpose, chapter 5 first presents an overview of the research design, and the procedures that 
were followed in collecting and analyzing the data. Subsequently, the particular research 
setting of the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector is provided as a contextual introduction 
to chapters 6 and 7, which report the actual findings of two empirical studies on the same data 
set.  
Chapter 6 builds further on the suggestion of chapter 4 to look at the capabilities that 
facilitate small businesses to engage in proactive environmental strategies, despite conditions 
that make a successful implementation of these strategies run “against all odds”. As such, it 
was designed to provide answers to research questions 2 and 3. After connecting the 
methodology as described in chapter 5 with the specific research question at hand, we 
describe munification and organicity as the two composite dynamic capabilities that explained 
the realization of PES in our firms. Subsequently, we discuss our findings and the 
implications for the resource-based perspectives that predict small size to be incompatible 
with PES.  
Using the same empirical data, chapter 7 further explores an insight that emerged in 
chapter 6. Since all the firms in our sample had the intention to engage in proactive 
environmental strategies, they assumed a strategy that ran counter to the institutionalized 
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practices and expectation in their industry. Whereas proactive environmental strategies are 
generally perceived as conforming to institutional pressures, they were an act of non-
conformity in the Belgian ornamental horticulture. Yet the current literature on institutional 
non-conformity is inconsistent in explaining how such processes can be possible in small 
businesses. After our explanation of this theoretical inconsistency and reiterating some 
methodological issues for the paper, we explore and discuss the underlying mechanisms that 
help to better understand how the successful institutional non-conformity came about in these 
firms. More specifically, our findings include (1) the interaction scope with the organizational 
field, (2) the cognitive approach towards institutional non-conformity, and (3) the 
organizational conduciveness to institutional non-conformity. Subsequently, we discuss the 
implications of our findings for institutional theory, the resource-based view of the firm and 
the organizations and the natural environment literature. 
 Finally, chapter 8, as the only chapter in part IV, presents the general conclusions of 
this dissertation. First, I discuss how the findings from part III contribute to answering the 
research questions as presented in chapter 3. Next, I discuss how the research design limits the 
extent to which our findings are transferrable to other contexts. In conclusion, I present some 
avenues for future research based on the new questions that this dissertation uncovered. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Proactive Environmental Strategies in 
Small Businesses: Definitions and 
Theoretical Framing 
 
 
 
 
 
“There is perhaps no process in organizations  
that is more demanding of human cognition than strategy formation.  
Every strategy-maker faces an impossible overload of information (much of it soft);  
as a result he can have no optimal process to follow 
.  
The researcher or management scientist  
who seeks to understand strategy formation  
is up against the same cognitive constraints,  
but with poorer access to the necessary information. 
 
 Thus he faces no easy task.  
But proceed he must, for the old prescriptions are not working 
 and new ones are badly needed.  
 
These will only grow out of a sophisticated understanding 
 of the rich reality of strategy formation,  
and that will require an open mind,  
a recognition of how little we really know,  
and intensive, painstaking research.” 
(Henry Mintzberg) 
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2. Proactive Environmental Strategies in Small Business: Definitions and 
Theoretical Framing 
2.1. Introduction 
The surge of interest of business and strategy scholars in the natural environment 
followed the general growth of attention in sustainable development after the World Council 
for Economic Development published its famous report “Our Common Future” in 1987 
(WCED, 1987). After decades of growing public debates on the negative social and 
environmental impacts of business, “Our Common Future” presented a landmark reflection 
and shift in thinking about business and society issues (Schmidheiny, 1992; Hart, 1995; 
Gladwin et al., 1995; Shrivastava, 1995b). First, the Council formulated a definition that has 
become the standard citation in almost every work that has been written on sustainable 
development since: 
“Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs.” 
(WCED, 1987: 43)  
Although this definition has been further scrutinized and debated (Gladwin et al., 1995), it 
made clear that if the world was to assume a guiding principle for the future, it should care for 
the prosperity of all people today (implying the eradication of hunger, poverty, illiteracy, etc), 
but also for generations to come (implying a care for nature and prudence on the use of 
resources). Second, “Our Common Future” was a moral call for a shared responsibility by 
everyone in society, including business. Although businesses were part of the problem, they 
were equally invited as partners in the process of finding a solution (Schmidheiny, 1992; 
Bilimoria, Cooperrider, Kaczmarski, Khalsa, Srivastva, & Upadhayaya, 1995). Yet, 
Brundtland and her colleagues also warned that such a shared responsibility would involve 
tough choices and trade-offs: 
“In the end, sustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a 
process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, 
the orientation of technical development, and institutional change are made consistent 
with future as well as present needs. We do not pretend that the process is easy or 
straightforward. Painful choices have to be made.”(WCED, 1987: 15) 
In order to tackle these changes, the Brundlandt report, as “Our Common Future” is 
often referred to, incited a number of new initiatives that brought businesses together to 
reflect on their impact on the environment. The World Business Council on Sustainable 
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Development, the UN Global Compact, the Caux Round Table and the Equator Principles are 
but some of the initiatives that have been taken in this perspective. In the academic world, 
several new journals (Journal of Cleaner Production, Business Strategy and the Environment, 
Journal of Industrial Ecology, Business & Society, Journal of Environmental Management, 
Organization & Environment, Business & Society, etc) and academic groups (the Social 
Issues in Management and the Organizations and the Natural Environment divisions in the 
Academy of Management, the Greening of Industry Network, etc) were founded or grew in 
membership, reflecting the specific new research that was deemed needed (Bansal & Gao, 
2006; Etzion, 2007).  
The existence of these institutions indicates that the business academics community 
considers the natural environment a legitimate separate stream of research. But why would 
this be the case? What is the difference between a proactive environmental strategy and any 
other strategy (e.g. innovation, growth, cost leadership, differentiation, or internationalization) 
that has been researched? In order to present an answer to this question, we will explore each 
of the semantic building blocks of “proactive environmental strategy in small businesses”. In 
this overview, my goal is to delineate the conversation to which this dissertation wishes to 
contribute, and to present my understanding of the boundaries of the literature on proactive 
environmental strategies. I will do so by first presenting “strategy”, as it has been defined in 
several streams of the literature. I will then continue by summarizing a number of arguments 
that justify a specific inquiry of the strategy domain into issues related to the natural 
environment. Next, I will discuss the different postures that the literature has identified with 
regards to environmental strategies. I conclude with a delineation of “small businesses” and 
highlight the most important characteristics that justify small businesses as a separate domain 
of research. 
2.2. “Strategy” 
The fundamental interest of strategic management research and theory is the question 
how a firm (or any other organization) achieves sustained superior performance (Powell, 
2001). Over time, researchers in “Business Policy and Strategy”, “Organization Theory” and 
the more fundamental sciences that feed into Business Administration research (economics, 
psychology, sociology and ecology) have formulated theories that provide different 
perspectives on the antecedents and consequences of strategy, the process moderators and 
mediators between the constructs involved and “sustained superior performance” (Agarwal & 
Hoetker, 2007). In addition, each of these constructs has been parameterized for theoretical 
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and empirical purposes in different ways, increasing the perspectives that exist in strategic 
management research. Mintzberg and Lampel find such eclecticism in the definitions of 
strategy welcoming and attribute it to the various attempts of strategy scholars to capture a 
part of the whole ‘beast’: “each of us, in trying to cope with the mysteries of the beast, grabs 
hold of some part or other”, yet “much of this writing and advising has been decidedly 
dysfunctional, simply because managers have no choice but to cope with the entire beast.” 
(1999: 21).  
In order to cope with such diverse theories, a number of scholars have provided 
synthesizing meta-frameworks to make sense of the respective assumptions these theories rely 
on, what part of strategy they are focused on, and what their main conclusions are 
(Whittington, 1993; Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999; Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999). 
Whittington (1993) distinguished between four approaches to strategy, in which each 
approach was characterized by a different conception of the human potential to think 
rationally and act effectively. Whittington conceived the evolution of strategy approaches as 
one that moved from a ‘homo economicus’ planning perspective with success the result of 
internal decisions and visions, to a more systemic perspective that viewed strategy as an 
organic process that included interaction with the external social and market environment. 
Hoskisson et al. (1999) presented a classification of strategy theories along a set of ‘swings of 
a pendulum’ over time. In their view, theories have swung back and forth between a focus on 
the internal characteristics of the firm on the one hand (especially the resource-based view of 
the firm), and attention directed externally towards the industry and societal structures on the 
other (especially the industrial organization literature). In the middle, they position the 
‘organizational economics’ literature, which has been more concerned with “devising 
appropriate governance mechanisms or contracts to help reduce transaction or agency costs” 
(Hoskisson et al., 1999: 444), the internal and external positions have been mostly interested 
with the performance of the firm. Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) distinguished ten ‘schools’ of 
strategy formation. Portrayed as a tree, they saw the roots as the basic disciplines (economics, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc), and the stem ramifying into a branch of 
prescriptive schools on the one hand, and the descriptive schools on the other. The ten schools 
differed, among other things, in the way they occupied a position on two dimensions: (1) 
whether they viewed the external world as comprehensive and controllable versus 
unpredictable and confusing, and (2) whether they saw internal processes as rational versus 
natural.  
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Throughout these classifications, the internal versus external focus, and the ongoing 
quest to bridge them, is a recurring distinguishing feature between strategy theories. 
Following these common perspectives, I choose to present a short overview of the different 
perspectives on strategy using this internal vs. external dichotomy and the attempts to bridge 
both perspectives. In the following subsections, I briefly summarize the prevailing 
perspectives in each of these threads. 
 
2.2.1. Outside-In Perspectives of Strategic Management 
 The Outside-In Perspectives of Strategic Management share a recurring focus on the 
external environment as the dominant factor in explaining sustained superior performance. 
They share the assumption that “the existing internal structure, strategy, and success of an 
organization is heavily influenced by the environmental forces in which it operates and with 
which it interacts and competes” (Jaffee, 2001: 209). As a result, outside-in perspectives are 
sometimes criticized for their overemphasis on the external environment in shaping and 
molding of organizations and their behaviors. It is interesting to observe that the constructs in 
these theories are often defined using a very aggressive language: “competitive advantage”, 
“rivals”, “power” or “pressure”. The perspectives differ, however, in their interpretation of 
both the context and the content of sustained superior performance, reflecting the different 
assumptions on which they are founded. Rather than seeing this diversity in assumptions as a 
“battle of truths”, the combination of perspectives offers a rich literature one can draw from to 
be informed about achieving particular states of excellence. 
2.2.1.1. Industrial organization economics 
In the “industrial organization economics” (I/O) literature, the performance of a firm 
follows a “structure-conduct-performance” logic (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1956; Porter, 1980; 
Porter, 1985). Essentially, the structural properties of the industry define what the appropriate 
conduct of the firm should be, and how this will result in firm performance. Michael Porter 
synthesized the structural properties of the industry in his “five forces model” (Porter, 1980; 
Porter, 2008). Depending on (1) the competitive rivalry in the market, (2) the bargaining 
power of suppliers and (3) the bargaining power of customers, (4) the threat of new entrants 
and (5) the threat of substitutes, firms must find a unique position in the market. Strategy is 
thus a choice: “the essence of strategy is in the activities – choosing to perform activities 
differently or to perform different activities than rivals” (Porter, 1996: 64). According to 
Porter, this choice generally has to be made between three generic strategies: cost leadership 
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(being the cheapest in the market as a result of structural cost advantages over competition), 
differentiation (creating superior value for customers) or focus strategy (cater to a specific 
segment in the market by offering a customized value proposition). These strategies determine 
the conduct the firm has to follow, in terms of price, advertising, capacity and quality 
decisions (Porter, 1981). In the I/O literature, strategy is thus essentially determined by the 
industry in which the firm operates, leaving the manager a set of options to choose from to 
respond to the challenges of the industry.  
Although the influence of the industrial organization literature is enormous, Porter’s 
view on the importance of industry in explaining organizational performance has not been 
without criticism. Whereas the importance of industry on organizational performance has 
been confirmed by Schmalensee (1985) and McGahan and Porter (1997), other studies by 
Rumelt (1991) and Roquebert et al. (1996) found that business specificities are more 
important than industry as explanatory factors of firm profitability. These studies have further 
spurred the debate on whether the perspective of the industrial organization literature was not 
too deterministic in its formulation (Bourgeois, 1984) and left an invitation for further 
research. Another critique on the industrial organization literature is in its normative 
conception of competitive advantage. In I/O, the source of competitive advantage can be 
found in the monopolistic, above normal returns that the firm is able to capture through its 
unique and protected product/market position (Mason, 1939). Interestingly, whereas the early 
I/O literature warned for the detrimental social welfare implications of monopolistic rents, the 
later literature turned this analysis around to a normative theory of organizational strategy in 
which above normal organizational rents could be achieved at the expense of social welfare, 
which was left out of the model (Barney, 1986; Barney, 1991). In other words, such a view 
implies that competitive advantage can only be achieved at the detriment of social welfare. 
Taken together, the I/O literature has informed the strategy literature especially in the 
way strategists must analyze and deal with their external market environment. In this 
perspective, Porter has reaffirmed his belief that the role of strategy is to find, and maintain, 
an immaculate position relative to the structural forces in its industry: “a company can 
outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference that it can preserve.” (Porter, 1996: 62). 
2.2.1.2. Contingency Theory 
 Although it has been criticized for lacking clarity, ambiguous statements and 
essentially not conveying a theoretical message (Schoonhoven, 1981), the basic premise of 
contingency theory is one of the most prevailing and recurrent messages in strategic 
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management research. In contingency theory, organizational performance is a result of the 
proper alignment of internal organizational design in response to external context variables 
(Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). The call for theoretical 
statements that take the impact of environmental contingencies into account is still present 
today (Oliver, 1997; Priem & Butler, 2001; Zahra, 2007; Tsui, 2007).  
In its most condensed form, contingency theory states that there is no universal, one-
size-fits-all, best way to manage. Rather a strategist must seek to “fit” the design of his 
organization and its subsystems with the environment in which it operates. In other words, the 
right response of the organization, in terms of design variables, culture, objectives, etc, to the 
particular state of the context in which the organization operates will yield superior 
performance. Determinants of the circumstances in which the firm operates include 
munificence (the abundance of resources in the environment that facilitate growth), dynamism 
(the turbulence and instability of the environment) and complexity (the number and variety of 
factors that influence the environment) (Dess & Beard, 1984). Depending on the variance of 
these influences, firms must maintain either mechanistic or organic organization types (Burns 
& Stalker, 1961), and formal or informal organizational structures (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967).  
Similar to most outside-in theories, however, contingency theory has a rather 
mechanistic and deterministic conception of management, which leaves little discretion to 
management to influence the external environment (Bourgeois, 1984). Nevertheless, the 
influence of contingency theory is still present today, given that it has “laid the groundwork 
for an approach to organizational theory that views organizations and their various 
subsystems as adaptive entities in relation to their environment.” (Jaffee, 2001: 214). This 
perspective is even present in some of the inside-out perspectives, such as the dynamic 
capabilities perspective, which I will discuss below. 
2.2.1.3. Resource Dependence Theory 
Whereas the I/O literature focuses on the positioning of an organization relative to the 
structural forces in an industry, and Contingency Theory on the adaptation of the 
organization’s internal structures to cope with the external context, the Resource Dependence 
Theory (RDT) is mainly interested in the management of the interdependencies organizations 
have with their surroundings.  
In the introduction to a revised version of the seminal work in Resource Dependence 
Theory, “The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective” 
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(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), Jeffrey Pfeffer summarized the core of the RDT in three major 
themes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). First, he argued that the central theme in the resource 
dependence theory is that the social context in which organizations operated, mattered: “The 
idea was that if you wanted to understand organizational choices and actions, one place to 
begin this inquiry was to focus less on internal dynamics and the values and beliefs of leaders 
and more on the situations in which organizations were located and the pressures and 
constraints that emanated from those situations.” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). An important 
implication for this is the decreasing impact of managers and individuals in explaining 
organizational performance and to put much more emphasis on the organization as an 
economic actor embedded in networks of interdependencies and social relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985).  
The second theme featured the construct of “power” as a critical ingredient for 
organizational survival or success. Underlying the RDT, and largely influenced by the 
contemporary discussions in the general economics literature, are the strategic influences that 
come with power asymmetries between organizations. Power asymmetries may lead 
organizations to hold-up situations (Williamson, 1975) and opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson, 1985). Due to the particularities of a firm’s interdependencies and their 
embeddedness in the social space, some organizations acquire more powers than others. 
The third theme is the role of organizational strategy. Given the organizational 
dependencies on the external environment, the role of the strategist is to seek opportunities to 
diminish the dependencies on other organizations by coopting sources of constraint (Selznick, 
1949) and to negotiate more favorable dependencies. In this sense, the RDT is one of the few 
outside-in perspectives that allows for managerial discretion in the management of externally 
imposed constraints (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Oliver, 1991; Jaffee, 2001): “rather than 
viewing organizations as largely passive or impotent in relation to environmental forces, 
resource dependence theory emphasizes proactive strategies that can be pursued to deal with 
environmental constraints” (Jaffee, 2001: 218). 
Taken together, the role of strategy according to the RDT is to work towards two 
related objectives: (1) to acquire control over critical resources to minimize the organizational 
dependence on external actors, and (2) to ensure a control over resources that further a 
dependency of the external environment on the focal firm.  
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2.2.1.4. Institutional theory 
Whereas the RDT already expanded the influence of the social context on 
organizational performance, institutional theory further emphasized the notion that 
organizational success and survival is essentially determined by the prevailing institutional 
forces in which firms operate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Rather 
than focussing on the question how organizations differ from one another, DiMaggio and 
Powell were interested in the question “why there is such startling homogeneity of 
organizational forms and practices” (1983: 148). Institutional theorists are unsatisfied with 
the arguments from economic theories that homogeneity in markets and organizations is the 
result of rational choices of individuals that are guided by economic pressures for efficiency. 
Many organizations and individuals, they argue, develop and continue practices and 
organizational forms that are clearly at odds with the prescriptions of economic optimization. 
Instead, organizational behaviour is the result of choices that are made within a range of 
possibilities that are determined by habits, traditions, taken-for-granted and cultural 
assumptions, but also by legally or other normatively  imposed restrictions (product standards, 
occupational safety, etc). “A key institutional insight is that individual preferences and 
choices cannot be understood apart from the larger cultural setting and historical period in 
which they are embedded.” (Powell, 1991) 
Institutional theory posits that organizations will seek social approval or “legitimacy” 
(Suchman, 1995) through conformity with the ‘isomorphic’ pressures of social prescriptions 
and expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997; Dacin, 
1997; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), especially in uncertain and unstable situations. They do so, 
because: 
“Organizational success depends on factors other than efficient coordination and 
control of productive activities. Independent of their productive efficiency, 
organizations which exist in highly elaborated institutional environments and succeed 
in becoming isomorphic with these environments gain the legitimacy and resources 
needed to survive” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 352).  
New firms in search for resources, for example, depend a great deal on the perceived and 
projected legitimacy that they have relative to the institutional expectations in which they 
operate (Dacin, 1997; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Davidsson, Hunter, & Klofsten, 2006). The 
motives for organizational and individual behaviour thus “extend beyond economic 
optimization to social justification and social obligation” (Oliver, 1997: 699). 
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 Institutions rest on three pillars (Scott, 2001): a regulative, a normative and a cognitive 
pillar. Each of these pillars is the result of an institutional force (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 
that shapes the expectations and norms of each pillar. Coercive pressures (norms and rules 
that are enforced through legal means and sanctions) result in regulative institutions; 
normative pressures (the norms and social obligations that come with membership of a 
community) result in normative institutions; and mimetic forces (the norms and taken-for-
granted assumptions that are engrained in habitual interactions and behaviours) result in 
cognitive institutions. Alternative denominations of these categories have also been used in 
the literature. Spender, for example, formulated the central role of strategic management as 
dealing with uncertainty. He further argued that “industry recipes” – “the shared knowledge-
base that those socialized into an industry take as familiar professional common sense” 
(Spender, 1989: 66) – are important elements that managers tap into to resolve the uncertainty 
in their environment. In DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) framework, these “industry recipes” 
would be equivalent to the cognitive institutions that firms use to deal with environmental 
uncertainty. Similarly, Prahalad and Bettis’s coined the concept of the “dominant logic” as “a 
mind set or world view or conceptualization of the business and the administrative tools to 
accomplish goals and make decisions in that business.” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986: 491). 
Dominant logics, like cognitive institutions, are the result of people developing a shared 
understanding of the world, by interacting with each other over an extended period of time. 
Such shared understanding not only drive people’s interpretations, but are enacted as a shared 
reality as well.  
 Despite the powerful message and new insights from the institutional theory as 
developed by DiMaggio and Powell, and Meyer and Rowan, this theory has been criticized 
for the fact that “much of the imagery of institutional theory portrays organizations too 
passively and depicts environments as overly constraining” (Powell, 1991). From the end of 
the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s, much of the theoretical (Oliver, 1991; Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; Seo & Creed, 2002) and empirical (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; 
Brint & Karabel, 1991; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Seo & Creed, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006) work within institutional theory has increasingly embraced more latitude in the way 
organizations can go about their institutional context. Especially when the institutional 
context results in contradictory expectations (Oliver, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002), or when it 
threatens the very survival of the organization (Sherer & Lee, 2002; Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002), will organizations take action beyond what is considered institutionally 
legitimate. Depending on the context in which an organization operates, it may develop a 
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range of strategies that range from conformity all the way to the manipulation of the 
institutions (Oliver, 1991). Recently, these latter strategies have been getting specific 
attention, because they represent a “paradox of embeddedness” (Seo & Creed, 2002): how can 
organizations change the very institutions that guide their thinking about the options they can 
take? 
The implication of institutional theory for strategy is that organizational survival and 
success depends on the legitimacy a firm can develop in its context. Besides carefully 
assessing the organizational efficiency, strategists should take the institutional expectations of 
the environments in which they operate into account. Yet, depending on a number of 
contextual factors, a number of strategies can be developed that may have as their goal to 
influence the institutional context.  
2.2.1.5. Population Ecology  
 Largely in line with many of the insights of institutional theory and increasingly 
intertwined with it (Dacin, 1997), the Population Ecology derives its theoretical assertions 
from the metaphorical comparison of organizational populations with those of biological 
populations. Importantly, the level of analysis in population ecology is not at the level of 
individual organizations, but at the level of a population, a collection of organizations in an 
industry (Jaffee, 2001). Similarly, the analytical focus of the ‘outside world’ is not on the 
entire environment, but on a population’s ecological niche: the resource pool that a population 
draws from and for which its members compete (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006). As a result, the 
Population Ecology perspective is informative on what strategies are best suited for 
populations in a particular environment (Jaffee, 2001). 
Population ecologists are especially interested in organizational ‘birth’ and ‘death’: 
organizational success can therefore be measures by its survival or not. The central 
conception of population ecologists is that performance is the result of a system of variation, 
selection, and retention of practices developed by organizations that compete for scarce 
resources for their survival (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Whereas 
some variety may exist in strategies and organizational forms within a population, resource 
scarcities will start a selection process that favors the survival of the best suited organizations 
and the ‘death’ of others. Markets thereby follow a logic that is akin to the Darwinian logic of 
natural systems. In order to increase the possibility of survival, however, organizations may 
‘mimic’ the strategies and organizational forms of successful organizations, hoping to be 
retained by the population as a result. 
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The role of strategy in all this is a much debated topic within Population Ecology. An 
important notion for population ecologists is “structural inertia” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Hannan and Freeman take the premise that “individual organizations are subject to strong 
inertial forces, that is, that they seldom succeeded in making radical changes in strategy and 
structure in the face of environmental threats” (1984: 149). The possibilities to engage in 
radical changes are small because of “sunk costs in plant, equipment and personnel, the 
dynamics of political coalitions and the tendency for precedents to become normative 
standards (…) legal and other barriers to entry and exit from realms of activity” (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984: 149). Organizational survival is thus entirely the result of environmental 
selection processes, which are hard to adapt to given the structural inertia of many 
organizations. Taken as such, strategy is a completely irrelevant discipline, given that 
organizational survival is “largely a matter of luck” (Kaufman, 1985). 
2.2.2. Inside-Out Perspectives of Strategic Management  
 Contrasting with the focus of the aforementioned outside-in perspectives, are the 
inside-out perspectives of strategic management. Instead of focusing on the external 
environment as the source of performance, these latter perspectives emphasize features 
internal to the firm in explaining organizational performance. Interestingly, the focus here is 
on exploiting the heterogeneity of firms and its opportunities, drawing on concepts of 
“comparative advantage”, “learning” and “rejuvenation”.  
2.2.2.1. Upper echelon theory 
 The central theme in the upper echelon theory is that “organizational outcomes – both 
strategies and effectiveness – are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive biases of 
powerful actors in the organization” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 193). The way in which the 
environment is perceived by the firm’s decision makers and how they act upon their insights 
are considered more important than the environment itself. Especially, the complexity, 
ambiguity and the information overload that decision-makers get from their environment 
makes managers guide their organizations based on their personal frames of reference, 
experience in different functions and careers, education, socioeconomic roots and other 
personal characteristics (March & Simon, 1958). As such, the upper echelon theory resonates 
with the findings of behavioral decision-making theories that individuals are constrained by 
their “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1982): decision-makers are limited in the amount of 
information they can process in complex settings and therefore make strategic choices based 
on their cognitions and values. As a result, organizations are a reflection of their top managers 
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(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and organizational competition becomes a competition between 
the sensemaking processes of their decision-makers (Daft & Weick, 1984). In this 
perspective, upper echelon theory and its associated theories of strategic leadership 
(Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982) and strategic choice (Child, 1972) have laid bare the 
necessity of strategy to incorporate a “missionary zeal”, to infuse the organization with 
meaning and direction which will guide future decision-making processes based on the 
strategy. 
 Although upper echelon theory was part of the rediscovery of the importance of 
managerial “free will” (Bourgeois, 1984) and has reemphasized the role of strategic 
management in organizational performance, it has acknowledged the constraints that both 
organizational and environmental factors may nevertheless impose. An important concept in 
this context is “managerial discretion” (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987): the latitude of 
decision spectrum the manager has within the organization and is allowed in the environment, 
but also the degree to which the chief executive is able to develop and envision multiple 
courses of action. As such, managerial discretion has the potential to bridge the theoretical 
explanations of organizational performance as an interplay between the cognitive and 
personal characteristics of strategists and the context in which they operate.  
 
2.2.2.2. The Resource-Based View 
Reacting to the somewhat deterministic role attributed to the industry structure in the 
“industrial organization economics” (I/O) and building on the work of Edith Penrose (1959), 
the “resource-based view” (RBV) redirected the strategist’s orientation to the inside of the 
organization and stressed the importance of an organization’s resources and capabilities in 
yielding competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; 
Grant, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993). Thus, whereas the Resource 
Dependence Theory was influenced by the market failures stemming from power 
asymmetries, the basis of the Resource Based View lies with incomplete factor markets 
(Peteraf, 1993). Here, sustained superior performance draws from firm-specific resources and 
capabilities that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993), the so called “VRIN”-conditions 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  
In contrast to assumption in the “industrial organization economics” literature that 
resources are distributed homogenously among firms, resources and capabilities are 
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distributed heterogeneously among firms. Resources include both tangible and intangible 
assets and capabilities that the organization uses to achieve its goals (Grant, 1991). 
Capabilities are generally defined as “the firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in 
combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end” (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993: 35). The VRIN conditions are essentially met in the presence of incomplete factor 
markets (Peteraf, 1993), but also when the acquiescence of resources or capabilities is path 
dependent (e.g. tacit knowledge) (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  
Although the RBV is considered one of the most important theoretical frameworks in 
the strategic management literature, it has been criticized for its overly static description of 
strategy, its predominant focus on internal resources and capabilities and its tautologic nature 
(Priem & Butler, 2001; Powell, 2001). The latter criticism becomes clear that, in a way, the 
resource-based view suggests that the source of competitive advantage can be brought back to 
those resources and capabilities that give the firm competitive advantages. From a theoretical 
point of view, such a statement makes the theory redundant, since it results in analytic 
propositions, i.e. statements that cannot be falsified.  
The role of strategy here is not in seeking monopolistic rents through its positioning in 
the market and a deliberate restriction of output, but rather to look for Ricardian rents from its 
unique access to or possession of resources (Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Priem & Butler, 
2001): to identify the best use of the firm’s resources and capabilities so that they generate a 
return that is superior relative to the returns other firms may get from them.  
2.2.2.3. Dynamic capabilities 
Emerging from the RBV and tackling the criticism that it was too static in its 
explanations about performance (Priem & Butler, 2001), the “dynamic capabilities” approach 
conveys a more dynamic approach to the effect of internal characteristics of the organization 
on sustained competitive advantage: “overall, dynamic capabilities are best conceptualized as 
tools that manipulate resource configurations” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 1118). Since the 
RBV did not explain where resources and capabilities come from, nor explained that they can 
become obsolete due to changes in the context of an organization (Priem & Butler, 2001), the 
dynamic capabilities literature suggested that there was more than just the resources to explain 
superior performance (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Whereas 
the dynamic capabilities perspective agrees that the resource configuration of a firm 
ultimately determines its performance (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), dynamic capabilities are 
needed to adjust this resource base in the event of changing circumstances. Strategy then 
Chapter 2 
 
25 
becomes constant process of altering the resource base “sooner, more astutely, or more 
fortuitously than the competition to create resource configurations that have that 
[competitive] advantage”. As such, sustained superior performance is appropriated to the 
Schumpeterian rents that come with the constant renewal of the firm’s practices to cope with 
the changes in the environment (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Powell, 
2001).  
The dynamic capabilities perspective thus builds on the emphasis in the RBV on 
organizational capabilities as the explanatory factor for sustained superior performance, but 
refines the theory by replacing static capabilities with more dynamic versions of capabilities. 
In contrast to the RBV, however, which maintains that superior performance comes from 
heterogeneous resources configurations across firms, dynamic capabilities have 
commonalities across firms. Although they may be manifested differently depending on the 
particular circumstances the firm is in, the same dynamic capability may be present in 
different firms. As such, the dynamic capabilities perspective presents a first step in 
combining the interaction between the environment outside the firm and the configuration 
inside the firm in explaining organizational performance. More elaborated perspectives of this 
kind, however, are the focus of the next subsections. 
 
2.2.3. Synthesizing Perspectives of Strategic Management 
 Given that some of the aforementioned theories on strategy assume quite different 
sources of sustained superior performance, a number of scholars have attempted to reconcile 
these differences. The product of these efforts are interesting overarching theoretical 
frameworks that offer more comprehensive worldviews, where one theory is used to inspire 
for solutions on the inconsistencies of the other.  
2.2.3.1. Grass-roots models of strategy formation 
A number of descriptive accounts of organizational strategy have been developed over 
time that reject a strategy as the sole result of a deliberate and rational process (Mintzberg, 
1978; Mintzberg & Mchugh, 1985). Whereas the majority of the inquiry and theory-building 
in both inside-out and outside-in strategy research has tended to follow a normative and 
causal logic, other organizational theorists have given more descriptive accounts of strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Sarasvathy, 2001; Farjoun, 2002). These authors mostly draw Mintzberg’s 
work in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in which he rejected the idea that strategies are the 
result of a deliberate process, but emerge as an interplay between a planning process and its 
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testing in the environment instead (Mintzberg, 1978). Since the context of most organizations 
is in permanent flux, and the inability of people to process all the information that it receives 
(Simon, 1982), strategies will often be infused by unforeseen influences and processes. As 
such, realized strategies are the result of both intended and emergent strategies. Yet Mintzberg 
and McHugh were not entirely pessimistic about the way this influenced the job of the 
strategist: 
“The inability to dictate fundamental strategic direction – establish target markets, 
select products or services – does not, of course, preclude management from trying to 
influence it. Managers can, for example seek to define broad boundaries around what 
is done (…). They can also exercise their influence on the emerging patterns, 
encouraging or discouraging the ones in which they find promise or danger.” 
(Mintzberg & Mchugh, 1985: 192-193).  
Along those lines, a number of scholars have progressively embedded these less deliberate 
types of strategy processes in their theoretical frameworks (Sarasvathy, 2001; Farjoun, 2002). 
What seems most important for strategy in these grass-roots models of strategy is the ‘vision’ 
or ‘goal’ that guides strategies in every day life. By defining (or borrowing) a strategy as the 
basic principles of purpose, a vision, an “ideology or missionary zeal” (Mintzberg & Mchugh, 
1985: 193), strategists possess “a clear strategy focus of the company, while allowing 
employees to enact the strategy in adaptive, innovative ways” (Grant, 2008). What is a 
necessary goal for strategists, then, is to be aware, even ingrained, of one’s aspirations 
(Sarasvathy, 2001) or the ontological purport of the organization, in order to guide the 
cyclical process of strategy as “planned emergence” (Grant, 2008). 
 
2.2.3.2. Competence-based view 
The “competence-based view” (CBV) has as its objective to be an “integrative theory 
that incorporates economic, organizational, and behavioral concerns” and which is 
“dynamic, systemic, cognitive and holistic” (Sanchez & Heene, 2004). In its core, the CBV 
addressed a critique of the RBV that, although a firm’s critical resources may extend beyond 
firm boundaries (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zaheer & Bell, 2005), the RBV had been focussed 
mainly on internal resources. Therefore, the role of strategy is not only its ability to seek “fit” 
between the organization and its environment, but also to “stretch” the organization by 
acquiring new competences and capabilities that may change the environment in its favour 
(Sanchez, Heene, & Thomas, 1996). As such, the CBV relates superior performance to an 
organization’s ability to respond to dynamic and changing environments, by attributing the 
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cognitive possibility of strategic management to imagine, design and implement the 
organizational processes and resources to respond to the environment, or even change it. Such 
an interplay between the organization and its environment is possible, since the organization 
is seen as a system of intra- and extra-organizational resources and actors over which the 
strategist must maintain a holistic view (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Sanchez et al., 1996; 
Sanchez & Heene, 2004). Strategy is thus the process of building the organization as an open 
system for value creation and value distribution through the building and leveraging of 
competences. 
In its formulation, the CBV adopts many of the insights from the resource-based view, 
upper echelon theory, resource dependence theory and institutional theory and thus represents 
an integrative theory of strategic management. Although as such, it is promising as a theory 
for management and instructive purposes, its use in research has been rather limited to date.  
  
2.2.3.3. Oliver’s institutional – resource based perspective 
Drawing upon both institutional theory and the resource-based view, Oliver argued 
that “resources selection and sustainable competitive advantage are profoundly influenced, at 
the individual, firm and interfirm level, by the institutional context of resource decisions.” 
(Oliver, 1997: 698). Essentially, the message is that resource characteristics and the 
capabilities to use them are important precursors of organizational performance, but only to 
the extent that they are valued by the institutional context: “even highly productive, inimitable 
resources will be of limited value without the organizational will or political support to deploy 
them.” (Oliver, 1997: 710). But the relationship between institutions and resources also works 
the other way around. By imposing regulation or developing certain policies, governments 
can change the institutional context in such a way that specific resources become rare or 
highly valuable. This assertion would be confirmed by the research suggesting that many 
regulations are the result of firms lobbying for standards that function as entry barriers for 
their competitors (Stigler, 1971).  
For Oliver, the role of the strategist is to manage both the organization’s resource 
capital as well as its institutional capital. The resource capital consists of all the resources and 
competencies that enhance the value-creation possibilities of the firm. The institutional capital 
is defined as the context which surrounds this resource capital and which enhances or inhibits 
its optimal use. By defining the role of strategy as this integrative purpose of managing both 
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economic and normative rationalities, a bridge can be built between the outside-in and the 
inside-out perspectives on strategy. 
2.2.4. Summarizing 
Although the former descriptions highlight the differing conceptions of how strategy is 
defined and where the sources for superior organizational performance lie, the most recent 
contributions stress the importance to seek a combination of perspectives when considering 
strategy: “because the nature of strategy problems cannot easily be framed within a fixed 
paradigm, strategic management is necessarily a multi-paradigmatic discipline, requiring 
varied theoretical perspectives and methodologies”. (Hoskisson et al., 1999: 444). As a result, 
research in strategy will benefit most from an integrative approach to firm performance, that 
blends insights both from inside-out and outside-in approaches to organizational performance. 
In addition, the unifying element in all concepts is an ontological search for what an 
organization stands for, and how this can inspire an organization to deploy its resources and 
capabilities in dynamic markets and societies in a way that enables it to achieve its objectives.  
In summary, I will use the following interpretation of strategy as a reference 
throughout this dissertation:  
Strategy is the purpose-driven and continuous process of resource building, selection 
and deployment for value creation and distribution, by navigating through and 
interacting with the structural and social conditions that influence their value. 
 
2.3. “Environmental” 
Within the domain of strategy, the (biophysical natural) environment presents a 
particular domain of interest. Environmental strategies are positioned alongside other 
strategies, in which the specific interaction between the focal firm and an extra-organizational 
issue is described. Each of these strategy types differ from another in the specific challenges 
imposed on organizations and how they endorse a customized strategic reflection process. For 
example, internationalization strategies (Melin, 1992; Caves, 1996; Peng, 2001) need to deal 
with “the liability of foreignness”, cooperation strategies (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Nooteboom, 
2004) with information asymmetries and agency problems, and political strategies with power 
asymmetries and institutional inertia (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In this subsection, the focus is 
on the natural environment as a specific issue to strategy. The Merriam-Webster online 
dictionary defines the (natural) environment as:  
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“the complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors (as climate, soil, and living 
things) that act upon an organism or an ecological community and ultimately 
determine its form and survival” (www.merriam-webster.com) 
As a consequence, I define a (natural) environmental strategy as  
the purpose-driven and continuous process of resource building, selection and 
deployment for value creation and distribution, by navigating through and interacting 
with the structural and social conditions emanating from the natural environment that 
influence their value. 
 
I argue that (natural) environmental strategies are distinctive from “other” strategies in 
three respects: (1) the natural environment is a common good and, as a result, generates a 
number of market failures; (2) the natural environment is a social issue; and (3) the natural 
environment instigates reflections of a paradigmatic nature. 
 
2.3.1. The natural environment and market failures 
 Many natural resources are “common goods”: they are transitory and indivisible in 
nature, which hinders the necessary allocation of property rights that allow market 
transactions to put a price on the consumption of the common good (Perman et al., 2003). As 
a result, economic agents that consume common goods in their production processes are 
unlikely to consider the free consumption of the common good in their production function. 
Such a cost-free consumption has been related with market failures (Coase, 1960). A market 
failure is a situation where markets fail to generate Pareto-efficient outcomes, i.e. where free 
market competition distributes utilities in a way that produces the maximum level of welfare 
to society (Arrow & Debreu, 1954), in this particular case: a natural environment that is able 
to sustain the well-being of its inhabitants. The natural environment elicits market failures 
because it does not meet the conditions set to the idealized neoclassical model of the free 
market (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960; Hardin, 1968): for many environmental resources, markets 
simply do not exist. The three most important market failures in the context of the natural 
environment are “externalities”, “tragedy of the commons” and “inefficiency”.  
The first situation, externalities, occurs when the cost of a transaction is carried by 
someone that has not consented to or has played any role in the execution of that transaction 
(Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960). In this respect, pollution is presented as the free consumption of a 
non-polluted resource that has a value for a third party. An oil company getting rid of waste 
oil by dumping it in the sea may cause great losses to the tourism industry living of a beach 
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that is polluted by the spilled oil. Similarly, excess nitrogen applied in manure on soils may 
run off with surface or ground water, which will subsequently need to be treated (often by 
public environmental services) against nitrogen toxicity if one would want to use it for human 
consumption. Besides the lack of property rights, common goods also suffer from information 
asymmetries. For many externalities it is difficult to pinpoint the originator of the externality. 
Whereas this may give bad-willed polluters the incentive to produce externalities because 
they cannot be caught or sanctioned for producing them, externalities are not always the result 
of deliberate ignorance or bad-willed intentions: the polluting or welfare-destroying effects 
are not always visible to its creator and he or she may thus not be aware of the externality. 
Furthermore, the effects of externalities are not always traceable to one specific actor: some 
emissions or consumption patterns only become harmful as a result of the culmination of the 
practices of a host of actors. Taken together, a recurring characteristic in these situations is 
that the polluting firm receives no incentives from the market to internalize the costs inflicted 
on third parties:  
“Economic systems make many polluting and wasteful goods seem alluringly 
inexpensive because they do not incorporate the full ecological costs of their 
production or use. These costs are passed on to future generations, transferred to 
nonusers of products as taxes or exported to less environmentally regulated 
countries.” (Shrivastava, 1995b)  
The second situation, “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990), 
refers to a situation where the short-term consumption of clean air, fish, pasture or any other 
common good, may extinguish the longer term existence of the natural resource. Without 
external constraints imposed or artificial markets created through quota trading or permits, 
economic agents lack the feedback mechanisms (i.e. discounted future costs reflected in the 
price) that signal the longer term peril of overconsuming the common good. As a result, they 
will tend to continue consuming the free common good until it is entirely gone. A typical 
example of the tragedy of the commons can be found in fisheries: by fishing too much, the 
regenerative capacity of fish is endangered in such a way that the population can not be 
sustained. From a more macroscopic point of view, the “tragedy of the commons” has been 
the focal point of worry since the industrial revolution. Since the early warnings by Malthus 
and Ricardo that there are limits to the carrying capacity of natural resources to sustain a 
growing economy, scientists have continued to question the possibility to sustain a 
development with increasing levels of consumption of natural resources (Meadows, 
Meadows, & Randers, 1972). The biggest question in this perspective is whether we can 
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sustain our current consumption levels through technological progress or whether it is only 
possible through self-organized resource consumption or even population control (Hardin, 
1968; Shrivastava, 1995b). 
Third, since there is no or little (perceived) cost for using common goods, there are no 
economic incentives to use them in a way that is socially efficient (Baumol & Oates, 1988). 
 “Fundamentally, it [pollution] is a manifestation of economic waste and involves 
unnecessary, inefficient or incomplete utilization of resources, or resources not used 
to generate their highest value. In many cases, emissions are a sign of inefficiency and 
force a firm to perform non-value-creating activities such as handling, storage and 
disposal.” (Porter & van der Linde, 1995b).       
From a strategic management point of view, the particularity of environmental 
strategies is rooted both in the free-rider problem that underlies the described market failure 
effects, and the lack of visibility or relative impact of one’s actions on the improvement of the 
natural environment. Firms that want to voluntarily refrain from causing externalities or social 
harms stemming from resource depletion face the peril of bearing the cost that careless 
businesses do not. At the same time, these latter businesses may benefit from the efforts from 
the former. Similar to the difference between those who pay and those who do not pay for a 
train ticket, the polluters free-ride the non-polluters’ efforts. As a result, environmental 
strategies are often perceived as costly endeavors that do not create market positions that are 
favorable from a strategic point of view (Walley & Whitehead, 1994; Reinhardt, 1999). 
“In a world where environmental externalities were the only departure from the 
assumptions of perfect competition (…) firms that volunteered to internalize these 
costs could not survive.” (Reinhardt, 1999: 10) 
 Whenever the production of waste also represents a cost to the firm, reducing 
pollution obviously presents an opportunity for cost reduction (Hart, 1995; Porter & van der 
Linde, 1995a). Such a situation represents a “win-win” between the minimization of 
environmental impact and the maximization of profit and is therefore the “low hanging fruit” 
of environmental strategy. Things become more difficult when the voluntary internalization of 
environmental impacts that do not present themselves as immediate win-wins (Walley & 
Whitehead, 1994; Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 1995). In order to overcome these market 
failures, strategists will need to seek alternatives that redeem their investments in the natural 
environment (Nehrt, 1996; Nehrt, 1998; Reinhardt, 1999; Dean & McMullen, 2007; Cohen & 
Winn, 2007). 
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2.3.2. The natural environment as a social issue 
 Besides the idiosyncratic properties of the natural environment in its relationship 
towards the market (the economic sphere), the natural environment induces specific 
interactions with the social sphere. The counterpart of the indivisibility of the natural 
environment is that every one claims to have the right to use or access the common good. As a 
result, a consumption level of the common good in a way that impedes the consumption for 
other agents, will prompt social protest and pressure to abandon the consumption. As such, 
the natural environment becomes a social issue (Clarkson, 1995). Social issues present 
particular conditions to strategy, since they may influence the possibilities, opportunities, 
threats and challenges to strategy in the form of (1) regulation, (2) stakeholder issues and (3) 
market segmentations.  
First, the natural environment is presented as regulation. Over the last decades, 
governments on different levels in society have engaged in substantial efforts to tackle the 
market failures associated with the natural environment through a variety of policy measures. 
Such measures include legislation stipulating which products can be used or produced, 
formalized “licenses to produce”, forbidding the use of polluting practices or even the 
production of certain products, market regulation through cap-and-trade systems, taxes and 
subsidies, compulsory reporting on toxic substances, and many more (Baumol & Oates, 
1988). The goal of these coercive measures follows a logic of sticks, carrots and sermons 
(Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 1998). Through sticks (punishment when failing to 
comply with the law), carrots (using financial incentives to further environmentally friendly 
practices) and sermons (sensitizing and awareness rising through media campaigns and 
knowledge diffusion), governments try to direct the economy to more environmentally 
friendly practices and products. The literature presents environmental regulation both as a 
threat and as an opportunity (Dean & Brown, 1995; Nehrt, 1996). It is argued that 
environmental regulation may destroy the economic possibilities of incumbent and 
conservative firms (Walley & Whitehead, 1994; Palmer et al., 1995), or may inhibit the 
foundation of new firms (Dean & Brown, 1995). Advocates of environmental regulation, 
however, argue that environmental regulation sets the stage for creative destruction and green 
innovation (Porter & van der Linde, 1995a; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Hart & Milstein, 
1999).  
Second, the natural environment is presented to businesses as a stakeholder issue 
(Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995; Jones & Wicks, 1999) and embedded in the larger concept 
of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) (Davis, 1973; Carroll, 1979; Wartick & Cochran, 
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1985; Wood, 1991; McGee, 1998). Despite the trend that more and more natural 
environmental issues are regulated, the last decades have also seen a dynamic surge in 
stakeholder activism. A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984), and may be both 
internal (employees, shareholders) or external (suppliers, customers, governments, 
competitors, civil society organizations) to the firm. Stakeholder theory argues that 
organizations should voluntarily take the claims of important stakeholders into account, 
because their support is necessary for the survival of the organization (Freeman, 1984; 
Clarkson, 1995). In a similar vein, caring for the natural environment is seen as a “corporate 
social responsibility”, the moral call to businesses to voluntarily take the effects of their 
activities on the social and natural environment into account (Carroll, 1979; Wartick & 
Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991; Swanson, 1995; McGee, 1998): “the moment corporations and 
their managers define and accept responsibility and obligations to primary stakeholders, (…) 
they have entered the domain of moral principles and ethical performance, whether they know 
it or not” (Clarkson, 1995: 112).  Firms that do not respond to their social responsibility do so 
at the peril of facing consumer or supplier boycotts, pressure group “naming and shaming”, 
employee strikes or shareholder activism (Freeman, 1984; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; 
Brammer & Millington, 2006). From a strategic risk management point of view, stakeholders 
are important when they are perceived powerful, when their claims are considered legitimate 
and when their interests solicit urgent responses (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Eesley & 
Lenox, 2006). A strong vehicle in conveying stakeholder influence is the reputation of an 
organization. Firms that create bad perceptions of their behavior in the social domain, may 
find themselves with decreasing trust and loyalty (Barney & Hansen, 1994) or access to 
critical resources (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), such as human capital (Turban & Greening, 
1996; Reinhardt, 1999). The type of influence that a stakeholder can have on the firm depends 
on the resource dependencies between a firm and its stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Frooman, 1999) or the position a firm holds in a stakeholder network (Rowley, 1997): it is 
evident that claims from stakeholders possessing critical resources for the firm (and which 
they may withhold in the event that the firm does not respond appropriately) will be assessed 
in different ways than those that do not (Frooman, 1999). Such insights are important; since 
they highlight that the influence of stakeholders may be both direct and indirect through other 
stakeholders (Rowley, 1997; Frooman, 1999; Hart & Sharma, 2004). Although “the natural 
environment” is not “a group or individual” by itself and is therefore most often represented 
by such civil society organizations (Crane & Matten, 2004) as Greenpeace, the Rainforest 
Chapter 2 
34 
Alliance or WWF, it is sometimes argued that the natural environment should be seen as a 
stakeholder in its own right (Leopold, 1948; Purser et al., 1995; Shrivastava, 1995b; Sharma 
& Henriques, 2005). In sum, through the interaction with stakeholders, the natural 
environment is presented as a strategic management issue. The growing attention for 
stakeholder management and social responsibilities in the organizational and strategy 
literature is proof of the specific set of resources, capabilities and response patterns which are 
required (Grant, 2008). 
A last manifestation of the natural environment as a social issue is that it may be used 
to appeal to customers and suppliers in product and factor markets. Since people and 
organizations want a healthy environment, it is argued that organizations that diminish their 
negative environmental impact on the environment will be remunerated for their efforts in the 
market, at least by some segments in the market that show specific sensitivity to it (Arora & 
Gangopadhyay, 1995; Arora & Cason, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995b; Henriques & Sadorsky, 
1996; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Prakash, 2001). Conversely, it is argued that 
organizations that produce negative impacts on the environment will be punished in the 
market (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996). 
To strategy, social issues present both opportunities and challenges, paving the way 
for product differentiation and cost minimization, but also as potential regulation or 
stakeholder induced cost increments. In addition to these unidimensional challenges, however, 
the most difficult challenges lie in the harmonization of the natural environment with other 
social challenges (Hall & Vredenburg, 2003; Matos & Hall, 2007). Solutions that would be 
very beneficial to the natural environment often conflict with other social claims. For 
example, it has often been suggested that the environmental burden is a function of 
population, affluence and technology (input/output) used to bring affluence to the population. 
As a result, one could argue – as some authors do – that one way to reduce environmental 
burden is by limiting the population (Hardin, 1968; Shrivastava, 1995b). A decrease in 
environmental burden by limiting population growth or affluence, however, often encounters 
fierce social resistance (Hart, 1997). Similarly, whereas biotechnology was presented as an 
important example of environmental leadership strategies (Hart, 1995; Hart, 1997), it has 
encountered the resistance of environmental and antiglobalization advocates alike, who raised 
concerns about the transfer of genes from genetically modified crops to wild plant species and 
the potential dependence of developing countries on seed companies (Hall & Vredenburg, 
2003). In sum, by considering the natural environment in strategic questions, strategic 
management is confronted with higher levels of complexity (Matos & Hall, 2007) and 
Chapter 2 
 
35 
uncertainty (Lewis & Harvey, 2001). Reconciling these differences requires fundamental 
answers from strategists as to what the company stands for, who it will please, why and how 
(Wheeler, Fabig, & Boele, 2002; Wheeler, Colbert, & Freeman, 2003). 
2.3.3. Paradigm shift 
The last idiosyncrasy of the natural environment to strategy lies in the place the 
natural environment occupies in one’s worldviews: the “natural environment” means different 
things to different people (Gladwin et al., 1995; McGee, 1998; Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999). 
Most importantly, perception differences not only reside in the heads of individuals, but 
amount to different paradigms in economic and business theory as well. A paradigm is an 
established epistemological framework that guides the thinking around a specific topic (Kuhn, 
1962). The result of the attention to environmental issues with probably the most far reaching 
consequences is an ontological questioning of “business” itself, and especially how business 
relates to the natural environment. Over the last decades, researchers have argued for a 
reconsideration of the role of the environment in economic thinking, because the way we 
define the human or business–natural environment relationship legitimizes, and reinforces our 
subsequent behaviors.  
“By disassociating human organization from the biosphere and the full human 
community, it is possible that our theories have tacitly encouraged organizations to 
behave in ways that ultimately destroy their natural and social-life support systems” 
(Gladwin et al., 1995: 896).  
The paradigmatic debate is thus concerned with the question whether the natural environment 
is an entity external to the firm with instrumental value, or whether organizations are 
intertwined and interdependent on a natural environment that has a moral value to economic 
life (Gladwin et al., 1995; Purser et al., 1995; Shrivastava, 1995b). We stress the difference 
between these perspectives, since they shed light on the unit of analysis employed in the 
context of environmental strategies. In the former approach, the unit of analysis is the firm or 
the organization, with the natural environment something that may be external to the firm (it 
can also be internal to the firm, to the extent property rights are owned for the natural 
resources), whereas this is impossible in the latter approach. It is evident that the perspective 
that is taken may have implications for the role and object of strategy, as is shown also in the 
theoretical thinking on the natural environment in both economics and strategy. 
In the history of economic thought, the natural environment has been investigated 
from two general streams: environmental economics and ecological economics. Whereas the 
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former perceives the natural environment and the economy as two distinct spheres that are 
linked with each other along transactions and exchanges, the latter defines the economy as an 
interlinked subsystem of the entire biosphere (Perman et al., 2003; Vatn, 2005; Common & 
Stagl, 2005). In environmental economics, the natural environment simply represents a source 
for production (e.g. land for tillage or building, minerals for ore, air to breath, drinking water, 
…), a sink able to accept pollution or waste (e.g. landfill, air or water for CO2 absorption or 
dilution, …), an amenity to enjoy (e.g. beaches, natural reserves, food …), an object of 
worship (animistic religions) or something to get rid off (e.g. diseases, floods, drought, …). In 
contrast, the ecological economics perspective equates “the environment” with both the 
individual building blocks, as well as all the bio-geochemical processes that keep this system 
functioning (Common & Stagl, 2005). The approach is holistic and embedded in ecological 
principles. Rather than considering the economy and the natural environment as independent 
systems that are connected trough exchanges and transactions, the economy is embedded in 
the natural environment.  
A similar distinction has emerged in management theory, which was catalogued by 
Purser and colleagues (1995) as the anthropocentric vs. the ecocentric organization paradigm 
and by Gladwin and colleagues (1995) as the technocentric vs. ecocentric paradigm. Put in 
simpler terms, the difference between the two perspectives is in seeing “nature-as-object” 
(anthropocentrism) versus “nature-as-self” (ecocentrism). In the ecocentric paradigm, strategy 
is concerned with the natural environment from a moral point of view (Purser et al., 1995) and 
strives – above anything else – for the sustainability of natural and cultural values. 
Conversely, in the anthropocentric paradigm, the natural environment is perceived though its 
instrumental function to the human being or the organization. The main vehicle is 
“environmental management”, concerned with “searching for better means to engineer and 
control nature for instrumental purposes” (Purser et al., 1995: 1078). It is in line with 
libertarian views of corporations, that state that “the social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970: 32) and that the voluntary endeavor for the social good 
is fundamentally subversive and wrong (Smith, 1776; Friedman, 1970). 
Gladwin and colleagues have argued that neither ecocentrism nor anthropocentrism 
provide the practical basis to achieve sustainable development, and that only a pragmatic 
“sustaincentric paradigm” is able to harness the theoretical underpinnings for this immensely 
complex social objective (Gladwin et al., 1995). In the sustaincentric paradigm, humans are 
“neither totally disengaged from, nor totally immersed in the rest of nature” (Gladwin et al., 
1995: 890), and the relationship between humans and nature is guided by both moral and 
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instrumental principles. The basic premise is that a prosperous economy depends on a healthy 
environment and vice versa, and that as a result, the role of humans towards nature is one of 
stewardship: we are responsible ourselves to uphold a state of nature that is able to support us. 
Recently, Michael Porter and Mark Kramer expressed the core of this view in their paper on 
“Strategy & Society” (Porter & Kramer, 2006):  
“Successful corporations need a healthy society. Education, health care, and equal 
opportunity are essential to a productive workforce. Safe products and working 
conditions not only attract customers but lower the internal costs of accidents. 
Efficient utilization of land, water, energy, and other natural resources makes 
business more productive. Good government, the rule of law, and property rights are 
essential for efficiency and innovation. Strong regulatory standards protect both 
consumers and competitive companies from exploitation. Ultimately, a healthy society 
creates expanding demand for business, as more human needs are met and aspirations 
grow. Any business that pursues its ends at the expense of the society in which it 
operates will find its success to be illusory and ultimately temporary.” (Porter & 
Kramer, 2006: 83) 
The general implication of this paradigmatic debate for strategy is twofold. First, a 
person’s paradigm reflects whether the natural environment is a parameter that is taken into 
account only in the production function (as a cost or a constraint) or becomes so important 
that it is included in the objective function of the firm (part of the mission and the evaluation 
criteria). The natural environment currently asks the strategist to make a choice and to reflect 
on where he or she will position the natural environment in his or her strategy. Second, 
paradigm shifts generally experience institutional inertia and resistance to move away from 
the business-as-usual. Such periods increase the complexity and uncertainty, as the paradigm 
shift opens new questions, requires new solutions and often new knowledge (Kuhn, 1962; 
Gladwin et al., 1995). The natural environment is now generally part of the production 
function as environmental departments and managers, compliance departments and officers, 
taxes, permits, quota and the like. The legal structures, expectations from shareholders, taken-
for-granted assumptions on the environment vs. economy reflect how deeply engrained and 
intertwined this paradigm is within the veins and fibers of our society (Hoffman & Ventresca, 
1999). A wave of new paradigmatic assumptions questions many of these fundamentals, 
strategies and practices and may thus require new capabilities, structures in response. One 
such a development is a shift from the dyadic relationship between business and government, 
with government controlling business, to a triadic relationship where both governments and 
civil society organizations are watchdogs over and facilitators of business activities that are in 
line with societal expectations (Hoffman, 1999). Furthermore, although a paradigm shift 
Chapter 2 
38 
imposes difficult questions from a macro-social point of view, it has clear implications for 
strategy. One of the problems of paradigms is that they cannot be compared: each paradigm 
has its own logic and conceptual frameworks that make it impossible to understand the logics 
of another. As a result, “choice” of a paradigm is impossible without accepting all the 
conceptual consequences that derive from its basic assumptions. For example, accepting the 
sole role of a corporation to make profits requires accepting a strong state to legally enforce 
property rights and to provide common services. Furthermore, the fact that paradigms exist 
may also enable strategists  to recognize arguments that derive from alternative paradigmatic 
backgrounds. Finding solutions for the fierce debates that may derive from inter-paradigmatic 
differences first requires understanding that organizations or individuals ground their thinking 
on different assumptions. Unless a common ground is found where joint understandings 
between different paradigmatic viewpoints are created, such inter-paradigm debates will end-
up in a “dialogue of the deaf”(Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999; Lepoutre, Dentchev, & Heene, 
2007).  
2.3.4. Summary 
 With the analysis as presented above, my goal was to summarize the arguments why 
the natural environment presents a particular domain of interest in the field of strategy. As I 
have demonstrated, the natural environment imposes challenges of free-rider problems, social 
and stakeholder interests and more paradigmatic, more philosophical reflections on the nature 
and role of the firm in relation to society. These challenges are important for strategy, since 
they will influence a firm’s performance, and will therefore require appropriate responses in 
terms of objectives and practices. The variety in responses that a firm can develop in this 
perspective are the object of the following section. 
 
2.4. “Proactive” 
The final semantic building block of “proactive environmental strategies” relates to 
the way how businesses can develop strategies in response to the natural environment as a 
contextual variable. “To prepare a[n environmental] strategy, managers must decide where 
they want to be on the spectrum from strict compliance to environmental leadership.” 
(Walley & Whitehead, 1994: 52).   
The term “proactive” derives from the general business and strategy literature, where a 
number of descriptions have been developed to characterize reaction typologies of firms with 
regards to their circumstances. Miles and Snow (1978), for example, identify firms as 
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“prospectors” when they continually look for opportunities and lead in responses towards 
changing contexts, “analyzers” when they critically follow up on their competitors and 
respond accordingly, “reactors” when they are unable to react upon changing environments, 
and “defenders” when they do not assess the environment outside their limited competency 
domain and aim to protect their current positions. Covin and Slevin (1989) and Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) draw on Miles and Snow to define proactivity as part of the concept of 
entrepreneurship, highlighting the need to take initiatives or introduce new practices or 
products ahead of competitors. In their view, proactiveness is opposed to passiveness, rather 
than reactiveness: whereas passiveness is an indifference or inability to seize opportunities or 
lead in the market, reactiveness suggests an active response to resist competitors. As such, 
they position their view in line with Chen and Hambrick, who stated that “proactiveness 
involves taking the initiative in an effort to shape the environment to one’s own advantage; 
responsiveness involves being adaptive to competitors’ challenges.” (1995: 457). 
 In the context of the natural environment, strategies have been placed mostly on a 
continuum that varies in the way organizations deal with the natural environment relative to 
what is required by law. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the various typologies that have 
been defined in the literature on environmental strategies. In the continuum of environmental 
strategies, proactive is opposed to what the literature has referred to as “reactive” (Henriques 
& Sadorsky, 1999; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003), “beginner” 
(Hunt & Auster, 1990) or “non-compliance” (Roome, 1992) postures. Firms that are labelled 
with these latter postures towards the environment are unable or unwilling to take the impact 
of their practices on the natural environment into account, even if this would be required by 
coercive legal or normative stakeholder pressures. “Reactive” postures thus generally feature 
a response revolving around complying with legal regulations, but may even involve behavior 
that does not meet the legal standards set (either deliberate or not). Accounts of firms with 
reactive strategies mostly describe practices as end-of-pipe solutions that do not question the 
business-as-usual of the firm (Hunt & Auster, 1990; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998) or try to obstruct environmental regulation (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; 
Newton & Harte, 1997; Cho, Patten, & Roberts, 2006). Proactive postures, on the other hand, 
demonstrate a voluntary adoption and development of practices that go beyond obeying the 
law in taking environmental issues into account. To the minimum, these practices comprise 
the willingness to prevent pollution at the source, but may go as far as completely redesigning 
products and processes (Hart, 1995), to redefining the business model (Sharma & Henriques, 
2005) and engaging in active roles in the industry or society to change behavioral patterns 
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(Hunt & Auster, 1990; Hart, 1995). In addition to merely going beyond the law, Sharma and 
Vredenburg added an additional dimension to the term “proactive”. In their definition, 
proactive environmental strategies are strategies that involve practices not required to be 
undertaken“in fulfillment of environmental regulations or in response to isomorphic 
pressures within the industry as standard business practice” (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998: 
776). In other words, proactive means that firms go beyond legal and within-industry norms. 
Table 2.1 - Typologies of environmental strategies 
Author Continuum Definitions 
Roome, 1992 Noncompliance 
vs. Leading 
Edge.1 
Noncompliance refers to a complete irresponsiveness to environmental issues, not even when this 
would be required by law.  
Compliance refers to a responsiveness in line with what is legally required.  
Compliance-plus covers a proactive approach that goes beyond the law to integrate environmental 
issues in the structure and systems of the firm.  
A Commercial and Environmental Excellence approach is characterized by the inclusion of the 
environment in the core values and strategy of the firm.  
 
Hunt and 
Auster, 1992 
Beginner vs. 
Proactivist 
 “Beginners” consider environmental programs unnecessary and turn their back to the problem 
“Fire fighters” deal with environmental problems in an ad-hoc way and further have little concerns 
about the environment. 
“Concerned citizens” express good intentions towards the environment, but do not implement any 
programs to realize them. 
“Pragmatist” companies take their time to manage their environmental problems actively, by 
empowering their environmental departments with sufficient expertise, funding and authority. 
Environmental problems, however, are not top priority. 
“Proactivists” attach top priority to environmental issues, dedicate high profile and motivated staff 
to it and are engaged in the public debate and political agenda-setting. 
 
Hart, 1995 Pollution control 
vs. Sustainable 
development 
Pollution control refers to firms that use end-of-pipe pollution abatement. 
Through “pollution prevention”, firms abate the impact generated on the environment by minimizing 
emissions, effluents and waste.  
 “Product stewardship” involves an approach towards a firm’s products which integrates the impacts 
generated on the entire lifecycle and value chain of the product.  Such an approach extends the 
boundaries of the analysis to both the history (raw materials, extraction methods, etc), as well as 
the future (waste, recycle procedures, etc) of the product.  
Finally, “sustainable development” represents the most advanced strategy towards the natural 
environment. The goal of this type of strategy is to not only account for the impact of a product or 
production system, but of more abstract issues as firm growth or development on countries in the 
developing world. 
 
Russo and 
Fouts, 1997 
Compliance vs. 
Proactive 
End-of-pipe compliance policies affect only physical asset resources. (…) Compliance is achieve 
primarily by the addition of pollution removing or filtering devices to the existing assets of a firm 
and does not require the firm to develop expertise or skills in managing new environmental 
technologies or processes. (…)  
 
As a proactive environmental policy takes hold in a firm, we would expect it to redesign its 
production or service delivery processes. Such a redesign would likely involve the acquisition and 
installation of new technologies” (Russo & Fouts, 1997: 538)  
 
Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 
1998 
Proactive vs. 
Reactive 
“Companies were considered proactive only if they exhibited a consistent pattern of environmental 
practices, across all dimensions relevant to their range of activities, not required to be undertaken 
in fulfillment of environmental regulations or in response to isomorphic pressures within the 
industry as standard business practices. In addition to consistency across dimensions, the proactive 
firms (by our definition) should have exhibited a consistent pattern of such voluntary actions over 
time.” 
 
Sharma, 2000 Conformance vs. 
Voluntary 
An environmental strategy of conformance involves complying with regulations and adopting 
standard industry practices that, according to institutional theory, would be the result of pressures 
from industry associations (King & Lenox, 2000), environmental NGOs, government regulators, 
competitor actions, and other industry stakeholders. 
  
                                                 
1 Although Roome is generally cited with 5 strategies, including “Leading Edge” – the state of the art in 
environmental management as practiced by a firm in its sector of the economy, Roome himself described this 
strategy as a position that could be adopted both by non-compliance, as well as by excellence companies”. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, a voluntary environmental strategy represents a consistent pattern 
of company actions taken to reduce the environmental impact of operations, not to fulfill 
environmental regulations or to conform to standard practices.” (Sharma, 2000: 683, emphasis 
added) 
 
Aragon-Correa 
and Sharma, 
2003 
Proactive vs. 
Reactive 
“Corporate strategies for managing the interface between business and the natural environment can 
be classified along a continuum that ranges from reactive to proactive. At one end of the 
continuum, a reactive posture is a response to changes in environmental regulations and 
stakeholder pressures via defensive lobbying and investments in end-of-pipe pollution control 
measures. 
  
At the other end of the continuum, proactive postures involve anticipating future regulations and 
social trends and designing or altering operations, processes, and products to prevent (rather than 
merely ameliorate) negative environmental impacts.” 
 
Buysse and 
Verbeke, 2003 
Environmental 
leadership vs. 
Reactive 
strategy 
Reactive strategies are the equivalent of Hart’s end-of-pipe firms. 
Pollution prevention firms have a limited adoption of environmental practices, a limited development 
of related competencies and a weak integration of environmental issues into corporate strategy. 
Environmental leadership firms are characterized mostly by the development of green competencies 
and environmental reporting, but excel in all perspectives in comparison to the other categories. 
 
Sharma and 
Henriques, 
2005 
Proactive vs. 
Reactive 
Reactive environmental strategies involve “following regulatory guidelines (to avoid penalties) or 
reducing energy costs, both of which are undertaken because organizations can see clear links 
between these activities and ability to operate within the law and enhance their profitability. The 
practices included were detoxification, synthetic reduction, fuel efficiency and energy efficiency.” 
(Sharma & Henriques, 2005: 169) 
 
Proactive environmental strategies “have moved beyond regulatory responses that involve costly 
investments in controlling polluting wastes and emissions (Walley and Whitehead, 1994). These 
proactive strategies include eco-efficient strategies for reducing wastes, materials, and energy use 
(Hart and Ahuja,1996) and preventing pollution at sources (King and Lenox, 2001; King and 
Shaver, 2001; Russo and Fouts, 1997) via the redesign of processes and products (Klassen and 
Whybark, 1999).” (Sharma & Henriques, 2005: 160). 
 
 
Following the overview as presented, I adopt a definition of proactive environmental 
strategies (PES) as: 
The continuous process of resource building, selection and deployment for value 
creation and distribution, by navigating through and interacting with the structural 
and social conditions that influence their value, with the purpose to prevent negative 
effects, or create positive impacts on the natural environment, beyond what is legally 
required or accepted as standard practice.  
 To strategy, proactiveness may yield both advantages, as well as considerable hurdles. 
On the one hand, engaging in the active and anticipatory search for new opportunities may 
yield first mover advantages (Nehrt, 1996). In the event that environmental practices or 
technologies take time to learn or establish, first movers will simply have the benefit that 
comes with more experience or the time that lagging firms need to incorporate new 
technologies. Furthermore, first movers may be more able to capitalize on the market 
opportunities identified: “by exploiting asymmetries in the marketplace, the first mover can 
capture unusually high profits and can get a head start in establishing brand reputation.” 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996: 146). On the other hand, proactive firms may also bear the risks and 
costs of the uncertain and experimental endeavors that imitating firms may subsequently copy 
without having had to bear these risks and costs. Furthermore, establishing new practices may 
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also put firms “in an institutional vacuum of indifferent munificence and, at worst, in a hostile 
environment impervious to individual action.” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994: 645) In other words, 
besides the particular complexities of environmental strategies as described above, the 
particular choice of choosing a proactive posture towards them adds additional complexity 
and uncertainty to it.  
 
2.5. “Small business” 
 Given the description of what will be meant by “proactive environmental strategies” in 
this dissertation, I now turn to the final and focal construct: the small business. As with 
proactiveness, “small” is not an isolated construct by itself. Rather, it is a qualitative category 
in the “organizational size” continuum that spans the extremes of various versions of “small” 
on the one hand, and various versions of “large” on the other (Curran & Blackburn, 2001). 
The literature, however, is not consistent on how these categories are used. More specifically, 
firm sizes can be measured on either a relative or an absolute basis. Whereas relative 
measures take the entire spectrum of firms and then assigns the label “small” to the smallest 
firms in the spectrum and the label “large” to the largest firms, absolute measures assign 
labels based on predefined cut-off levels. In this dissertation, however, I take an absolute 
perspective on size. More specifically, I follow the definition as provided by the European 
Commision (European Commission, 2003a), which considers businesses to be “small” when 
they have  
- Fewer than 50 employees 
- A turnover and/or balance sheet total that that does not exceed € 10 million  
By defining small business as such, we include the micro-enterprises, which have been 
defined as those that have 
- Fewer than 10 employees; 
- A turnover and/or balance sheet total that does not exceed € 2 million. 
Small businesses present a specific domain of inquiry within business and strategy 
research, because they possess certain idiosyncratic attributes that make certain models 
designed for larger firms inappropriate for smaller firms (Dandridge, 1979; Welsh & White, 
1981; d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988). As such, firm size is presented as an internal 
contingency factor that needs to be taken into account, both when interpreting or generalizing 
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study results (therefore it is very often used as a control variable), as well as when designing 
managerial activities and responses to the external environment (Merz & Sauber, 1995). 
Although one of the characteristics of small business is their large heterogeneity, which 
makes it virtually impossible to make overarching and generic propositions about them 
(d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988; Curran & Blackburn, 2001), general agreement exists about 
the following three idiosyncrasies of small businesses. 
1. Importance of the owner-manager. One of the most important characteristics of small 
firms is that in many small firms, the manager of the firm is also the principal owner 
of the firm:  
“the importance of the owner-manager in the small business cannot be 
overemphasized. Because of his or her central function a greater comprehension of 
the role of the owner-manager will enhance the understanding of small business 
itself” (d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988: 227).  
Although ownership is mostly financial – which means that some personal assets may 
be at risk, it will most often be more than that. Besides financial assets, large 
investments of personal time and effort make the ownership as much psychological as 
financial (Gibb, 2000). Associated with ownership is the advantage that the owner-
manager does not have other owners or stockholders to report to as in many large 
corporations, leaving strategic decision-making in the firm entirely based on his own 
independent discretion. Although the small firm may be under great pressure and 
dependent relationships with key customers, suppliers, banks, regulatory officials, and 
many more stakeholders, their independence still grants them the free possibility to 
decide who they deal with and who not (Gibb, 2000). Given the large personal 
investments in the company, and the fact that very few small business owner-
managers rely on extensive information searches or formal strategic planning 
(Shrader, Mulford, & Blackburn, 1989), decision-making in the firm results mostly in 
a process that involves and reflects the vision and values of the owner-manager 
(Carson, Cromie, McGowan, & Hill, 1995). Such a vision is most often “an intuitively 
experienced image of what is to be achieved and how” and is “often hidden even from 
the entrepreneur himself”, but “helps the entrepreneur realize and enact his 
environment and rationalize his behavior” (Johannisson, 1987: 51). Such an 
intertwined relationship between personal and business life has been shown to result in 
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higher levels of commitment of the owner-manager to the firm than organizational 
employees (Thompson, Kopelman, & Schriesheim, 1992; Cooper & Artz, 1995). 
2. Organizational configuration. Next to the importance of the owner-manager, probably 
the second most cited characteristic of smaller firms is its limited access to resources 
and limited power to modify environmental forces to their advantage (Woo & Cooper, 
1982; Carson et al., 1995; Lee, Lim, & Tan, 1999; Gibb, 2000). Due to their smaller 
size, smaller firms face disadvantages compared to their larger counterparts in terms of 
managerial expertise, experience curves, knowledge, R&D capabilities and general 
slack resources (Bourgeois, 1984; Nooteboom, 1993; Dean, Brown, & Bamford, 1998; 
Atherton, 2003). The owner-manager and his employees are often responsible for a 
wide variety of tasks, which results in lower functional expertise and a constant 
process of ‘firefighting’ problems with ad-hoc solutions (Nooteboom, 1993). In 
addition to the short-term effects in terms of available knowledge, this also inhibits the 
potential to absorb new knowledge in the future (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In 
addition, small businesses cannot use scale advantages as bargaining power with 
suppliers (including capital suppliers) and buyers to negotiate better prices (Porter, 
1980) or use their clout in direct influences on political decision-makers (Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999). In contrast, smaller firms have been attributed the advantage of being 
more flexible to adapt to changing to external changes in the environment (Woo & 
Cooper, 1982; Fiegenbaum & Karnani, 1991; Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Ebben & 
Johnson, 2005). Whereas larger firms often have formalized and rigid decision 
structures that give them structural inertia in the event of environmental change 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984), smaller firms are able to respond more swiftly because of 
their short communication lines and informal type of management (Mintzberg, 1979). 
In addition, larger firms are, due to their generally larger size, more prone to the 
scrutiny of external stakeholders, while smaller firms may remain invisible on the 
radar screen and exploit their “stealth” (Chen & Hambrick, 1995) to exploit small 
niches and market pockets that are too small for larger firms (Porter, 1980; Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995; Dean et al., 1998). 
3. Task environment. Finally, as a result of the limited resources and the reduced 
influence on the environment, smaller firms will be more vulnerable to uncertainty and 
complexity in their environment (d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988; Storey, 1994; 
Atherton, 2003). In response, small business owner-managers must “travel light” 
(Carson et al., 1995) – draw upon simple organizational structures with short 
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communication lines within the firm and use their external network contacts to 
diminish their uncertainty (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Gibb, 2000; Atherton, 2003). 
Again, how the firm responds to these uncertainties and complexities and how 
quickly, depends on the personality of the owner-manager. Carland et al. (1984), for 
example, distinguish between entrepreneurs – those that own a firm with the purpose 
of profit making, and small  business owner-managers – those that have a firm to 
further their own goals. The latter firms are often referred to as ‘lifestyle’ firms or 
‘craftsman’ firms, and are often described as more reactive, less progressive and less 
reliant on external and internal information processing. Merz and Sauber (1995), for 
example, found that the least proactive and entrepreneurial firms were often the 
smallest, with least engagement in collecting external or internal information, the 
shortest time horizons and impulsive owner-manager centered decision-making. 
Besides particularities of small businesses to theory and practitioners alike, small 
businesses present idiosyncratic challenges to researchers as well. These challenges are 
reflected in the fact that, although small businesses constitute the larger part of firms in the 
economy, and generate over 60% of employment and total GDP in most economies 
(Observatory of European SMEs, 2003), there has been relatively less research done on small 
firms (Curran & Blackburn, 2001). Among other reasons, Curran and Blackburn attribute this 
to the fact that small businesses present “a difficult area in which to conduct research” (2001: 
5). In contrast to larger businesses, small businesses rarely have secondary material, reports 
and statistics available, which makes conducting quantitative studies more difficult. In 
addition, “one of the most difficult aspects of strategy research is collecting primary data 
from individual firms. This problem is often more difficult when working with small firms, 
since they are notorious for their inability and unwillingness to provide desired information” 
(Fiorito & Laforge, 1986: 10-11). In addition, the small businesses community is immensely 
diverse, which makes generalizations all the more difficult and inappropriate (d'Amboise & 
Muldowney, 1988; Curran & Blackburn, 2001): “in other words, there are no perfect, 
unchallengeable outcomes form research on SMEs (…). The test of quality of any research is 
the extent to which its conclusions can be generalized convincingly to any wider audience and 
especially to fellow researchers.” (Curran & Blackburn, 2001: 7). The many contributions in 
such specialized journals as Journal of Business Venturing, Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, Small Business Economics, International Journal of Small Business Management, 
the recent surge in publications on entrepreneurship and the new journal on entrepreneurship 
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by the Strategic Management Society are proof that “small business” and “entrepreneurship” 
scholars are nevertheless engaging in this quality testing endeavor. It is my objective to 
participate in this process, in the first instance through this dissertation.  
2.6. Conclusion 
 With this chapter, my goal was to delineate the conceptual barriers of this dissertation. 
Box 1 repeats the definitions of proactive environmental strategy and small business as they 
will be used throughout this dissertation. It is clear that these boundaries, albeit providing the 
useful limits and focus to facilitate research, comprise a substantial domain, with different 
views on what strategy, the natural environment and proactiveness constitutes. As such, it 
substantiates Mintzberg’s quote in the beginning of this chapter that research in such a 
domain, especially given the morality and interests that are woven in many of the arguments 
that are developed on the topic, is no easy task. Yet, with the definitions and concepts as 
provided in the analysis presented above, we can now proceed to description of what he have 
learned so far on proactive environmental strategies, where the research questions and gaps in 
the literature remain and especially those for which this dissertation will try to present some 
answers.  
 
 
 
A proactive environmental strategy is 
 
the continuous process of resource building, selection and deployment for value creation and 
distribution, by navigating through and interacting with the structural and social conditions 
that influence their value, with the purpose to prevent negative effects, or create positive 
impacts on the natural environment, beyond what is legally required or accepted as standard 
practice. 
 
A small business has 
- fewer than 50 employees 
- a turnover and/or balance sheet total that that does not exceed € 10 million  
Box 1 - Definitions of proactive environmental strategy and small business 
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"We are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants.  
We see more, and things that are more distant, than they did,  
not because our sight is superior or because we are taller than they,  
but because they raise us up, and by their great stature add to ours." 
(John of Salisbury) 
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3. Developing Research Questions: the State-of-the-Art on Proactive 
Environmental Strategies 
3.1.  Introduction 
In order to position the contribution and research question of this dissertation, my goal 
in this chapter is to identify, by means of a general overview of the current knowledge on 
proactive environmental strategies, the most prevailing conclusions and research gaps in the 
literature. Metaphorically, this section presents my climbing on the proverbial “shoulders of 
giants”, and to subsequently stand on them to present my own findings and reflections. To this 
purpose, I benefited from two recent pieces that have summarized the “Organizations and the 
Natural Environment” (ONE) literature to date (Bansal & Gao, 2006; Etzion, 2007). Bansal 
and Gao’s paper was concerned mostly with the question in which top journals the ONE 
literature was published and how the natural environment was used: as context variable 
(“environmental context”), as mediator/moderator in determining organizational (financial) 
performance (“organizational outcomes”) or as dependent variable (“environmental 
outcomes”). Etzion’s paper, on the other hand, used three distinct viewpoints to review the 
ONE literature between 1992 and 2007: the level of the individual firm (its strategic and 
contingent attributes); the level of the industry (regulation, consumers and intra-industry 
dynamics) and the organizational environment (stakeholder influences and the institutional 
environment). Although both studies have provided helpful frameworks and viewpoints to 
structure the growing PES literature, I choose to organize my analysis around the two 
questions that have been dominating the field: “what determines whether an organization 
adopts a PES?” (antecedents), and “what are the effects of a having a PES to an 
organization?” (consequences).  
Reviewing the growing of PES literature is a treacherous task as, similar to the 
semantic confusion in the entire domain of “corporate social responsibility” and “sustainable 
development” (Gladwin et al., 1995; Henderson, 2001; van Marrewijk, 2003; Perman et al., 
2003), the literature has used a plethora of expressions to refer to PES. Terms such as “green 
strategy”, “environmental strategy” and “strategy and the natural environment” are but some 
of the possible alternative denominations used. In order to manage this variety and to disclose 
the choices I made in delineating the field, I used a systematic review process that has as its 
most important goal to be as transparent as possible about the followed methodology. Before 
presenting the actual literature review, the next section is therefore dedicated to a description 
of the research methods used in the literature review. I then continue with a descriptive report 
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of the papers that were used in the literature review and subsequently describe the thematic 
findings on the antecedents and consequences of PES in the third and fourth section. I 
conclude this chapter with a discussion of the findings and a formulation of research 
questions.  
3.2. Methods 
 In order to present a systematic review of the antecedents and consequences of PES, I 
followed the method of systematic literature reviews as developed by Tranfield (2003) and 
which was further refined by a number of articles in the International Journal of Management 
Reviews (e.g. Leseure, Bauer, Birdi, Neely, & Denyer, 2004; Thorpe, Holt, Macpherson, & 
Pittaway, 2005). The goal of this methodology is to use a “replicable, scientific and 
transparent process” (Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003: 209) that brings together “as many 
already existing (…) studies as possible that are relevant to the research being undertaken, 
irrespective of their published location, or even disciplinary background.” (Thorpe et al., 
2005: 258), and provides “an audit trail of the reviewers decisions, procedures and 
conclusions” (Tranfield et al., 2003: 209). Figure 3.1 shows the several steps that were 
undertaken in this process. 
Prior to the review, I defined as its objective “to systematically assess the antecedents 
and consequences of proactive environmental strategies as they are described in current 
literature”. I decided to focus only on articles that were published in the Web of Science 
(WoS), since this database coupled high quality with functionality and full article access to 
the most important and impactful journals in their respective fields. I then set out in a five 
stage study selection process as follows. First, I did three searches using “environmental 
strateg*”, “green strateg*” and “natural environment” + “strateg*” as key words. This process 
yielded 586 citations. I then used the WoS functionality that allows for selection on document 
type and excluded all book reviews, meeting abstracts, letters and news items. The 
combination of remaining articles, reviews, editorial materials and discussions yielded 551 
articles. Finally, I used an additional WoS functionality that allows selecting papers based on 
subject areas. I retained all articles with key words “management”, “business”, “economics”, 
“ethics”, “sociology” and “social sciences – interdisciplinary”, to exclude papers with key 
words such as “marine & freshwater biology”, “genetics & heredity” or “oncology”. This 
selection process left a total of 126 articles. 
  
  
Figure 3.1 - The systematic review process (based on Thorpe, 2005) 
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The second stage attempted to address a bias in the generated database resulting from 
key word selection. Given the different nomenclatures used to refer to proactive 
environmental strategies, besides “environmental strategy”, “green strategy” or “strategy and 
the natural environment”, I expected the search to miss out on important articles. A quick scan 
of the remaining papers based on my prior knowledge of the field confirmed my expectation. 
I therefore ranked the 126 articles based on the number of citations each article had received, 
to capture the most influential articles in the selection. Using the citation ranking, I then 
selected papers until the cumulative number of citations of the selected papers yielded at least 
25% (390 citations) of the total citations to the 126 articles (1561 citations).  
Table 3.1 shows these top cited articles and the selection process of 3 articles: Hart  
(1995), Walley and Whitehead (1994) and Sharma and Vredenburg (1998). Subsequently, I 
selected all the papers that cited these three papers in a new selection, and applied the same 
document type and subject area exclusion criteria as in the first stage. This process yielded 
303 articles. 
Table 3.1 – Top cited articles and their citation number 
Author Article Number of citations 
Cumulative 
percentage 
(Total)  1561 100% 
Hart, 1995 “A natural-resource based view of the firm” 182 12% 
Walley and 
Whitehead, 1994 “It’s not easy being green” 135 20% 
Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 1998 
“Proactive corporate environmental strategy and the 
development of competitively valuable organizational 
capabilities” 
91 26% 
Hart, 1997 “Beyond greening: Strategies for a sustainable world” 86 31% 
Klassen and 
Whybarck, 1999 
“The impact of environmental technologies on 
manufacturing performance” 70 36 
… … … … 
 
In stage 3, I exported both searches to Reference Manager software and continued the 
selection process with 429 articles. After deleting all duplicates in the database, I set out in a 
process of screening all titles and abstracts for relevant and less relevant articles in stage 4. 
Articles were considered less relevant if their topic was not related to the natural environment, 
dealt with technical aspects or did not have a business focus. Examples of titles that were 
excluded included “Public parks and the geography of fear”, “Antecedents and consequences 
of internet use in procurement: An empirical investigation of US manufacturing firms” and 
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“The resource-based theory: dissemination and main trends”. This exclusion process yielded a 
total of 170 usable papers. 
I am aware that the combined approach of key words and key paper citations may not 
entirely correct for variant classifications or nomenclature usage. For example, influential 
articles that were published before or around the same time as the three key articles would not 
be captured in this process. To correct for this bias, the fifth phase consisted of an additional 
check using a database of papers that was collected during the time of my PhD project and by 
checking the references used by the articles read. Together, this process yielded a total of 202 
papers that were used in the review process. 
3.3. Descriptive review of the literature 
 Given the extensive discussion on the evolution and publication outlet characteristics 
of the PES research in Bansal and Gao (2006), I will only describe three observations that 
drew my attention while reading the sampled papers.   
Observation 1: the number of papers published on PES is stabilizing after a dramatic 
increase in the 1990s. 
Figure 3.2 - Number of publications found on proactive environmental strategies 
 
 
Although the number of papers that are published on PES seems to stabilize in recent years, 
Figure 3.2 shows a dramatic increase in publications in the 1990’s. The pattern is similar to 
the review as presented by Bansal and Gao (2006) and shows a stable publication rate, with a 
number of peaks in 1995, 1998 and 2000 that reflects the publication of special issues on PES 
in the Academy of Management Review in 2005 and in the Academy of Management Journal 
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in 2000. No definite explanations can be found for the peak in 1998, although Bansal and Gao 
(2006) suggest that this surge may be the effect of a sudden increased attention in PES in 
general, in response to the 1995 AMR Special Issue, or because of a larger supply of recently 
graduated doctoral students that publish their doctoral research. Although Bansal and Gao 
(2006) concluded that the publishing rate was stable over the period 1995 – 2005 when 
correcting for the special issue peaks, the 3-year average trend line in Figure 3.2 nevertheless 
shows that the number of publications has grown from almost nothing in the beginning of the 
1990’s to about 18 papers per year today. 
Observation 2: “Proactive environmental strategies” cover a broad spectrum of 
operationalizations, confusing the comparability of findings. 
 As argued in the introduction and the methods section, many denominations have been 
used to refer to the equivalents of “proactive environmental strategies”. In addition to the key 
words that we used in our search, we found such alternatives as “ecologically sustainable 
organizations”, “corporate environmentalism”, “pollution prevention strategies”, 
“enviropreneurial marketing” and many more. In addition to this semantic variety, however, 
the “environmental strategies” have been operationalized and measured in multiple ways as 
well. In order to assess the way PES were manifested in the literature, I first coded all papers 
on their conceptual or empirical contribution, yielding 66 conceptual (33%) and 136 (67%) 
empirical papers. I then focused only on the empirical papers and coded whether PES were 
used as a dependent variable or independent variable (112 papers), and indicated how the PES 
was manifested. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the uses of each PES proxy. Whereas 
some studies measure PES by the strategic intentions and attitudes towards the natural 
environment (Rojsek, 2001; Goldstein, 2002), others have used more actions-based proxies 
(Gilley, Worrell, Davidson, & El-Jelly, 2000; Aragon-Correa, Matias-Reche, & Senise-
Barrio, 2004; Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Pujari, 2006), environmental management systems 
(Curkovic, Melnyk, Handfield, & Calantone, 2000; Jiang & Bansal, 2003; Potoski & Prakash, 
2005; McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005), awards and/or events (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; 
Banerjee, 2001), membership of programs (such as Responsible Care in the chemical industry 
or the CST scheme in Costa Rica) (King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera & De Leon, 2005; Lenox, 
2006), and still others have used a combination of practices and (perceived) environmental 
results (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Sharma, 2000; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004; Bansal, 2005).  
 Such a plethora of meanings of PES has led some authors to differentiate between 
“environmental orientation” and “environmental strategy” (Banerjee, 2001; Banerjee, Iyer, & 
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Kashyap, 2003). Whereas environmental orientation is “the recognition by managers of the 
importance of environmental issues facing their firms”, environmental strategy reflected “the 
extent to which environmental issues are integrated with a firm’s strategic plans” (Banerjee 
et al., 2003: 106). Other authors conclude that “there are different types of proactive 
initiatives and practices, and that they might not always be reduced to a single dimension” 
(Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2005c: 2). As a result, the most recent articles, and 
most specifically those published in operations management journals, have engaged in a 
further refinement of correlations between antecedents and consequences of specific 
subdimensions of PES, such as strategic practices vs. operational practices (Gonzalez-Benito 
& Gonzalez-Benito, 2005a; Wagner, 2007) or product-related improvements vs. process-
related practices (Gilley et al., 2000). Such further refinements are likely to increase in the 
future, since they uncover the complexity of processes that are underlying the broader concept 
of proactive environmental strategy. This will also become clear in the discussion of the 
antecedents and consequences of PES. 
Table 3.2 - Proxies used for PES in empirical literature 
PES proxy Number % 
Actions 57 51 
Intentions + actions 19 17 
Environmental management system 14 13 
Intentions 8 7 
Actions + results 6 5 
Program membership 5 4 
Awards + events 2 2 
Patents 1 1 
Total 112 100 
 
Observation 3: The larger enterprise dominates PES research. 
A third element that emerged from the literature was its predisposition towards 
investigations of the larger firm. In order to get a more quantitative estimate of the firm size 
balance in the sample, I coded all empirical papers on the size of the firms that were used in 
their investigation. As the cut-off levels, I used the earlier presented definition of micro (< 10 
employees), small (10-50 employees), medium (50-250 employees) and large (> 250 
employees) businesses as provided by the European Commission. Table 3.3 presents an 
overview of this analysis.  
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Table 3.3 - Size of firms investigated in empirical papers 
Type Number % 
Micro 2 1 
Micro + Small 3 2 
Micro + Small + Medium 6 4 
Micro + Small + Medium + Large 6 4 
Small 1 1 
Small + Medium 2 1 
Small + Medium + Large 16 12 
Medium + Large 18 13 
Large 65 48 
N/A 10 7 
Level of analysis other than firm level 7 5 
Total 136 100 
 
 Although small and medium-sized businesses generally represent over 99% of 
businesses and generate over 40% of economic added value and 60% of the employment in a 
country (Observatory of European SMEs, 2003), they are represented in less than 30% of the 
research. Furthermore, investigations that are specifically interested in PES in small or micro-
businesses are almost inexistent. Only 4% of the papers in the sample were specifically 
focused on this group of firms. Such a low interest in small businesses is not only 
inappropriate because of the large impact small firms have on the natural environment (at 
least, in cumulative terms), but the models that have been developed for large firms may also 
not be applicable to smaller firms: “Given differences in the structure, governance, scale, 
reach and resource base of large and small enterprises, it would be unwise to presume that 
findings in the general literature can be directly applied to the small company sector” 
(McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005: 200). Before making such conclusions, however, the next 
subsections are dedicated to a thematic overview of the models and relations that have been 
either proposed or tested based on theoretical and empirical work in the sampled papers.  
 
3.4. Thematic review of the literature 
 As mentioned before, I have structured my review along two major streams in the 
literature, namely the antecedents and consequences of PES. As a roadmap through the 
various constructs that were defined in this process, Figure 3.3 presents an overview of the 
categories that are presented in each of the following subsections. 
Chapter 3 
56 
Figure 3.3 - The antecedents and consequences of PES 
 
3.4.1. Antecedents of Proactive Environmental Strategies  
A large part of the literature has been interested in the reasons why and when a firm 
would be inclined to adopt a PES. In line with the description of strategy in the former 
chapter, I have summarized these antecedents as the external drivers and contingencies 
(outside-in perspectives), and the internal drivers and facilitators (inside-out perspectives). In 
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the next subsections, I will discuss the literature of each of these antecedents and highlight 
gaps in the literature where this dissertation aims to contribute. 
3.4.1.1. Internal drivers: motivation and goal-related factors (a) 
 The importance of motivations and goal-related factors becomes most evident when 
asking the question “why do firms not adopt a PES”? In general, this question generally elicits 
the response “because they simply do not want to.” In other words, a lack of motivation is 
considered one of the most important reasons why firms do not take environmental issues into  
 
account, let alone be proactive in the matter. One of the most comprehensive efforts to 
synthesize the internal drivers for PES to date can be found in Bansal and Roth (2000). Based 
on their findings in 53 diverse companies, using several data sources, they proposed 
“environmental responsibility”, “competitiveness” and “legitimacy” as the three main 
motivations for environmental responsiveness and some indications were given on their 
implications for the level of proactivity assumed. Their model was further confirmed by 
Gonzalez-Benito and Gonzalez-Benito (2005a) in a survey among Spanish firms and several 
contributions in the literature can be fit in to their framework. This has given both interesting 
and sometimes diverging conclusions. 
1. Environmental responsibility. Although the level of our analysis is the firm, a number 
of authors have argued that the strategies, initiatives and actions spring from the 
personal theories, values and perceptions of individuals operating in the firm (Egri & 
Herman, 2000; Prakash, 2001; Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2005b). Several 
studies therefore highlighted the importance of “environmental champions” or 
“environmental stewardship” in the firm: employees or managers that have – as an 
individual – a concern for the environment and sell their concern inside the 
organization (Bansal, 2003). Only when there was some form of commitment from 
employees (Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Bansal, 2003), or more importantly from 
strategic decision-makers (Sharma, 2000; Banerjee, 2001; Banerjee et al., 2003; 
Aragon-Correa et al., 2004; Branzei, Ursacki-Bryant, Vertinsky, & Zhang, 2004; del 
Brio, Fernandez, & Junquera, 2007), did firms engage in strategic environmental 
actions. In their study on ‘environmental leaders’, Egri and Herman (2000) found that 
such individuals were mostly characterized by an openness to change, self-
transcendence and ecocentrism, along with personality characteristics that correlate 
well with entrepreneurship and leadership. However, despite the importance of 
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individual values, Bansal (Bansal, 2003) found that the speed, scope and scale of an 
organization’s response to environmental issues depended on the combined effect and 
congruence of individual concerns and organizational values. This finding is 
important, since it highlights how individual concerns may be attenuated by the 
culture and values of his or her environment.  
2. Competitiveness. Businesses will also be more inclined to adopt PES when they 
perceive environmental responsiveness as an opportunity to increase or secure the 
longer-term profitability of the firm (Sharma, 2000; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Banerjee, 
2001; Bansal & Bogner, 2002; del Brio & Junquera, 2002; Banerjee et al., 2003; 
Carmona-Moreno, Cespedes-Lorente, & De Burgos-Jimenez, 2004; Gonzalez-Benito 
& Gonzalez-Benito, 2005c). The need for this competitiveness argument pervades 
almost all studies that discuss motivational antecedents of PES. While some believe 
that attention to the natural environment will spawn innovations, reduce costs and 
uncover new market opportunities (Shrivastava, 1995a; Porter & van der Linde, 
1995b), other think that such win-wins between economic and environmental 
prosperity are only possible to a certain point and will incur costs from thereon 
(Walley & Whitehead, 1994; Palmer et al., 1995; Schaltegger & Synnestvedt, 2002). 
As a result, many firms that do not engage in more proactive types of environmental 
strategies motivate their choice by referring to a lack of competitiveness benefits 
(Boiral, 2006).  
3. Legitimation. Another internal motivator for the adoption of PES is the sensitivity of a 
firm to the way it is perceived as a legitimate organization by its constituencies, both 
internal and external. Whereas competitiveness relates more to legitimacy in the 
market, legitimacy here is referred to the goodwill an organization receives from 
society to continue its existence or practices (Suchman, 1995), both in response to 
social (regulatory) and stakeholder (non-regulatory) issues (Clarkson, 1995). Firms 
adopting PES out of legitimation reasons do so in order to comply or stay ahead of 
regulation (Shrivastava, 1995a; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2003; Clemens 
& Douglas, 2006). In addition, especially firms that have lost their legitimacy at some 
point are more likely to adopt a PES in response to assure their “license to produce” 
for the future. In its most cynical form, firms may even adopt a PES to counter or 
cover up for other, less ethically defendable practices (Williams & Barret, 2000; 
Bansal & Clelland, 2004).  
  Chapter 3 
 
59 
These three internal drivers have been found in a wide variety of sectors and hold in 
different firms with different sizes. It is important to note, however, that each of these 
motivation categories are ideal types. In reality, firms with proactive environmental strategies 
will do so as a result of a combination of motivations. In fact, the highest levels of proactivity 
are likely to emerge from firms where all three motivations are present. Yet two important, 
seemingly contrasting conclusions on the internal drivers for PES can be drawn from the 
literature: (1) the all pervasive importance of competitiveness and external pressures and (2) 
the need for a moral commitment perspective.  
1. The need for competitiveness and external pressures. Many studies have found that 
employees and managers stay away from selling their concern with the environment as 
a moral responsibility and sell it as an ‘amoral’ (Crane, 2000) business benefit 
(Banerjee, 2001; Bansal, 2003) or inevitable threat (Fineman & Clarke, 1996):  
“motives of ethics and social responsibility for greening initiatives are rarely claimed 
by executives other than those from social mission companies. This suggests that 
coercion from powerful stakeholders, such as pressure groups and regulators, 
mediated by politically adept and professionally ambitious internal champions, is 
more likely to encourage corporate greening than any voluntary moral impulses or 
principles.” (Crane, 2000: 691).  
The message that echoes from many studies that have investigated the antecedents of 
environmental responsiveness is one of warning: firms will only engage in practices or 
strategies that go beyond the law if they see an economic benefit in it, or when 
resistance would result in reduced legitimacy with its constituencies. In the absence of 
such incentives, the number of firms with PES will remain largely marginal. 
2. The need for moral commitment. Given that we define PES as the voluntary 
internalization of environmental impacts beyond legal requirements, the former 
conclusion could provoke pessimism and cynicism about the mere existence and 
credibility of PES. Are environmental strategies not always a response to some form 
of external pressure? And, if yes, then how can one still consider them to be the result 
of ‘voluntary’ initiatives? Yet despite the apparent need for external pressures in many 
companies, “directly or indirectly, corporate environmental action depends on how 
stakeholder pressures connect with managers’ values, with their personal theories of 
economic/instrumental purpose, and with their self or role identities.” (Fineman & 
Clarke, 1996: 728). To the minimum, this implies that action is impossible without 
managers or employees making sense of, or being concerned with the natural 
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environment. To the maximum, this suggests that – in the end – external pressures are 
not necessary for those firms engaging in proactive environmental strategies. The 
studies of Branzei and colleagues (2004), Buysse and Verbeke (2003) and of Aragon-
Correa and colleagues (2004) show that external pressures are not always necessary to 
champion natural environmental issues. Many case studies and surveys that have 
probed firms for the underlying mechanisms why they have gone beyond legal 
requirements still refer to a moral and ethical responsibility “to do good” or “to do the 
right thing” (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Banerjee, 2001). This implies that behind many 
proactive environmental strategies, an affectionate, value-laden moral sensitivity is 
hidden, triggering exploration and further commitment to take the natural environment 
into account. It is exactly this affectionate component that differentiates PES from 
many other strategies (Halme, 2002). Such a conclusion may especially be important 
in smaller firms, where the organizational goals and values reflect those of the 
owner/manager more so than the management in larger firms. As such, the effect of 
the personal values of a manager can be expected to be larger in smaller firms than in 
larger firms (Aragon-Correa, Hurtado-Torres, Sharma, & Garcia-Morales, 2008). 
In sum, we can conclude that the adoption of PES will be a result of the interplay of 
both internal and external drivers. Since both external pressures and internal motivations seem 
to influence why a firm engages in practices that take it beyond the law to internalize the 
natural environment in its strategy, I conclude that any endeavor undertaken to investigate 
PES should be mindful of both perspectives.  
 
3.4.1.2. External drivers: institutions (b) 
Whereas the focus of the former literature has been mostly concerned with the 
adoption of PES deriving from deliberate managerial choices, a second stream in the literature 
has been investigating PES as a result of external pressures exerted on organizations. The PES 
literature sometimes gets the critique of being overly “evangelic” (Newton & Harte, 1997) in 
believing that organizations will voluntarily take environmental issues into account. Although 
the critics of this “overoptimistic” view of PES acknowledge the need for more business 
attention to the natural environment, they warn that the majority of firms will only engage in 
more proactive environmental strategies in the event of increasing public or regulatory 
pressure (Newton & Harte, 1997). In addition, concerns are raised whether increased public 
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pressure will even be enough to stimulate business to – either voluntarily or out of 
instrumental concerns – move towards more environmentally friendly directions.  
The research on external drivers for PES is embedded in the theoretical categories as 
provided by institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). More specifically, studies have been 
done on the responses of firms to individual or combinations of pressures as defined in 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) framework of coercive, normative and mimetic pressures. 
Coercive pressures stem from legal requirements, the breaching of which involves a legal 
sanction. Normative pressures follow from social obligations and duties that are associated 
with membership of a community or association. Finally, mimetic pressures emerge as the 
imitation and continuance of successful practices from peers or tradition in response to 
uncertain or ambiguous situations. The empirical contributions investigating the adoption of 
environmental strategies in response to these institutional pressures show a progressive 
refinement and understanding of the relevant processes involved.  
1. Coercive pressures. As was mentioned before, legal requirements are among the most 
important drivers for PES. Many studies demonstrate how environmental 
responsiveness is the result of the perceived pressures from regulatory bodies 
(Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Andrews, 1998; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; 
Banerjee, 2001). In the context of proactive environmental strategies, however, this 
regulatory influence is somewhat problematic. Since we defined a proactive 
environmental strategy as organizational actions beneficial for the natural environment 
beyond regulatory requirements, the influence of coercive pressures should still be 
assessed in the way a firm’s actions and strategies go beyond these pressures. The 
literature provides three interesting findings in this perspective. First, the most 
proactive firms often do not consider coercive pressures to be important. In their study 
of 197 large Belgian firms, Buysse and Verbeke (2003) found that firms with pollution 
prevention strategies (medium proactivity) attached far more importance to coercive 
regulatory pressures than those firms with a reactive strategy (least proactive) and a 
leadership (most proactive) strategy. They argued that leadership firms would be more 
driven by internal drivers and would hence consider regulatory pressures only as an 
extra support rather than as the main driver. Similar results were found by Rivera and 
De Leon (2005), who reported that the most environmentally proactive CEO of Costa 
Rican hotels did not consider regulatory incentives important for their strategies. Also, 
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Clemens and Douglas (2006) found that firms that already had superior resources 
associated with PES perceived significantly less coercive pressures than their less 
proactive peers. Second, Maxwell and colleagues (2000) found that a perceived threat 
of regulation, without the actual threat being in place, functioned as a great stimulus 
for firms to decrease their environmental impact. Third, recent studies indicate that 
multinational companies (MNCs) often take up proactive environmental strategies in 
the clear absence of host country environmental regulations, yet follow the 
standardized practices emanating from their headquarters which operated in 
organizational fields where these institutional pressures for attention to the 
environment are present (Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000; Christmann, 2004; Child & 
Tsai, 2005). All these studies indicate that coercive pressures will influence the 
environmental responsiveness of a firm, but do not seem to instigate firms to opt for 
more proactive strategies and go beyond legal requirements. 
2. Normative pressures. The impact of normative pressures on the adoption of PES is 
somewhat inconclusive, and mostly depends on both structural features of the firm and 
the characteristics of the stakeholder that is exerting some kind of pressure on it. A 
widely used and confirmed perspective in this context is the responsiveness 
organizations develop in response to a firm’s internal (employees, shareholders) and 
external constituents (suppliers, customers, civil society organizations). Various 
studies have shown that firms develop PES to abide to the wishes of these myriad 
stakeholder pressures (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; 
Bansal, 2005; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). The term “stakeholders”, however, seems to 
cover a range of actors that is too broad to make conclusive statements about which 
responses are elicited by whose interests. Whereas some studies found that the internal 
stakeholders were most important (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003) and that lobby groups 
were considered of negligible influence (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996), others found 
that firms only developed PES in response to external ‘campaigning’ organizations 
(Fineman & Clarke, 1996). A potential explanation for these results lies with the 
specific relational interdependencies between a firm and its stakeholders, and the 
power of the stakeholder over the resources needed by the firm (Frooman, 1999; 
Sharma & Henriques, 2005). Often ignored in the literature that uses a stakeholder 
perspective to PES, however, are the within-industry normative pressures that derive 
from trade associations and professional associations that represent the sector 
(Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999; Wade-Benzoni, Hoffman, Thompson, Moore, Gillespie, 
  Chapter 3 
 
63 
& Bazerman, 2002). Over the last decades, several industries around the globe have 
made collective agreements with governments to realize environmental improvements 
through self-regulation (Segerson & Miceli, 1998; Delmas & Terlaak, 2002). Several 
studies have indicated that trade association membership can be an important stimulus 
for the adherence to these voluntary programs (Hoffman, 1999; King & Lenox, 2000; 
Rivera, 2002). Yet, despite the normative pressures exerted from trade and 
professional associations to achieve a collective environmental goal, strong forces for 
opportunism exist to defect (King & Lenox, 2000; Darnall & Carmin, 2005; Lenox, 
2006). Only when groups are small enough or when some sort of normative sanction 
or exclusion criterion exists, will firms conform to the normative pressures for self-
regulation (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; King & Lenox, 2000; Maxwell, Lyon, & 
Hackett, 2000; Kollman & Prakash, 2002; Orsato, den Hond, & Clegg, 2002; Potoski 
& Prakash, 2005; Lenox, 2006).  
3. Mimetic pressures. Mimetic pressures present themselves mainly in situations of 
higher uncertainty. In situations where little (valuable) information is available to 
predict the evolution of a firm’s environment or the strategic actions of its 
constituents, firms may emulate the opinions or behaviors of leading individuals or 
organizations in the industry. They do so to keep the firm from suffering social or 
financial sanctions resulting from actions deviating from the social norm. Both the 
conceptual and the empirical literature, however, are again in conflict on how the 
mimetic pressures influence PES. The larger part of the literature argues that firms 
will conform to the clout of industry associations and leading firms and adopt PES as a 
result (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Rivera, 2002; Bansal, 2005; Clemens & 
Douglas, 2005; Child & Tsai, 2005; Shah & Rivera, 2007). Bansal (2005), for 
example, found that firms started conducting environmental audits in response to 
mimetic pressures. Child and Tsai (2005) found that MNCs in China and Taiwan often 
adopted the same environmental manners as those of other members of local networks, 
such as the American Chamber of Commerce. Similar results were found by Shah and 
Rivera (2007) in the export processing zones in Trinidad and Tobago. Also, voluntary 
initiatives for environmental self-regulation like the Responsible Care program in the 
chemical industry hinge on the mimetic pressures of the larger and more visible 
business in the industry to attract and retain members (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 
2006). Yet the direction of within-industry pressures is not always conducive to the 
adoption of proactive environmental strategies. Bansal and Roth, for example, found 
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that mimetic within-industry pressures tended to discourage higher levels of 
proactivity to the environment “because it made other field members ‘look bad’, (…) 
ratcheted up standards for other field members, raising operating costs”, and made 
them “conform to standard industry practice” (2000: 731). Such hesitancy towards 
PES would especially be present in organizational fields with high levels of cohesion 
(close and embedded connections between field members). This would suggest that 
the most proactive firms are actually going against mimetic pressures within their 
industry, which is confirmed by a few studies that found lower importance of 
competitor pressures among proactive firms (Andrews, 1998). Most interesting, 
however, is that the majority of studies that investigate business responses to 
stakeholders simply do not include trade associations or within-industry pressures 
(Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Fineman & Clarke, 1996; Banerjee, 2001; Banerjee et 
al., 2003; Lefebvre, Lefebvre, & Talbot, 2003; Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2006; Eesley & Lenox, 2006) or focus predominantly on the pressures they 
exert in favor of proactive environmental strategies as argued above. 
The former paragraphs demonstrate the importance of each of the institutional forces 
on the adoption of PES. Institutional theory literature suggests, however, that the institutional 
environment always consists of a combination of coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
and their relative importance may change between sectors, between organizational fields, and 
also over time. One important factor for such dynamic changes in the relative importance of 
institutional pressures comes with ‘triggering events’. The importance of triggering events has 
been documented in several publications by Hoffman in the chemical industry (Hoffman, 
1999; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). In his historical analyses of the US chemical industry over 
the last four decades, Hoffman was able to demonstrate how important events changed the 
norms and responses of chemical companies and of their constituents. Events may shift the 
power, legitimacy and the urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997; Eesley & Lenox, 2006) of certain 
stakeholders, instigating a change in business behaviors more in line with stakeholder 
demands.  
Together, these empirical studies highlight the growing importance of institutional 
pressures pushing businesses to strategies more inclusive of the natural environment. This 
influence is widely accepted and empirically confirmed. However, these papers also highlight 
that very similar stakeholder pressures may be perceived differently among firms, with 
different responses to stakeholder pressures as a result. The presence of stakeholder pressures, 
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by itself, is thus not a good predictor for the adoption of PES. Although many explanations 
can be given why these differences in perceptions exist and why not all pressures from a 
firm’s constituencies result in the adoption of PES, I believe the current literature has 
neglected two potential explanations: 
1. A first reason is that a firm simply may not experience any pressure. Pressures can 
only be responded to if they exist. Even in these times in which the natural 
environment is rising on the public agenda, an individual firm may not be exposed 
to any noticeable pressure about it. Although it is often argued that there is an 
increasing public interest in the environmental actions of firms, this is not always 
the case: “not everyone is equally interested in all aspects of preserving the 
environment, and some [stakeholders] may be more inclined to act than others” 
(Aragon-Correa & Rubio-Lopez, 2007: 362). This may be especially the case with 
smaller firms (Azzone, Bertelè, & Noci, 1997; Noci & Verganti, 1999; Hillary, 
2000a; del Brío & Junquera, 2003; Vernon, Essex, Pinder, & Curry, 2003), of 
which the perceived contribution to pollution may be considered negligible both 
by stakeholders and the firms themselves (Merritt, 1998; Hillary, 2000a). As a 
consequence, in many industries only the larger and more visible firms attract the 
scrutiny from both regulators and the general public (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Greening & Gray, 1994; Goodstein, 1994; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Although 
smaller size is not necessarily correlated with lower visibility (Bowen, 2000), 
smaller firms may nevertheless benefit from their “stealth” (Chen & Hambrick, 
1995) and remain invisible to public scrutiny. As a result, if small firms experience 
any institutional pressure, it is mostly coercive (Worthington & Patton, 2005; 
McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005), which makes the adoption of environmental 
initiatives beyond legal expectations more a result of “elective action” than a result 
of an urgent response to economic or institutional pressures (Bansal & Bogner, 
2002).  
2. Secondly, pressures for more PES may conflict with other pressures that resist 
PES.  Institutional pressures against increasing environmental attention still exist. 
As described in chapter 1, the movement towards the voluntary adoption of 
environmental practices by companies represents a paradigm shift (Gladwin et al., 
1995; Purser et al., 1995; Kilbourne, Beckmann, & Thelen, 2002; Starkey & 
Crane, 2003; Prasad & Elmes, 2005), with inevitable institutional inertia as a result 
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(Kuhn, 1962; Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999). Although some coercive and 
normative pressures may push firms in the direction of more proactivity towards 
the environment, they may therefore conflict with more conservative within-
industry normative and mimetic pressures that defend an industrial common goal 
of maintaining the business-as-usual. Especially the within-industry mimetic 
pressures should not be underestimated, given that “mimicry is more likely than 
normative pressure to influence organizations in a field to adopt concepts and 
practices related to ecological sustainability” (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995: 
1034). The uncertainty of adopting a PES may be larger than not having one, 
which directs the isomorphic pressures inwards towards traditional and thus ‘safer’ 
grounds. The influence of these cognitive institutions is particularly strong among 
smaller firms. As said, smaller firms are less visible to the larger public. Small 
businesses have therefore been found to be strongly influenced by the cognitive 
frameworks that are shared with peers and the local business community (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Brown & King, 1982; Vyakarnam, Bailey, Myers, & Burnett, 1997; 
Arbuthnot, 1997; Tilley, 2000). Hence, only when the dominating practices and 
taken-for-granted assumptions are changed or questioned, will organizations move 
along towards more proactive environmental strategies. Yet similar resistance may 
exist among larger firms as well. Given the high probability that increased 
normative pressures and regulatory requirements will need organizational change 
or even make current business models impossible, “there are indications that 
business networks are actively resisting moves towards increased compulsion” 
(Newton & Harte, 1997: 90), and that the scant initiatives of business 
environmental networks (such as the Business Council for Sustainable 
Development and the Global Compact) are “just a pretence to subvert the 
environmental agenda and fight off regulatory control” (Newton & Harte, 1997: 
90). Research has shown that the most polluting firms are also the firms that spend 
most money to lobbying with politicians represented in environmental 
commissions (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Cho et al., 2006), especially larger firms 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In conclusion, firms are probably under differing 
pressures from their various constituencies in the organizational field, pushing 
them in opposite directions. An inquiry in how firms react to or reconcile the 
institutional pressures that are in fact against the adoption of PES, however, is 
lacking to date. 
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3.4.1.3. Internal facilitators (c) 
 Besides the internal motivations and goals of the firm, several studies have revealed 
that the presence of certain organizational structural features, resources or capabilities may 
foster the development of PES. Beware that my focus here is not on how resources or 
capabilities aid in the execution of PES, but on their impact on the presence of such strategies.  
1. Firm size. The empirical evidence indicating a positive correlation between a firm’s 
size and the likelihood of it having a PES is overwhelming (Florida, 1996; Russo & 
Fouts, 1997; Aragon-Correa, 1998; Judge & Douglas, 1998; Spence, Jeurissen, & 
Rutherfoord, 2000; Sharma, 2000; King & Lenox, 2000; Hillary, 2000a; Remmen, 
2001; Gil, Jimenez, & Lorente, 2001; Schaper, 2002; King & Lenox, 2002; Chan, 
2005; Bansal, 2005; Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2005c; Elsayed, 2006; Shah 
& Rivera, 2007). Smaller firms tend to adopt strategies that are focused on merely 
complying with the law (Azzone et al., 1997; Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; Hillary, 
2000a; Remmen, 2001; McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005), and are even “vulnerably 
compliant” (Petts, Herd, Gerrard, & Horne, 1999): smaller firms may not be aware of 
their legal requirements, making compliance sometimes more the result of luck than of 
a particular strategy. As a consequence, most of the literature suggests that PES are 
rare among small businesses. Despite these general assertions, a few studies have 
indicated that a refined picture that takes moderating factors into account is necessary. 
For example, recent results in the Canadian forestry industry indicate how smaller 
firms were constrained by their size in the more technical PES, where scale seems to 
have a benefit, yet that firm size did not have an effect on the adoption of 
ecostewardship practices or the general alignment of environmental issues with the 
firm strategy (Sharma & Henriques, 2005). In addition, ample anecdotal evidence 
seems to indicate that PES do exist among small businesses and are sometimes even 
championed by smaller firms (UNIDO, 2002; European Commission, 2003c). Such 
contradictory evidence indicates that firm size may hide undercurrents that may be 
better explanatory factors for PES than only size (Bowen, 2002a; Lepoutre & Heene, 
2006). 
2. Strategic proactivity. Several studies have found that firms which have more proactive 
postures in general will more likely adopt a PES as well (Aragon-Correa, 1998; 
Aragon-Correa et al., 2008). Often this proactivity was reflected in the prior presence 
of advanced capabilities such as R&D intensity developed by the firm (Arora & 
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Cason, 1995),  total quality management capabilities (Klassen, 2000; Curkovic et al., 
2000), or general knowledge and education about the environment (Schaper, 2002; 
Fryxell & Lo, 2003)  which have also been found to have a positive impact on PES 
adoption. 
3. Discretionary slack. Although some correlation may exist with firm size, discretionary 
slack is another recurrent important facilitating factor for the adoption of PES. 
Discretionary slack refers to the latitude one has over one’s decisions, due to an 
abundance of resources which function as a “cushion of actual or potential resources 
which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for 
adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate changes 
in strategy with respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois, 1981: 3).  Several 
studies have found that slack resources facilitate the adoption of PES (Russo & Fouts, 
1997; Sharma, 2000; Bowen, 2002b; Bansal, 2003; Aragon-Correa et al., 2004; 
Bansal, 2005; Clemens & Douglas, 2006), yet that its mere presence is not enough: 
“slack may facilitate strategic environmental behaviours, but will not necessarily 
initiate them” (Bowen, 2002b). Slack may provide the space for strategic change, 
innovation and experimentation, but hinges on the motivation of an individual to 
dedicate the slack to PES. 
4. International experience. A number of studies indicate how the exposure of a firm to 
different national contexts increases the probability that it will adopt a PES (Buysse & 
Verbeke, 2003; Lefebvre et al., 2003; Bansal, 2005). International experience is 
related to an increased openness to stakeholders, which has been found as an 
important predictor of PES adoption (Klassen & Whybark, 1999a). However, not all 
international experience seems conducive to PES. King and Shaver (King & Shaver, 
2001), for example, found that foreign firms investing in the US lagged their US 
counterparts in waste prevention. The complexity in regulatory differences was 
proposed as a possible explanation. 
5. Ownership. Only three studies were found that discussed the ownership influences on 
the adoption of PES, unfortunately with contradictory results. Given that family-
owned firms often have a longer strategic horizon, have a stronger attachment to the 
reputation of the firm and to the community to which it belongs (Sharma & Irving, 
2005), it is hypothesized that family firms would be more inclined to adopt PES. 
However, whereas Dyer and Whetten (2006) were able to conform this hypothesis, 
Craig and Dibrell (Craig & Dibrell, 2006) found opposing results. Hence, further 
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research awaits the impact of the ownership structures on firm PES. Besides 
ownership by family or not, differences between public (government-based) and 
private (market-based) ownership were also investigated. Darnall and Edwards (2006) 
hypothesized and confirmed that due to the lower prior presence of advanced 
capabilities in public companies (total quality management, inventory control and 
pollution prevention capabilities), they inherited higher costs of adopting an 
environmental management system. 
The large variety in responses with regards to the identified influences highlight, 
again, that generalizing across firms is difficult. In addition to the internal drivers and 
facilitators, and the external drivers, studies have also focused on the impact of external 
contingencies on the adoption of PES. These are discussed next.  
3.4.1.4. External facilitators: contingencies (d) 
 In addition to the institutional forces that may push firms to adopt a PES, the literature 
has also identified a number of external contingencies that moderate the response 
organizations develop towards the natural environment. More specifically, these 
contingencies may pull firms towards or deter them from PES. In a recent article, Aragon-
Correa and Sharma (2003) modeled these influences in the most comprehensive framework to 
date, by looking at three important contingencies of the task environment: munificence, 
complexity and uncertainty. Munificence refers to “the scarcity or abundance of critical 
resources needed by (one or more) firms operating within an environment” (Castrogiovanni, 
1991: 542), usually to accommodate growth in an industry (Dess & Beard, 1984). Complexity 
results from the number and diversity of factors that influence the general business 
environment (Smart & Vertinsky, 1984), increasing the difficulty to locate the levers that 
make the environment manageable or understandable. Uncertainty refers to the “perceived 
inability to predict something accurately” because one “perceives himself/herself to be 
lacking sufficient information to predict accurately or because he/she feels unable to 
discriminate between relevant data and irrelevant data” (Milliken, 1987: 186). Together, 
these three external factors can be used to capture the external contingencies of PES adoption. 
1. Munificence. Munificent business environments, as opposed to hostile environments, 
are characterized by an abundant supply of resources and capabilities (private or 
public) that feed in the industry. Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) hypothesized that 
munificent environments are conducive to the adoption of PES, because they allow 
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extra support, resources and learning abilities to aid in the uncertain and novel 
practices that may be associated with their introduction. The empirical literature seems 
to agree with this hypothesis. Halme (2002), for example, found that more munificent 
business environments allowed for more experimentation and learning that is needed 
for the sometimes novel practices associated with PES. McEvily and Zaheer (1999) 
found that small firms’ embeddness in a munificent network of ties facilitated the 
acquisition of pollution prevention capabilities. Finally, industry growth rates (Russo 
& Fouts, 1997) and subsidies (Russo, 2003) have been found to foster the 
development of PES. 
2. Complexity. Given that PESs are dealing with issues that have effects both in the 
social and economic realm, the number of factors and sometimes diverging interests 
are large. Matos and Hall argue that the complexity of strategies inclusive of natural 
and social issues had “increased complexities and presented ambiguous challenges 
that many current environmental management techniques cannot adequately 
address.” (2007: 1083)  As a result, Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) argue that the 
likelihood firms will want to take up this additional complexity in already complex 
environments is small. The higher the complexity in the general environment, the 
lower the probability firms will adopt a PES.  
3. Uncertainty. The impact of uncertainty plays out both (1) on the general business 
environment, as well as (2) on the uncertainty on how environmental issues or 
strategies will affect the firm. First, when the general business environment has high 
levels of uncertainty altogether, firms will be accustomed to the need to innovate and 
scan the environment for information and would thus be more inclined to adopt PES. 
Sharma and colleagues (2007), for example, demonstrated how the likelihood that ski 
resort organizations had a PES increased with their higher perception of general 
environmental uncertainty. In contrast, Baker and Sinkula (2005) did not find the 
environmental turbulence to have an effect (neither positive or negative) on the 
presence of enviropreneurial marketing strategies in the firm. As it seems, the effect of 
uncertainty in the general environment on PES adoption has not yielded conclusive 
results. Second, when uncertainty exists about how issues related to the natural 
environment will affect either the firm (effect uncertainty) or its decision effects 
(response uncertainty), the likelihood that firms will engage in PES will be lower. In 
general, the natural environment embodies high levels of unpredictability, given the 
ongoing substantive uncertainty (Lepoutre et al., 2007) on the environmental effects of 
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certain practices (biodiversity risks in genetically modified organisms, human impact 
on climate change, etc) and the complexity of ecosystems – “everything is connected 
with everything else” (Lewis & Harvey, 2001: 202). Lewis and Harvey (2001), for 
example, found that executive perception of the general environment in the textile 
industry significantly increased when the natural environment was included in the 
uncertainty analysis. Firms would therefore mostly adopt a wait-and-see approach to 
proactive environmental investments or technologies (Rugman & Verbeke, 1998). 
Empirical evidence comes mostly from the impact of issue salience. The more visible 
and traceable a firm’s impact on the environment is and the more emotions it elicits 
among its constituents, the higher the likelihood firms will adopt a PES. This is 
reflected in the findings of several studies that especially the most visibly polluting 
sectors adopt PES in response to the high levels of scrutiny they get (King & Lenox, 
2000; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2003). Also, Jiang and Bansal (2003) and 
Potoski and Prakash  (2005) for example, found that issue salience increased the 
likelihood of firms adopting an ISO 14001 environmental management system in 
response to institutional pressures.  
The description of these three contingencies shows how the external environment, in 
addition to the influence that it exerts as a driving force, also sketches the background against 
which firms make their decisions and which facilitate or inhibit the adoption of PES. The 
variety of studies that confirm this influence further assert that studies investigating proactive 
environmental strategies benefit from insights in these external conditions. 
 
3.4.1.5. Summary 
The picture that emerges from the different factors that influence the adoption of PES 
is one of complexity: whether a firm goes beyond legal requirements to integrate 
environmental concerns in its strategy is a result of both internal and external drivers and 
facilitating factors. As a consequence, the likelihood that overarching predictions can be made 
about the adoption of PES is low. In fact, this has led some authors to link the existence of 
“myths” and “misunderstandings” that exist about PES to the sometimes “evangelic” and 
normative exclamations that exist about PES (Newton & Harte, 1997; Prasad & Elmes, 2005; 
Aragon-Correa & Rubio-Lopez, 2007):  
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“We strongly advise avoiding the temptation to apply general prescriptions to the 
analysis of environmental strategies, and recommend using a contingent lens instead. 
Improving corporate environmental performance is urgent for a sustainable world, 
but environmental management demands a specific analysis of each firm and its 
business and general context.” (Aragon-Correa & Rubio-Lopez, 2007: 375) 
 
3.4.2. Consequences 
 As with many studies in strategy and management, the dependent variable that attracts 
the most attention of researchers is the question whether there are competitive benefits 
associated with PES. In addition, a natural interest would also be to investigate whether PES 
actually result in better environmental performance. This second section is dedicated to both 
effects of PES and the factors that influence their impact. 
3.4.2.1. Environmental performance (e) 
 Although the improvement of the natural environment is the final goal of PES, 
remarkably little studies actually asses whether firms with a PES are successful in achieving 
improved environmental performance. Most studies seem to assume, however, that the 
adoption of proactive environmental practices automatically generates good environmental 
performance. Applications of social behavior theory on environmental intentions learn that 
noble intentions do not necessarily result in actions or willingness to act (Derksen & Gartrell, 
1993; Schaper, 2002; McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005). For example, studies have shown that a 
firm disclosing a commitment to a PES, is not necessarily effective: a firm may disclose a 
commitment for “impression management” reasons, to decrease the impact of unsystematic 
risk (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). In addition, very few voluntary environmental programs or 
standards really check whether the environmental performance of their members really 
improves (Darnall & Carmin, 2005; Potoski & Prakash, 2005), which results in the adoption 
of PES on the fringe and not at the core of the firm strategy (Wagner, 2007; Boiral, 2007). 
Another explanation could lie in the measurement of PES: “some studies have used 
environmental management indicators as part of environmental performance”, and others 
“have measured environmental performance within the variable environmental management” 
(Claver, Lopez, Molina, & Tari, 2007: 607). For example, environmental performance has 
been measured as having an environmental management system (Lefebvre et al., 2003; Chen, 
Lai, & Wen, 2006), awards (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996), the perception of reductions 
relative to competitors (Branzei et al., 2004) and self-reported improvements of emissions 
(Melnyk, Sroufe, & Calantone, 2003; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004).   
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The few existing studies that do investigate the PES - environmental performance 
relationship seem to convey a startling finding: it is almost as if all firms engaging in a PES 
are successful in their endeavor (Klassen & Whybark, 1999a; Clelland, Dean, & Douglas, 
2000; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004; Chan, 2005; Potoski & Prakash, 2005). Given the considerable 
challenges that the natural environment imposes to most organizations in terms of 
uncertainties, paradigm shifts, inexistent experience, etc, one would expect this not to be 
generalizable across all firms. More research would be needed to investigate the difference 
between intentions and results. 
3.4.2.2. Economic performance (f) 
 Studies investigating “whether it pays to be green” have been interested in both the 
impact of PES on economic performance, as well as the impact of environmental performance 
on the economic performance. In this context, economic performance has been investigated as 
return on assets, stock price, market share and combinations of these aforementioned 
indicators (Wagner & Schaltegger, 2004; Wagner, 2007). Although a formidable number of 
papers promote the “business case of greening” by pointing at cost reductions, revenue 
enhancements, the strengthening of supplier ties, improved public image, reduction of 
liabilities, etc (Gallarotti, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995a), empirical results are inconclusive. 
Whereas the majority of studies indicate a positive association of PES with economic 
performance (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Klassen & Whybark, 
1999b; Dowell et al., 2000; Clelland et al., 2000; Gil et al., 2001; King & Lenox, 2002; 
Melnyk et al., 2003; Carmona-Moreno et al., 2004; Chan, 2005; Chen et al., 2006), others find 
opposing results (Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001; Galdeano-Gomez & Cespedes-Lorente, 2004; 
Bansal, 2005) or are inconclusive (Gilley et al., 2000; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004; Menguc & 
Ozanne, 2005; Wagner, 2005; Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2005c; Wagner, 2007). 
This has led some authors to suggest that the relationship between PES and economic 
performance follows an inverse U-shaped pattern (Schaltegger & Synnestvedt, 2002; Wagner, 
2005): environmental efforts may have an increase in economic performance first, but “sooner 
or later the increased environmental effort will represent net costs” (Schaltegger & 
Synnestvedt, 2002:341-342). The actual point at which environmental investment return net 
costs, however, depends on both internal (management) and external (consumer preferences, 
available technologies, etc) factors. In order to further refine the relationship between 
environmental strategies or environmental performance and financial performance, a number 
of studies have therefore argued in favor of and introduced mediating and moderating 
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variables. Such an endeavor derives from the fact that it is very unlikely that a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ rule for the link between proactive environmental strategies and financial performance 
would exist (Aragon-Correa & Rubio-Lopez, 2007; Wagner, 2007): 
“discussions of business and the environment are too often derailed into sterile 
arguments about whether it “pays to be green”, as though the answer had to be 
categorical. Rather than searching for an unconditional answer, it is useful to ask 
under which circumstances it makes sense from a business standpoint for firms to 
invest in in environmental performance.” (Reinhardt, 1999: 10) 
Again, both internal and external moderators have been proposed and investigated to 
refine the PES – economic performance relationship. In what follows, I will discuss the 
findings that have emerged from my reading of the literature in this perspective. 
3.4.2.3. Internal moderators (g) 
 Most of the moderating and mediating factors that have been studied in PES - 
environmental/economic performance relationship are embedded in the resource-based view 
of the firm. The underlying logic is that PES instigate the development of complex, path-
dependent and embedded capabilities, which in turn increase the competitive advantage and 
the financial or environmental performance of the firm (Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997; 
Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). The theoretical basis is the ‘Natural 
Resource Based View of the Firm’ (Hart, 1995), which states that the natural environment 
imposes constraints to organizations that will necessitate the development of specific 
capabilities to remain competitive in the market. In fact, Marcus and Anderson have 
demonstrated that the complex capabilities needed for environmental management can only 
derive from having a mission that reflects a proactive environmental strategy (2006). Several 
of such capabilities have been identified in both conceptual and empirical papers:  
- innovation (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Christmann, 2000; Lefebvre et al., 2003; 
Chan, 2005; Chen et al., 2006)  
- continuous improvement and total quality management capabilities (Kitazawa & 
Sarkis, 2000; Hanna, Newman, & Johnson, 2000; Darnall & Edwards, 2006) 
- higher-order learning (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Chan, 2005; Williander & Styhre, 
2006) 
- integration of stakeholder perspectives (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Klassen & 
Whybark, 1999b; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Pujari, 2006)  
- cross-functional teams (Pujari, Wright, & Peattie, 2003; Pujari, 2006) 
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- employee involvement (Kitazawa & Sarkis, 2000; Hanna et al., 2000; Forman & 
Jorgensen, 2001; Ramus, 2001; Tien, Chung, & Tsai, 2005; del Brio et al., 2007) 
- the integration of environmental issues in strategic planning and core managerial 
processes (Judge & Douglas, 1998; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; del Brio et al., 2007; 
Wagner, 2007)  
- flexibility to reverse investments (Rugman & Verbeke, 1998)  
- capacity for change (Judge & Elenkov, 2005). 
Whereas most of these capabilities were investigated to determine their impact on the 
financial performance, some studies have also shown these capabilities to have an impact on 
the environmental performance, for example higher-order learning (Lapre, Mukherjee, & Van 
Wassenhove, 2000; Halme, 2002; Chan, 2005), innovation (Chan, 2005), stakeholder 
integration (Chan, 2005), integration of environmental issues in the strategic planning process 
(Judge & Douglas, 1998). 
 In addition to resources and capabilities, a number of studies hint that structural 
variables may also act as moderators. Here, firm size has been found with both positive 
(Wagner, 2007) as well as negative (Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2005c) and without 
effects (Orlitzky, 2001).  Also, Craig and Dibrell (2006) found that firms with PES achieved 
higher innovation capabilities and greater financial performance when they were family firms. 
These former structural features have led researchers to believe that the idiosyncratic nature of 
smaller firms will require a specific analysis on the resources and capabilities that aid in the 
execution of PES (McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005; Etzion, 2007; Aragon-Correa et al., 2008). At 
the moment, however, only Aragon-Correa and colleagues (2008) have investigated whether 
the capabilities that were found in larger firms were also needed for successful PES execution 
in small firms. In their study among 108 Spanish small garages they found that garages 
benefitted from similar resources and capabilities as large firms, i.e. shared vision, 
stakeholder management and strategic proactivity. 
3.4.2.4. External contingencies (h) 
 In addition to the internal factors that mediate or moderate the PES – environmental 
and economic performance relationships, external factors have also been shown to have an 
influence. Again, we draw on Aragon-Correa and Sharma’s (2003) contingency framework to 
synthesize the findings in the literature. 
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1. Munificence. The potential positive effects of PES on competitive advantage seem to 
be attenuated in munificent environments. Given that more hostile conditions (as 
opposed to munificent conditions) make it more difficult for competitors to imitate 
complex and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) and that capabilities generating 
experience and credibility are more important in hostile environments (Brush & Artz, 
1999), Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) hypothesized that most benefits in terms of 
competitive advantage could be harvested in hostile environments. Similar 
propositions were also made by Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995b), 
who suggested that environmental regulations – decreasing the munificence – would  
result in increased firm performance (the ‘Porter hypothesis’). Regulation attracts the 
formation of support industries for pollution abatement (Greaker, 2006), or may 
induce new innovations which accrue competitive advantages, especially to first 
movers (Nehrt, 1996). Two rare studies among smaller firms, however, present 
conflicting results on Aragon-Correa and Sharma’s proposition. Whereas Clemens 
(2006) found that higher munificence in the form of green subsidies negatively 
impacts firm profitability, Lefebvre et al. found that “firms whose products are facing 
adverse market conditions find it difficult to turn environmental initiatives into 
profits” (2003: 277).  
2. Complexity. Complexity in the general business environment seems to have a positive 
influence on the competitive advantage of PES as well. Maintaining the argument as 
presented above that a PES is associated with the development of capabilities which 
are difficult to imitate, Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) suggested that the few firms 
that develop a PES in a complex environment, will be able to reap benefits from their 
capabilities. Empirical indications have been found again in the context of 
environmental regulation: since environmental regulation is often complex and may 
require changes in business practices, firms that have engaged in proactive 
environmental practices benefit from their early mover learning advantages (Nehrt, 
1996). In addition, such complex regulation may function as an entry barrier to new 
firms (Dean & Brown, 1995), decreasing the competitive threat that otherwise may 
have come from new entrants (Porter, 1980).  
3. Uncertainty. Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) finally predict that uncertainty in the 
general environment will strengthen the PES ~ competitive advantage relationship. 
Conversely, they predict a weakened relationship in situations where the effects of the 
natural environment on the organization are uncertain or when it has difficulty to 
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predict the outcomes of one’s decisions. To our knowledge, there are no studies that 
have explicitly looked at either of these propositions. One indication comes from 
Baker and Sinkula (2005), who found that industry turbulence did not have any effect 
on the effect of enviropreneurial marketing on the development of market share, yet 
positively effected new product success as a result of enviropreneurial marketing. As it 
seems, more empirical research will be needed to further investigate the impact of 
uncertainty. 
 
3.4.2.5. Summary 
 The general pattern that emerges from studies on the consequences of PES is that – in 
general – firms with PES seem to generate better environmental and economic results. 
However, the literature also shows that these positive results may hide more complex effects 
that combine both positive and negative impacts of underlying processes and that these effects 
may also change over time. Capturing this complexity requires a further refinement of the 
measures and proxies which are used for both environmental and economic performance. 
Investigations that build upon how both internal resources and capabilities and external 
conditions work together to influence these constituting sub-elements are thus required to 
further understand the consequences of PES. 
 
3.5. Discussion and research questions 
 In the foregoing sections, my objective was to summarize the extant literature on 
proactive environmental strategies. In this process, I followed an approach that is in line with 
two of the most important research questions that drive the literature on PES: (1) what are the 
driving forces and facilitating factors that predict organizations to adopt a proactive 
environmental strategy (antecedents), and (2) does a proactive environmental strategy lead to 
better environmental and/or economic performance, and when (consequences)? Although the 
extant literature is young, the reviewed literature demonstrates an ongoing effort, both 
theoretically and empirically, to increase the understanding of both these antecedents and 
consequences associated with PES. Despite the valuable results this endeavor has yielded so 
far, a number of questions remain unanswered or have yet to receive definitive answers. 
Specifically, the complexity that derives from the multiple combinations of interacting 
influences that drive and facilitate PES suggests that each unique combination of factors has 
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its own challenge. As a result, the research on antecedents and consequences of PES may best 
benefit from investigations that focus on these challenges and underlying processes: 
“If a group of business academics wrote that all firms ought to seek differentiated 
niches in their marketplaces, or that all should maintain debt to capital ratios of 40%, 
or that all should seek maximum employee empowerment, executives would respond, 
correctly, that the answers depend on the nature of the business. (…) So too with the 
environment; the right strategy depends on the industry and the firm.” (Reinhardt, 
1998: 647) 
 In responding to the idiosyncratic challenges that stem from the interplay between 
organizational and contextual factors, the recent literature has argued in favor of using a 
perspective that use both inside-out theories (e.g. resource-based view, dynamic capability 
perspective) and outside-in theories (e.g. institutional theory, resource dependency theory, 
contingency theory). Whereas some papers have included institutional theoretical perspectives 
with resource based perspectives (Bansal, 2005; Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Clemens & 
Douglas, 2006), others have used a combination of contingency theory and resource-based 
perspectives (Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Chan, 2005; Sharma, Aragon-Correa, & 
Rueda-Manzanares, 2007). In sum, the future of PES research is to be found in applying 
combinations of theoretical lenses that take both internal and external aspects of PES into 
account. From my literature, I identify two important research gaps that may benefit from 
such an approach:  
1. PES in small businesses. Although the evidence indicating a positive correlation 
between firm size and the adoption of PES is overwhelming, there is both anecdotal 
and more complex empirical contradictory evidence that suggests that other processes 
are at work. With the many influences that determine both PES adoption and its 
consequences, it remains unclear how a small firm size impacts both the willingness 
and the ability of firms to engage in PES. In addition, remarkably few studies exist 
that have explicitly taken a small business lens to look at PES. Not all studies that 
have been focused on “smaller firms” were talking about smaller firms in absolute 
terms (less than 50 employees and less than € 10 million turnover or balance sheet), 
which is reflected in the remarkably low share of studies that have been specifically 
interested in small firms. As a result, my first research question is: 
RQ1: What is the impact of firm size on the adoption of PES in smaller firms? 
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The literature is adamant when it comes to differentiating between smaller and large 
firms. As Welsh and White said, “small firms are not little big firms” (Welsh & White, 
1981); and small firms need their own theoretical developments (Dandridge, 1979; 
d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988). As mentioned, the theoretical models and the 
empirical tests of their validity have been mostly focused on larger firms. In fact, some 
studies have used the low responsiveness of small firms to PES as a legitimation to 
focus their empirical work and theory development only on large firms (Andrews, 
1998; Sharma, 2000). As a result, several authors have noticed this lack of small 
business specific research and have called for more theoretical and empirical inquiry 
to fill this void in theory (Hillary, 2000a; del Brío & Junquera, 2003; Clemens, 2006; 
Etzion, 2007; Aragon-Correa et al., 2008). In addition, most of the small business PES 
literature that has been developed to date has explored the antecedents of PES 
adoption. An inquiry into the processes and capabilities that influence the 
consequences of PES in small businesses, however, remains limited to date. As a 
notable exception of some preliminary recent results in this area, Aragon-Correa and 
colleagues were able to show that “size, a common proxy for organizational resources, 
is a relevant but not a deterministic condition for developing the most proactive 
environmental strategies” (Aragon-Correa et al., 2008: 98). Furthermore, their 
findings indicate that “even SMEs can adopt proactive environmental practices and 
that these practices can lead to superior financial performance via specific 
capabilities based on the unique strategic characteristics of SMEs” (Aragon-Correa et 
al., 2008: 98). An in-depth exploration of the capabilities that small businesses require 
to successfully improve their impact on the environment, however, is lacking to date. 
As a result, 
 
RQ2: What are the resources and capabilities associated with successful PES 
execution in small businesses?  
 
2. PES in adverse conditions. A second research gap lies with the inconclusive results 
with regards to the effect of mimetic pressures. To date, most of the literature has 
viewed proactive environmental strategies as a response to institutional pressures for 
more attention to the environment to which companies should conform. The slow and 
limited growth of organic farming, the slow and marginal investment of car 
manufacturers in reducing car CO2 emissions and many more examples, however, are 
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evidence that proactive environmental strategies are still meeting considerable 
institutional inertia (Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999). Either this evidence should lead to 
the questioning of institutional theory, or the depiction of the institutional pressures is 
skewed. I argue that besides coercive and normative pressures present, most 
businesses encounter pressures which run counter to these societal forces and which 
are interested in a status-quo with a predominant focus on profits, exempt from the 
costs that environmental regulation or internalization would incur. Few contributions, 
however, have looked at how firms can realize a PES when the institutional conditions 
are against having one in the first place. As was mentioned before, these conditions 
are likely to be present especially in the institutional environment of small firms. As a 
result, 
 
RQ3: How can small business be successful in PES when the (institutional) 
conditions are against having one? 
 Although chances are high that other research gaps are hidden in the literature review, 
this dissertation is dedicated to increasing the knowledge about the three research questions 
that were mentioned. 
 
3.6. Overview of chapters addressing the research questions 
The remainder of this dissertation presents three studies that aim to answers the 
research questions as presented above. In order to guide the writer through this process, Table 
3.4 provides an overview of the research questions and methods used to answer them in the 
corresponding chapters. First, chapter 4 draws on a literature review to assess the impact of 
firm size on small business social responsibility, thereby including PES. Second, the focus of 
chapter 6 research question 2. By drawing upon a multi-case study in the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture sector, the methodology and context description of which is laid out in chapter 5, 
a set of capabilities are defined that helped small businesses in this context to realize proactive 
environmental strategies. Given that the particular context of the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture are against having such a PES, the findings of chapter 6 also provide an answer to 
research question 3. However, given that we found a number of theoretical inconsistencies in 
the institutional theory literature on how PES as an act of institutional non-conformity was 
possible among small firms, chapter 7 further analyses the results of chapter 6 within the 
context of institutional non-conformity. 
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Table 3.4 - Overview of research questions and corresponding chapters 
Chapter RQ1:  
 
What is the impact of firm size on 
the adoption of PES in smaller 
firms? 
RQ2:  
 
What are the resources and 
capabilities associated with 
successful PES execution in small 
businesses?  
RQ3:  
 
How can small business be 
successful in PES when the 
(institutional) conditions are 
against having one? 
4. The impact of firm size on small 
business social responsibility: a 
critical review 
Literature review   
5. Methodological and contextual 
introduction to the empirical 
studies 
   
6. Against all odds: Realizing 
proactive environmental 
strategies in small businesses 
 Multi-case study in Belgian 
ornamental horticulture 
Multi-case study in Belgian 
ornamental horticulture 
7. Fools breaking out: Explaining 
small business successful 
institutional non-conformity 
  Multi-case study in Belgian 
ornamental horticulture 
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Chapter 4 
 
Investigating the Impact of Firm Size on 
Small Business Social Responsibility2 
 
 
Abstract 
The impact of smaller firm size on corporate social responsibility is ambiguous. Some 
contend that small businesses are socially responsible by nature, while others argue that a 
smaller firm size imposes barriers on small firms that constrain their ability to take 
responsible action. This paper critically analyzes recent theoretical and empirical 
contributions on the size – social responsibility relationship among small businesses. More 
specifically, it reviews the impact of firm size on four antecedents of business behaviour: 
issue characteristics, personal characteristics, organizational characteristics and context 
characteristics. It concludes that the small business context does impose barriers on social 
responsibility taking, but that the impact of the smaller firm size on social responsibility 
should be nuanced depending on a number of conditions. From a critical analysis of these 
conditions, opportunities for small businesses and their constituents to overcome the 
constraining barriers are suggested. 
 
 
                                                 
2 This chapter was published as “Lepoutre, J. & Heene, A. 2006. Investigating the impact of firm size on small 
business social responsibility: A critical review.  Journal of Business Ethics, 67(3): 257-273.” It was presented in 
an earlier version at the EABIS Conference on Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Identifying the knowledge gaps, 15-16 December 2005, Durham Business School, UK.We wish 
to thank the participants of this conference, Bart Nooteboom, Mirjam Knockaert, Annick Willem, Geoff Moore, 
Laura Spence and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions to improve this paper. 
The Policy Research Centre for Sustainable Agriculture is gratefully acknowledged for the opportunity to carry 
out this research. 
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Preface 
 The current chapter addresses the first research question in this dissertation, i.e. “What 
is the impact of firm size on the adoption of PES in smaller firms? Here, the goal is to refine 
the analysis that was presented in the former chapter and specifically focus on the interaction 
between the small scale of small firms and its impact on the ability and willingness of small 
firms to engage in PES. As became clear in chapter 3, however, extant literature on small 
business PES remains scarce to date. Hence, we decided to broaden the scope of the literature 
review, and include insights from the broader business and society scholarship. Given that the 
broader “corporate social responsibility” literature is dedicated to the investigation of 
organizational behavior that goes beyond legal expectations in addressing general social 
issues, of which the natural environment is a subset, the findings should be appropriate to PES 
as well. In addition, we also included reports and non Web of Science-papers and books in the 
review of this paper. 
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4. Investigating the Impact of Firm Size on Small Business Social 
Responsibility: A Critical Review 
4.1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has gained salience in 
academic literature (de Bakker, Groenewegen, & den Hond, 2005). However, although CSR 
can be applied to all sorts of businesses, regardless their size or sector, it has been 
predominantly investigated at the level of the larger firm (Spence, 1999; Hillary, 2000a; 
Observatory of European SMEs, 2002; del Brío & Junquera, 2003; Werner & Spence, 2004). 
A specific investigation of CSR in a small business context is important for three reasons. The 
first argument is that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) constitute 99% of all 
business in the EU and are responsible for 66% of total employment and around 40 % of the 
total value added in the EU (Observatory of European SMEs, 2003). Their impact on society 
is therefore underestimated and ignoring SMEs in research is “in fact totally inappropriate” 
(Spence & Lozano, 2000). Second, implementing CSR in large enterprises is not necessarily 
the same in SMEs. Small firms are not little big firms (Dandridge, 1979; Welsh & White, 
1981) and have a number of specific characteristics which have an impact on what a small 
business social responsibility constitutes. Finally, large firms are becoming increasingly 
entrepreneurial in nature, implying that the research on small business social responsibility 
may yield valuable insights for larger enterprises as well (Quinn, 1997). 
Although the literature on small business social responsibility (SBSR) has been 
growing over the last years, the knowledge on SBSR is still fragmented and has not yet 
developed into a coherent theory. A theory is important, as it provides an economic means to 
organize information in a way that is internally and externally consistent, verifiable, has 
generality and possesses scientific parsimony (d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988). Such a slow 
theory development can be explained by the fact that, in general, it is difficult to integrate all 
small businesses in one general theoretical framework (d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988; 
Curran & Blackburn, 2001). The small business community is very heterogeneous and 
behaviour is influenced by a number of factors. The same variety seems to exist in SBSR 
research. The influence of firm size on SBSR, for example, yields diverging results and 
opinions. On the one hand, a number of reports state that small firms are better positioned and 
equipped for socially responsible behaviour than large firms. Small businesses are often 
celebrated for such social benefits as creating jobs, inducing economic growth and 
introducing innovations (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999; Audretch, 2002; European Commission, 
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2003b). In addition, many small businesses attract clients and employees in the local 
community. As having a good reputation is of paramount importance to their competitiveness, 
small businesses would naturally engage in practices that are aligned with their stakeholders’ 
wishes and behave socially responsible (Besser, 1999; BITC, 2002; European Commission, 
2003c; EMSF, 2004). Furthermore, the entrepreneur, as a specific type of the small business 
owner-manager, is associated with personality traits that increase the likelihood of responsible 
behaviour (Teal & Carroll, 1999; Solymossy & Masters, 2002). For those reasons, it is often 
stated that due to their very nature, small businesses are socially responsible, but that they just 
do not know they are (BITC, 2002; EMSF, 2004).  
Other researchers have found that small businesses experience more difficulty than 
larger firms to take their social responsibility. Many small business owner-managers have 
never thought about CSR or believe that their social and environmental impact is negligible 
(Petts et al., 1999; Hitchens, Thankappan, Trainor, Clausen, & De Marchi, 2005). Small 
business managers themselves argue that they have no time or resources to dedicate to social 
responsibility (Tilley, 2000; Observatory of European SMEs, 2002; BITC, 2002) and that 
obeying the law may be a problem to begin with (Tilley, 1999; Petts et al., 1999; Gerrans & 
Hutchinson, 2000). Empirically, these statements have been substantiated by a number of 
studies that have found a positive relationship between size and community involvement or 
environmental behaviour among SMEs (Murphy, Smith, & Daley, 1992; Besser, 1999; 
Observatory of European SMEs, 2002; BITC, 2002; Vives, Corral, & Isusi, 2005), and similar 
impacts of firm size on CSR have been found among larger enterprises as well (Greening & 
Gray, 1994; Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Sharma, 2000; Brammer & Millington, 2006).  
These conflicting observations demonstrate that the question whether and how the 
small business context influences CSR remains unresolved. In this article, we therefore want 
to contribute to the development of SBSR theory by critically reviewing the relationship 
between firm size and small business social responsibility. We will do so by consecutively 
exploring the effects of size on four antecedents of managerial and organizational behaviour. 
Our analysis begins with issue characteristics, then personal characteristics, followed by 
organizational characteristics and finally context characteristics. We conclude our paper with 
a discussion on the implications of our model for practice and theory and suggest directions 
for future research. 
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4.2. Defining the Small Business and its Social Responsibility 
Small businesses have been distinguished from larger companies by such criteria as 
financial turnover, assets, market share, numbers employed and ownership (Curran & 
Blackburn, 2001). The cut-off levels that are chosen along those dimensions, however, vary 
considerably between studies and are sometimes not even reported (Spence, 1999; Hillary, 
2000a). We take the EU definition for small enterprises, with inclusion of micro-businesses, 
as a starting point. Small businesses are those that have less than 50 employees and have a 
turnover or balance sheet total that does not exceed € 10 million (European Commission, 
2003a). Furthermore, Spence recommended that “small businesses should be defined as those 
with fewer than 50 employees, and that they should be owner-managed and independent” 
(Spence, 1999: p. 169). In this paper, we focus on those businesses that fall within the scope 
of both these definitions, because it allows a narrowed focus and increased possibility of 
finding patterns that are generalizable across companies. Although studies that also comprised 
medium-sized enterprises were not excluded, they were only included if their results were 
also valid for small business. 
We base our definition for SBSR on the European Commission’s publication on 
“Responsible Entrepreneurship”, in which it defined the responsible entrepreneur as one that 
(1) treats customers, business partners and competitors with fairness and honesty; (2) cares 
about the health, safety and general well-being of employees and customers; (3) motivates his 
workforce by offering training and development opportunities; (4) acts as a ‘good citizen’ in 
the local community; and (5) is respectful of natural resources and the environment (European 
Commission, 2003c). In our review of SBSR literature, we have thus integrated contributions 
from “small business ethics” issues, “social responsibility” issues and “environmental” issues. 
In order to cover the impact of size on all the contingent factors of SBSR behaviour, 
we follow a number of reviews that have classified the contingent factors of small business 
behaviour into four, more or less similar, dimensions (d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988; Chau 
& Siu, 2000; Solymossy & Masters, 2002; Longenecker, Moore, Petty, Palich, & McKinney, 
2006): issue, personal, organizational and context characteristics. Issue characteristics refer to 
the situation or the matter of concern to SBSR behaviour; personal characteristics relate to the 
values, competencies and actions of the owner-manager; organizational characteristics 
involve the tangible and intangible resources and structures of the firm; and context 
characteristics refer to the economic, social and institutional factors which are external to the 
organization.  
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4.3. Issue characteristics 
In the literature on small business social responsibility, we find a number of instances 
where the “moral intensity” of social responsibility issues – the moral imperative that a 
certain situation generates – varies with firm size. In his landmark paper, Jones (1991) 
proposed a model that explains moral action on the basis of six dimensions of issue moral 
intensity. The higher the moral intensity of these dimensions, the more likely a person will (1) 
recognize the moral issue; (2) use sophisticated moral reasoning; (3) develop an intention to 
behave morally; and ultimately (4) behave ethically. Recent research suggested that these six 
dimensions can be reduced to three (McMahon & Harvey, 2006): Probable Magnitude of 
Consequences, Proximity and Social Consensus. Probable Magnitude of Consequences refers 
to the probability that an action will have a certain level of effect in time. Proximity relates to 
the feeling of social, cultural, psychological or physical closeness of the agent with the victim 
(or beneficiary) of the action. Social Consensus indicates the level of social agreement that the 
action is evil (or good).   
Empirical research found that large and small enterprises are very similar with regard 
to the importance they attach to abstract normative ethical, social and environmental 
principles (Longenecker, McKinney, & Moore, 1989; Merritt, 1998; Bucar, Glas, & Hisrich, 
2003). However, small and large businesses differ with regard to the responsibility issues 
recognized once these abstract principles are applied in specific situations in reality 
(Longenecker et al., 1989; Humphreys, Robin, Reidenbach, & Moak, 1993; Hornsby, 
Kuratko, Naffzigger, LaFollette, & Hodgetts, 1994; Lahdesmaki, 2005). Small business 
owner-managers are particularly sensitive to activities related to their immediate internal 
stakeholders (employees, customers and suppliers), involving loyalty in their (often close) 
relationship with customers and employees; openness, honesty and fairness in contracts, 
agreements, payments and (marketing) information; pricing issues among competitors; and 
the origin of resources (Humphreys et al., 1993; Hornsby et al., 1994; Vyakarnam et al., 1997; 
Vitell, Dickerson, & Festervand, 2000; Lahdesmaki, 2005). On the other hand, such unethical 
actions as padding expense accounts, often resulting in a higher income for the owner-
manager, are experienced as less problematic (Longenecker et al., 1989; Murphy et al., 1992). 
Also, SBSR actions in domains external to the firm (e.g. community and the natural 
environment) are relatively limited and fragmented (Tilley, 1999; Tilley, 2000; BITC, 2002; 
Vives et al., 2005), predominantly because small business owner-managers “have never 
thought about it” (Observatory of European SMEs, 2002).  In Latin America, for example, 
only 5% of small businesses remained idle with respect to internal SBSR activities. In 
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contrast, inactivity concerning external stakeholders and the environment was much higher 
(39% and 52% respectively) (Vives et al., 2005). Moreover, the fact that compliance with 
labour legislation was much higher than with environmental legislation serves as additional 
evidence for this variety in issue perception. Although similar trends can be found among 
medium-sized and large firms, these larger firms nevertheless showed higher activity levels in 
environmental and external social issues (Observatory of European SMEs, 2002; Vives et al., 
2005) and were also more prudent with regard to operational and tax issues than they had 
concerns about marketing issues (Murphy et al., 1992). 
This empirical evidence indicating the differences in perception between smaller and 
larger firms can be explained by the moral imperative that is experienced along the three 
moral intensity dimensions as summarized by McMahon and Harvey (2006). First, size has an 
effect on the perceived Probable Magnitude of Consequences. Whereas the effects of 
unethical behaviour in marketing issues are often very visible and open to external scrutiny, 
financial issues are not as widely audited in small firms as they are by the formal controls in 
larger firms (Longenecker et al., 2006). Thus, the issue visibility – whether the behaviour can 
be noticed by constituents inside or outside the organization (Bowen, 2000) – is important, as 
it influences the magnitude of the consequences of irresponsible behaviour. Likewise, a 
number of researchers have demonstrated that many small businesses perceive their impact on 
the natural environment or their efforts to improve it to be negligible (Holland & Gibbon, 
1997; Merritt, 1998; Petts et al., 1999; Ludevid Anglada, 2000; Observatory of European 
SMEs, 2002; Schaper, 2002; Hitchens et al., 2005; Vives et al., 2005). If individual behaviour 
does not result in immediately noticeable improved or worsened environmental outcomes in 
specific situations, then many people are not willing to engage in such behaviour despite their 
abstract concern with society or the environment (Sharma, 2000; Schaper, 2002), especially 
when “bad” behaviour is followed with only mild punishment (Trevino & Youngblood, 
1990). However, when there is a perception that such an effort is part of a shared 
responsibility to work for environmental betterment, then small business owner-managers will 
be more willing to accept their own responsibility (Spence et al., 2000; Ludevid Anglada, 
2000).  
Second, size also influences the Proximity of the responsibility issues. After reviewing 
22 studies on the stakeholder pressures related to small business environmental performance, 
Hillary found that few customers were interested in the environmental performance of small 
businesses, possibly because they also believe that the small business impact on the 
environment is negligible (Hillary, 2000b). Stakeholder pressures for environmentally 
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responsible behaviour are thus not always present (Holland & Gibbon, 1997; Gerrans & 
Hutchinson, 2000), partly explaining the reduced importance given to specific environmental 
actions. On the other hand, researchers have suggested and found higher employee 
commitment to the organization and job satisfaction when higher ethical values are present 
(Hunt, Wood, & Chonko, 1989; Turban & Greening, 1996; Schwepker, 2001; Valentine, 
Greller, & Richtermeyer, 2006). It is obvious that the Proximity of the effects of internal 
SBSR actions is therefore much higher than external issues such as community involvement 
and the natural environment. 
  
Finally, Social Consensus also has a different impact on small businesses. Differences 
in SBSR have been found both in the same culture (Serwinek, 1992; Smith & Oakley, 1994; 
Teal & Carroll, 1999; Observatory of European SMEs, 2002) and between different cultures 
(Bucar et al., 2003; Vives et al., 2005). Small firms are influenced and affected by the general 
value systems which dominate their societal networks in their sector and in the rest of the 
value chain in which they operate (Arbuthnot, 1997; Tilley, 2000). Norms and pressures from 
community and peers constitute among the most important internal drivers for ethics (Brown 
& King, 1982; Petts et al., 1999). The influence of the local business community culture is so 
strong, that a small business owner-manager’s personal values developed in youth are 
displaced by the values of this community (Brown & King, 1982). Based on focus group 
conversations with small business managers, Vyakarnam et al. could report that:  
“one of the most strongly felt influences was the rules of the ‘game’ by which one 
operates in a given industry. There appear to be norms within the sub-culture of the 
industry which behoves an individual to conflict with it. (…) Other industries have 
norms around the way prices are set, deals are done and so on. These forces may be 
stronger influences on an individual than the national culture.” (1997: 1633).  
In summary, these empirical findings indicate that smaller firms do not necessarily recognize 
fewer issues, but recognize and experience different issues than larger firms. Small size 
results in different visibility of issues to both the business and its constituents, diminishes the 
sense of impact on society and the natural environment and increases the power of peer 
pressure within a certain industry. The imperative for socially responsible action is therefore 
mostly felt with regard to internal stakeholders and in a much lower level with regard to 
external stakeholders and the natural environment compared to larger firms. 
Chapter 4 
 
93 
4.4. Personal characteristics 
As owner-managed small businesses depend on the owner-manager for their 
management, an analysis of the peculiarities of small business owner-managers is germane to 
understanding the size – SBSR relationship. Contributions on the relationship between 
personal characteristics and socially responsible behaviour are dominated by two substreams. 
The first associates some typical personality traits of entrepreneurs with responsible 
behaviour. The second relates the general position of the owner-managers in a small business 
with regard to his or her possibility to interpret and act upon SBSR issues. 
4.4.1. Entrepreneurship and ethics 
Recently, we have seen great theoretical advances on the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and ethics. Especially the works by Solymossy and Masters (2002), Morris 
et al. (2002) and Longenecker et al. (2006) have added insight to the theory on the 
entrepreneurial antecedents of SBSR decision-making. Although Solymossy and Masters 
postulated that “the similarities between the predictors of entrepreneurship and of ethical 
behaviour are striking” (Solymossy & Masters, 2002: 235), their analysis and that of 
Longenecker et al. (Longenecker et al., 2006) also indicate that entrepreneurial traits are not 
necessarily always associated with more ethical behaviour. While entrepreneurship may yield 
new jobs, innovations and economic growth (Audretch, 2002), the entrepreneurial act may 
also be allocated to such activities as rent seeking or even crime (Baumol, 1990), or may 
result in innovations that pose new ethical problems to society (Hannafey, 2003). The 
entrepreneurial traits that have been used to explain these contradictory results are locus of 
control, need for achievement, tolerance of ambiguity, Machiavellism and Cognitive Moral 
Development (Morris, Schindehutte, Walton, & Allen, 2002; Longenecker et al., 2006).  
Entrepreneurs are said to have an internal locus of control, a high sense of control over 
the events in their environment (Shaver & Scott, 1991). Although a number of studies report a 
positive relationship between an internal locus of control and ethical behaviour (Zahra, 1989; 
McCuddy & Peery, 1996; Yurtsever, 2003), others were inconclusive (Hegarty & Sims, 
1978). Similarly, a high need for achievement has been identified as a typical entrepreneurial 
trait (McClelland, 1961) and has been associated with ethical decision-making (McClelland, 
1961), but only as far as the need for achievement does not involve a trade-off between ethical 
behaviour and some other entrepreneurial goal (Longenecker et al., 2006). As many ethical 
situations are ambiguous and ask for a careful balance of interests (Hannafey, 2003), tolerance 
for ambiguity, the ability to respond positively to ambiguous situations (Teoh & Foo, 1997), 
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has equally been related to ethical behaviour (Morris et al., 2002). Machiavellism, the act of 
influencing others to further a personal goal has only been found to have a negative influence 
on ethical decision-making aspects (Yurtsever, 2003). Finally, some evidence exists that the 
Cognitive Moral Development (Kohlberg, 1969), the level of cognitive skills that guide moral 
decision-making, is a fraction higher among entrepreneurs than among others (Teal & Carroll, 
1999), which would suggest that entrepreneurs are more likely to have higher ethical 
standards to begin with. In summary, results on the links between entrepreneurship and ethical 
behaviour are rather inconclusive. Entrepreneurship may thus be a convenient machinery for 
those people wishing to act in ethical ways, but is no guarantee that ethical behaviour will be 
deployed.  
Despite the interesting insights the works of Solymossy and Masters (2002) and 
Longenecker et al. (2006) have given, their focus is on entrepreneurs, a very specific type of 
small business owner-manager (Smith & Miner, 1983; Carland, Hoy, Boulton, & Carland, 
1984). They fit the definition of the “opportunistic entrepreneur”, who exhibits “breadth in 
education and training, high social awareness and involvement, confidence in their ability to 
deal with the social environment, and an awareness of, and orientation to, the future” (Smith 
& Miner, 1983: 326). At the other end of the spectrum is the “craftsman entrepreneur”, 
characterized by “narrowness in education and training, low social awareness and 
involvement, a feeling of incompetence in dealing with the social environment, and a limited 
time orientation” (Smith & Miner, 1983: 326). As Deeks (1973) suggested, only maybe one 
out of ten small businesses owner-managers may be an entrepreneur of the former type. In 
reality, most owner-managers will show features that position them somewhere in between 
those two ends of the spectrum. Restricting personality characteristics of small business 
owner-managers to those of entrepreneurs would therefore be a mistake. In the following 
section, we will expand our analysis to the stereotypical characteristics of the small business 
owner-manager. 
 
4.4.2. Characteristics of small business owner-managers 
Small business owner-managers are often depicted as having a permanent lack of time 
and a lack of (specialized) knowledge.  
“In small firms the entrepreneur often participates intensively in day to day 
production, on the shop floor. As a result, his time is extremely scarce. (…) Small 
firms will in majority have no specialized staff for finance, personnel or marketing, 
and certainly not for legal affairs.” (Nooteboom, 1994: 288) 
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The results on the impact of time on SBSR are well documented and also unanimous: small 
businesses that experience a lack of time are less likely to engage in SBSR practices 
(Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; Hunt, 2000; BITC, 2002; Schaper, 2002; Hitchens et al., 
2005). Likewise, the lack of knowledge about SBSR issues among small business owner-
managers has been described extensively (Holland & Gibbon, 1997; Tilley, 1999; Ludevid 
Anglada, 2000; Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; Hunt, 2000; Observatory of European SMEs, 
2002; del Brío & Junquera, 2003). However, those firms that delegate responsibilities and 
create an empowering and learning environment for SBSR seem to circumvent these time 
constraints (Petts et al., 1999). More networked firms also experience fewer problems with 
time and knowledge (Noci & Verganti, 1999; Hunt, 2000; Meredith, 2000; BITC, 2002). 
4.4.2.1. Time 
In the context of SBSR, a lack of time becomes a problem when it results in a 
deficiency of “discretionary slack” –  the latitude for managerial discretion to reduce internal 
or external pressures, resulting from excess time and resources (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & 
Tansik, 1988; Spence, 1999; Sharma, 2000). Discretionary slack has been identified as an 
important antecedent for innovative and environmental behaviour (Bourgeois, 1981; Sharma, 
2000; Bowen, 2002b). Slack discretionary resources allow firms to look for information that 
is not necessarily problem related, may allow firms to innovate in projects that do not require 
an immediate pay-off, may allow experimentation with new innovations or simply to reflect 
and learn on current processes (Bowen, 2002b). Those owner-managers that are occupied 
with “firefighting” operational problems or are reluctant to delegate discretionary 
responsibilities to employees are most likely characterized by lower levels of discretionary 
slack, often with an incomplete understanding of social responsibilities and its opportunities 
as a result. 
4.4.2.2. Knowledge 
Small business managers are often responsible for a wide variety of tasks in the 
company (from operational to strategic), with a lack of functional specialization and expertise 
as a result (Verhees & Meulenberg, 2004). Such knowledge, skills and experience are not 
only key to the performance of the firm in the short term (Barney, 1991), but they also have 
an impact on the absorptive capacity of the firm – the ability to recognize and exploit 
opportunities from outside the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Many small business 
managers simply have no time to collect the large amounts of information that are available to 
them, scan the impact they might have on stakeholders or the environment in the long or the 
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short run, interpret this information and find the necessary business solutions (Smeltzer, Fann, 
& Nikolaisen, 1988; Shrader et al., 1989). Moreover, knowledge in organizations exists in 
both explicit (transmittable in formal, systemic language) and implicit (personal, hard to 
communicate or formalize) forms (Nonaka, 1994). In small businesses, knowledge is 
predominantly present in implicit ways, based on experience (learning by doing) and often 
only in the head of the owner-manager (Nooteboom, 2004). For such knowledge it is much 
harder to formulate and accept criticism and engage in “higher order learning” – to deploy 
corrective action that changes the norms and the underlying principles that guide 
organizational behaviour (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Interestingly, the lack of knowledge often 
exists despite abundance in information (Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; Hunt, 2000; Hitchens 
et al., 2005), suggesting that the lack of knowledge is not only a contextual consequence, but 
also a result of the cognitive limitations of the human brain. Indeed, small business owner-
managers are typified by increased bounded rationality problems (Simon, 1982; Nooteboom, 
1994) in three dimensions: width (fewer functional areas in employees), depth (lower overall 
level of education) and variety (dominance of the personal perspective of the owner-
manager). This variety dimension relates to the strong relationship that an owner-manager has 
with his or her business. Such commitment may either result in a persevering or a stubborn 
way of dealing with SBSR issues, limiting the variety of knowledge inputs that are addressed. 
On the one hand, personal commitment gives the small business an advantage to deploy 
SBSR behaviour and act upon the knowledge and vision it stands for (Hannafey, 2003). 
However, it may put the small business in a less favourable position, when such commitment 
results in stubborn and self-centred behaviour, not allowing anyone in the firm to disagree or 
to be included in decision-making (Baron, 1998; Petts et al., 1999) or to be blind from their 
stakeholders’ wishes or suggestions (Vandekerckhove & Dentchev, 2005).   
However, businesses that are engaged in network structures increase their absorptive 
capacity (Meredith, 2000; Atherton, 2003). The mere effect of interacting with peers on 
production methods and business challenges is often a first step in externalizing implicit 
knowledge and organizational learning (Brown & Duguid, 1991). In addition, networks 
increase the availability of new information and knowledge to build the mental models that 
are potentially more in line with reality. As a result, networks have been cited as key media 
through which SMEs can learn on a wide variety of topics (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003), but 
also as the locus of new knowledge creation (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). 
We conclude that the specific position and personality characteristics of small business 
owner-managers do have an influence on SBSR behaviour. The effect and direction on SBSR 
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behaviour, however, depends on the type of owner-manager. Small businesses owner 
managers characterized by low levels of discretionary slack, limited absorptive capacities and 
reduced network relationships will less likely recognize SBSR issues or act upon them. 
Conversely, in the case that small business owner-managers can develop capabilities that 
create discretionary slack, allow organizational learning and build network relationships, then 
time and knowledge constraints will be greatly reduced. Also, small business owner-managers 
that have established intent for SBSR behaviour, will be more effective in the case they 
possess such entrepreneurial traits as need for achievement, internal locus of control and 
tolerance for ambiguity.  
4.5. Organizational characteristics 
As was suggested by Dean et al. (1998), small and large firms possess fundamentally 
different resources and capabilities. Relative to their larger counterparts, management 
literature typically describe small businesses as having less access to resources and being less 
powerful (Welsh & White, 1981; Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Nooteboom, 1994; Carson et al., 
1995; Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Dean et al., 1998). Although these characteristics have often 
lead researchers to conclude that small business would have a reduced possibility to engage in 
SBSR practices, our analysis will show that some caution is required. Again, contradictory 
evidence exists with regard to the relationship between the organizational characteristics of 
small businesses and SBSR. 
4.5.1. Resource poverty 
 Besides the time and knowledge constraints that were mentioned before, small 
business owner-managers cite a lack of financial resources as one of the most important 
barriers for engaging in SBSR (Ludevid Anglada, 2000; Hillary, 2000b; Observatory of 
European SMEs, 2002; Hitchens et al., 2005; Vives et al., 2005). However, firms 
demonstrating a higher environmental performance were not always found with more internal 
financial resources (Schaper, 2002; Hitchens et al., 2005) or to experience financial 
constraints (BITC, 2002). Several reasons exist to explain these conflicting streams of 
evidence.  
Evidence that confirms the financial resources barrier uses arguments related to cost 
considerations, investment prioritization and the burden of systemic innovations. First, in the 
minds of most small business owner-managers, SBSR activities are perceived as costs that 
will result in competitive disadvantage (Tilley, 1999; Ludevid Anglada, 2000; Gerstenfeld & 
Roberts, 2000). In addition, relative to their larger counterparts, small businesses have fewer 
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opportunities to reap the benefits of economies of scale, scope and learning (Nooteboom, 
1994), increasing the relative burden of these costs. Second, small businesses often experience 
immediate cash needs that do not allow them to build up large financial reserves, with a lack 
of slack financial resources as a result. A small business owner-manager may want to invest 
in employee training, community development or environmental technologies, but postpone 
such investments because of other investments or business needs which pose a more 
important and immediate need in the strategic or operational activities of the firm (Ludevid 
Anglada, 2000). “Business is not bad, it is just difficult – and in difficult times, the first goal 
of a business is to survive” (Fassin, 2005). Larger firms, on the contrary, often possess slack 
financial resources or easier access to external resources to finance such investments, allow 
workflow buffers or to employ teams specialized in CSR issues (Bourgeois, 1981; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996; Bowen, 2002b). Third, social or environmental problems sometimes require a 
systemic change either within a company or across a number of organizations to solve them. 
The costs and the risk for investing in solutions may consequently be too large for one firm to 
carry (Tilley, 1999; Fountain, 1999) and it might not be able to get loans or support from 
financial institutions because of this.  
By contrast, several explanations exist that challenge the financial arguments used by 
small businesses to defend their low SBSR activity. First, cash limitations are only 
experienced when SBSR actions would require financial resources. Increased SBSR is not 
necessarily associated with higher costs. Higher financial performance has been found in 
association with green performance (Schaltegger & Synnestvedt, 2002; Clemens, 2006). 
Second, companies that integrate SBSR in their overall strategy may not experience SBSR as 
an “add-on” and therefore not perceive SBSR as an extra cost (Vives et al., 2005), but rather 
as a cost advantage (Christmann, 2000). This is in line with the small business management 
literature indicating that a single-minded focus in strategy and resilience positively influences 
performance (Nicholson, 1998; Ebben & Johnson, 2005). Finally, slack resources may also 
result in satisficing behaviour (Bourgeois, 1981; Simon, 1982), preferring for example 
existing routines above environmental and more cost-efficient strategies (Bowen, 2002b). 
Although these streams of evidence present different opinions, they can nevertheless 
be integrated into one argument. Just as larger businesses, small business will experience 
limited financial constraints with those SBSR actions that have immediate returns or are 
strategically integrated in the management of the firm. However, due to a lack of (slack) 
financial resources, small businesses will experience more difficulty than larger firms to 
engage in SBSR actions that have no immediate return, require systemic changes or are 
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boundary spanning. As a result, even proactive small firms experience a lack of financial 
resources as a constraining factor (Palmer, 2000). 
4.5.2. Power 
Smaller size often results in lower negotiation power and leverage to modify 
environmental forces in the market, with their suppliers and in politics (Porter, 1980). In the 
context of SBSR, this lack of power is a problem when the small business depends on other 
actors to engage in SBSR activity itself. 
First, besides the effect of peer pressure on the recognition of responsibility issues, the 
small size of a business may also hamper it to actively go against generally accepted norms in 
an industry. Small business owner-managers generally perceive themselves to be more ethical 
than their peers (Tilley, 2000; Vitell et al., 2000; Ludevid Anglada, 2000). In the situation that 
SBSR action would increase production costs, then going against this dominant culture in a 
sector, with the danger of free-riding behaviour by their competitors, might be a considerable 
hindrance in taking socially responsible action (Vyakarnam et al., 1997).  
Similarly, the CSR behaviour of a small business’s partners in the supply chain has a 
major impact on small business behaviour itself (Arbuthnot, 1997; Dawson, Breen, & Satyen, 
2002). Clearly, this depends on the size and power of such constituents and whether they 
adopt a CSR strategy. The stimulating effect of large customers setting responsibility targets 
for their smaller suppliers has been widely acknowledged (Noci & Verganti, 1999; 
Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; Hunt, 2000; BITC, 2002). Conversely, irresponsible behaviour 
by larger customers impedes small businesses to engage in SBSR practices themselves: 
 “Heroic resistance to an oppressive power is the province of the students at 
Tiananmen Square, not the businessfolk in the capitalist societies the students risk 
their lives to emulate. Businesspeople do not stand on principle when it comes to 
dealing with abusers of power and trust. You have to adjust, we were told. If we dealt 
only with customers who share our ethical values, we would be out of business.” 
(Bhide & Stevenson, 1990) 
The sustainability of a business’s products may also depend on the characteristics of its 
resources, for which it may rely on suppliers in the market. If there are no players in the 
market that supply sustainable resources, this might be a situation that a small business cannot 
change by itself (Noci & Verganti, 1999). Likewise, when socially responsible action would 
require the cooperation of all players in the supply chain (e.g. closing material loops through 
waste recycling), SBSR action is only possible when parties up- and downstream of the 
supply chain are also willing to engage in such practices (Noci & Verganti, 1999). Larger 
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businesses then have more leverage to instigate socially responsible behaviour among their 
constituents.  
Finally, due to their limited individual political significance in terms of job creation or 
general social power, influencing political decision-making is limited (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). 
Not only do larger firms have more leverage, but they also have more resources they can 
dedicate to actively contribute in the policy making process (Bourgeois, 1981; Meznar & 
Nigh, 1995). Such political power is important when small firms want to aid in public policy 
making, for example to establish a ‘level playing field’ among peers, but also among players 
in the supply chain. When it comes to resolving boundary spanning social problems, small 
businesses expect a considerable role from the government in setting a ‘level playing field’ 
for all business, giving indications on environmental standards or guidelines (Tilley, 2000; 
Ludevid Anglada, 2000), rather than relying on voluntary self-regulation (Petts et al., 1999; 
Tilley, 2000). Small business therefore often work through employers’ organizations or 
branch organizations, that often do have an institutionalized place in the policy decision-
making process (Hillman & Keim, 1995; Doh & Guay, 2006). As we will further argue, these 
organizations thus have a considerable responsibility for the SBSR of their members as well. 
In summary, we therefore conclude that due to a lack of power, small businesses will 
be more dependent upon the social responsibility behaviour of their constituents than larger 
firms.  
4.6. Context characteristics 
Although context factors have been mentioned as important moderating factors of the 
size – SBSR relationship throughout our paper, there are three contextual factors that are of 
particular importance: external stakeholder pressures, the socio-economic context and the 
institutional environment. 
 
4.6.1. External stakeholder pressures.  
The importance of stakeholder pressures on SBSR behaviour has already been 
mentioned several times in this paper. It has been demonstrated that smaller firms face 
stakeholder pressures distinct from larger firms. However, the relationship between external 
stakeholder pressures and size has not been addressed yet. Due to their larger size, large 
enterprises would be more visible and experience more scrutiny from the general public, with 
increased institutional pressures as a result (Oliver, 1991; Greening & Gray, 1994; Meznar & 
Nigh, 1995; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Brammer & Millington, 2006). Yet, findings on the 
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relationship between organizational size, visibility and SBSR behaviour yields diverging 
results. Bowen (2000) observed that the visibility of an organization – whether it can be seen 
by its relevant constituents or not – is not determined by organizational size alone. Rather, the 
size – visibility relationship is moderated by the community in which the business operates 
and the type of business it is in. Smith and Oakley (1994), for example, found that 
entrepreneurs in nonurban areas were less accepting of ethically questionable behaviours than 
those in urban areas. Businesses that were active in smaller communities were therefore found 
to develop more responsible behaviour (Bowen, 2000). By contrast, businesses that have no 
such relationship with the local community may choose to operate in stealth mode (Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995) and remain invisible to the general public as a competitive strategy or avoid 
institutional pressures from the public. 
Yet, in the situation that a small business chooses to be visible and reap the benefits of 
a good market reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), it may lack the size to really capitalize 
on brand names or product reputation and “market” its environmental or social performance 
(Spence et al., 2000). Although it is often assumed that the small business maintains direct 
and dyadic relationships with its stakeholders, many stakeholder interests are not 
communicated directly to the individual firm but through a web of influences at different 
levels in society (Rowley, 1997). It is often only the branch organization that receives the 
demands and expectations from NGOs and other pressure groups in society. Reputation may 
thus not be formed at the level of the individual firm, but at sector or country level. As a 
result, small businesses may be saved from scrutiny and individual punishment when they 
refuse to take their social responsibility, but also be unable to reap the benefits of an improved 
reputation as a result.  
In summary, whether smaller size results in diminished organizational visibility 
greatly depends on the context the business is operating in. Those small business that are 
characterized by higher levels of organizational visibility will receive more scrutiny and 
information from their stakeholders and will therefore engage more in SBSR. In addition, they 
will have more opportunities to capitalize on the benefits of being socially responsible. 
4.6.2. Socio-economic context  
Based on their comparative analysis of the external social responsibility activity of 
7662 European and 1330 Latin American SMEs, Vives et al. (2005) suggested that a 
country’s general welfare level has an impact on SBSR activity. Whereas Latin American 
small businesses demonstrated more SBSR activity in general, efforts were also 
Chapter 4 
 
102 
predominantly directed towards disfavoured groups in society, rather than sponsoring sports 
or cultural activities in Europe. Moreover, a lack of financial resources was a more important 
barrier than the lack of time. They found an explanation for these differences in the higher 
presence of poverty in Latin American societies. This is in contrast, however, with the results 
as found in the Observatory’s study, showing that the highest involvement was found in 
Northern countries such as Finland, Denmark, Iceland and Norway. The lowest percentages of 
involvement were found in lower welfare countries such as Spain and Greece. Here, different 
public welfare traditions, the differing role businesses are attributed in society and different 
cultures were proposed as possible explanations (Observatory of European SMEs, 2002). 
However, except for a few exceptions, higher SBSR levels are consistently associated with 
larger size in both parts of the world. Based on these findings, we conclude that it is not 
possible yet to determine how the socio-economic context influences the way smaller 
business take SBSR action. 
4.6.3. Institutional environment  
The literature on SBSR is consistent on the peculiar institutional needs of small 
business on at least three aspects. First, small businesses want a government to set a ‘level 
playing field’ for all businesses with regard to SBSR issues and are sceptical towards self-
regulatory mechanisms. Not only do they distrust the ethics of their peers (Tilley, 2000; Vitell 
et al., 2000; Ludevid Anglada, 2000), but they are also “vulnerably compliant” – compliance 
with the law is more good luck than good judgement (Petts et al., 1999). Such policies are, 
however, difficult to align with the emphasis that has been put on the voluntary nature of CSR 
(European Commission, 2001; EMSF, 2004). A second stream of literature has therefore 
suggested that any policy initiatives should be directed through existing channels that small 
businesses already know and trust (BITC, 2002; Grayson, 2003; EMSF, 2004; Castka, 
Balzarova, Bamber, & Sharp, 2004). Especially, the development of industry organization and 
small business supporting systems is critical in the level of socially responsible behaviour 
(Spence et al., 2000; de Bruijn & Lulofs, 2000). Finally, as was mentioned before, industry 
culture is a very important conditioning factor for SBSR. Industrial organizations therefore 
have a responsibility to create a sense of shared responsibility, joint institutions for collective 
responsibility taking and to steer “cowboys” to more SBSR behaviour (Spence et al., 2000; 
Ludevid Anglada, 2000; de Bruijn & Lulofs, 2000). 
We conclude that industrial and branch organizations, by providing the information 
channels and meeting fora that small business trust and by creating a shared responsibility 
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among peers, will be more important drivers for socially responsible action among small 
business than they will be among larger business.  
4.7. Discussion and conclusion 
Although there is both anecdotal evidence and theoretical logic to argue that being a 
small business does not necessarily impede SBSR behaviour, we cannot ignore the 
compelling evidence in the studies by Vives et al. (2005) and the European Observatory of 
SMEs (2002) that there is a relationship between size and socially responsible behaviour. 
What has become clear from our analysis is that the contradictory evidence does not negate 
the idiosyncratic difficulties of small businesses in taking their social responsibility, but it 
indicates that the size – SBSR relationship also depends on a large number of conditions. 
Such a conclusion is important, as the result of our critical assessment helps to identify ways 
for small business owner-managers and their constituents to overcome the problems they 
encounter in the context of SBSR. We see at least four areas where this is possible. 
The first and most important conclusion we draw is that most small business do not 
recognize specific social responsibility issues. More important than the practical barriers to 
engage in SBSR activities are the cognitive processes that forego such actions. If an issue is 
not recognized, than the likelihood of SBSR action is very low. The SBSR literature identifies 
both differing issue characteristics and limited cognitive capabilities as the most important 
antecedents of this low issue recognition. Our analysis has shown, however, that those owner-
managers who are able to increase their discretionary slack, absorptive capacity and their 
knowledge by engaging in networks and delegating responsibilities, are more likely to both 
recognize responsibility issues and ways to contribute in resolving them.  
Second, the case for a culture of shared responsibility and the creation of institutions 
for joint responsibility taking is compelling. Not only does it increase the recognition of 
responsibility issues by giving small business owner-managers a sense that their contribution 
has a noticeable effect in the resolution of responsibility issues, but also provides 
opportunities for joint learning, risk sharing, overcoming scale disadvantages and getting 
access to resources.  
Third, we have seen evidence that entrepreneurship itself is no guarantee for 
responsible behaviour. However, those small business owner-managers that have established 
intent to engage in SBSR activities will benefit from entrepreneurial features both in finding 
opportunities and engaging stakeholders. 
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Finally, due to a lack of (slack) financial resources, small businesses will experience 
more difficulty than larger firms to engage in SBSR actions that have no immediate return, 
require systemic changes or are boundary spanning. Likewise, due to a lack of power, small 
businesses will depend more on the social responsibility behaviour of their constituents than 
larger firms. However, those firms that are able to integrate SBSR in their strategic 
management, focus on win-win situations that result in returns, and increase their 
organizational visibility, will partly be able to overcome such constraints.  
In summary, we conclude that small businesses, in general, will experience more 
difficulties than their larger counterparts when engaging in socially responsible action. 
Barriers will be especially experienced with regard to those issues involving external 
stakeholders or the natural environment. Such a conclusion is important, because it implies 
that small businesses will only partly be able to undertake their social responsibility in 
isolation. There are two ways of interpreting this conclusion. One way would be to conclude 
that we should not bother small businesses with CSR issues, because they are just not made 
up for the challenge. We should then reformulate our normative propositions on the social 
responsibility of the smaller firm and bring the locus of their responsibility to a different level, 
for example at the level of the government. Small businesses in the UK seem to be in favour 
of this approach, indicating that they consider it to be “the Government’s responsibility to 
communicate environmental values, to establish a code of environmental conduct and to 
provide a benchmark of acceptable environmental standards for the business sector. The 
Government was expected to take a leadership role concerning the environment.” (Tilley, 
2000: 37) 
A second interpretation would be that if small businesses have difficulty taking social 
responsibility by themselves, individual SBSR should be complemented with a culture of 
shared responsibility. Despite the clear responsibility this puts in the hands of industry 
organizations and government, shared responsibility thus still involves an individual business 
responsibility. The locus of responsibility is not only at the level of the government or 
industrial organizations, but remains at the level of the individual small business as well. In 
order to overcome the difficulties that a small business experiences in taking responsibility by 
itself, the owner-manager should become active on a level higher than the individual firm. 
Thus, in addition to creating jobs, economic growth and picking the ‘low hanging fruit of 
SBSR’, small business owner-managers can become more effective in SBSR action by 
actively seeking partners in the market, government, society or the entire supply chain and by 
developing the capabilities that will take away the barriers they experience for SBSR action. 
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As an implication for small business owner-managers, our analysis offers the 
opportunity to reconsider both descriptive and normative assessments of SBSR. As engaging 
effectively in social and environmental practices is difficult from the perspective of the small 
business and involves a collective effort from a wide range of stakeholders, small business are 
advised to seek cooperation or network contacts with stakeholders and peers to overcome 
these difficulties. A normative extension of SBSR theory could therefore be that, as in some 
situations a small business cannot take its responsibility by itself, it should take action on a 
collective level. More specifically, it relates to the question whether we accept or not that a 
small business uses its lack of resources as an excuse for its limited socially responsible 
action.  
The results of our research provide direction for future study. Where the current 
research has primarily focused on the explanatory factors for small business social behaviour 
in a static way, there is a growing need to investigate the dynamics of SBSR. Particularly the 
factors internal and external to the small business that influence change processes towards 
more SBSR behaviour need further development. A priority in this regard is to research how 
managerial capabilities that increase networking, collaboration and responsibility delegation 
aid in the development of organizational slack and SBSR action. Also, those capabilities that 
allow small businesses to effectively address resources across the boundaries of their 
organization need further development. In addition, increasing the knowledge on the critical 
success factors of governmental or industrial organizational initiatives aimed at creating 
shared responsibilities would be beneficial to small business owner-managers, policy makers 
and academics. With regard to the latter, the findings of such research may also be useful to 
the wider CSR theory development. In summary, there are a number of interesting avenues 
for future research. We believe that our review can provide the basis on which such further 
research can build. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Methodological and Contextual 
Introduction  to the Empirical Studies3 
 
 
                                                 
3 While the research design and the data collection are the result of my own work, I collaborated with Dr. 
Michael Valente (University of Victoria, Canada) in the data analysis of the empirical study. In the text, Dr. 
Michael Valente is referred to as the “co-author”. 
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5. Methodological and Contextual Introduction to the Empirical Studies 
5.1. Introduction 
 The literature reviewed in chapter 4 suggested that small business models on proactive 
environmental strategies could benefit from a closer look at the dynamics involved in small 
businesses dealing with constraining internal and external factors. As such, it further 
emphasized the need to address the research questions defined in chapter 3: 
RQ2: What are the resources and capabilities associated with successful PES 
execution in small businesses? 
RQ3: How can small businesses be successful in PES when the (institutional 
conditions) are set against having one? 
 Given the dearth of empirical material and theoretical development to address these 
two research questions, I set up a research that was designed to provide answers through a 
qualitative multi-case study research. Whereas the findings of this research will be presented 
in the next two chapters, the current chapter serves two purposes. First, it explains and 
justifies the methodological approach that was used in designing and executing the research. 
It will therefore first discuss the research design, and then report the sources used in collecting 
the data and how they were analyzed. Secondly, the chapter provides the reader with a 
contextual introduction to the research setting: the Belgian ornamental horticulture industry. It 
will do so by first presenting a description of ornamental horticulture in general and how it is 
related to the natural environment. I then zoom in into the specific Belgian context, by first 
presenting an environmental organization with particular importance for this dissertation, 
VMS, and then describe the sector in general demographic and socio-economic terms, the 
general business environment and the external institutional environment. 
5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Research design 
This dissertation uses a multiple case design with the purpose of elaborating existing 
theory (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999). The particular nature of our research questions 
directed us to multiple case studies for two reasons. First, case studies are best for gathering 
rich descriptions of complex and multilevel social phenomena (Gephart, 2004; Weick, 2007) 
about which not much is known (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The specific purpose is to build theory 
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rather than to test it (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Siggelkow, 2007) by using the cases as a series 
of experiments  in which the emergent theory is replicated, extended and contrasted (Yin, 
2003; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Given the inconsistent theoretical explanations on small 
business proactive environmental strategy (Hillary, 2000a; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; Aragon-
Correa et al., 2008), such an approach is not only appropriate, but also necessary. Second, 
small businesstegies are rarely explicit or consciously formalized in strategic documents or 
updated business plans, which precludes the access to large sources of secondary data (Curran 
& Blackburn, 2001). The lack of formalization of small business strategies is the result of the 
often tacit, implicit and even unconscious conceptions of organizational direction embedded 
in the mind of the owner-manager (Gibb & Scott, 1985; Johannisson, 1987). Probing small 
businesses for their strategies therefore requires uncovering the underlying intentions and 
patterns of actions that make up these strategies through in-depth inquiry and rich descriptions 
(Curran & Blackburn, 2001).  
 As the empirical setting for this multi-case study research, I chose the ornamental 
horticulture sector in Belgium. This setting was appropriate for the research questions in this 
dissertation for a number of reasons. First, the focus on a confined geographical area 
(Belgium) and sector allows minimizing variation in the environmental factors that a firm 
may be facing in terms of socio-cultural and political contexts, business climate and 
professional association representation, and focus on the focal variation of interest 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), in this case small business PES. Second, the ornamental horticulture 
industry consists almost exclusively of small ventures, which are in the interest of this 
dissertation. Third, as we will further show, strong conservative forces in the sector were in 
place that discouraged the adoption of proactive environmental strategies. Fourth, and most 
importantly, the industry has a small member organization in place that allowed me to identify 
and select organizations that revealed a particular attention to the natural environment. This 
organization, VMS (Vlaams Milieuplan Sierteelt), has as its purpose “to position itself as a 
center for sustainable entrepreneurship that guides ornamental horticulture firms, by means 
of a phased plan, to more future oriented and socially responsible practices” (www.vms-
vzw.com). Members voluntarily self-report data that allow VMS to calculate a firm-specific 
score that reflects the environmental performance of the firm. According to the performance 
score (points on 100), firms are subsequently assigned an A- (70-100), B- (55-70), C- (15-55) 
or D- (<15) label. Abuse of VMS is prevented through a series of independent audits. A more 
detailed description of VMS is provided below. 
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VMS membership presents an exceptional opportunity to objectively capture a firm’s 
environmental intentions. In addition, the particular circumstances of VMS membership 
indicate that the institutional conditions are set against achieving high VMS scores. Although 
one could argue that firms become member of VMS only as a means to improve the firm’s 
reputation or to get access to environmentally sensitive customers, the specific context of 
VMS in the ornamental horticulture makes such claims improbable. In fact, only 6% of the 
entire sector population has become member, and membership has been declining in recent 
years (MPS, 2006). This low penetration of VMS membership is generally attributed to four 
important factors: (1) VMS membership does not result in any added value in the market, (2) 
the registration activities which are required for VMS membership are perceived to take up 
too much time, (3) environmentally friendly practices are seen as too costly and risky in the 
highly competitive environment of the ornamental horticulture sector, and (4) the general 
individual and professional association dissatisfaction with environmental regulations endorse 
a conservative stance towards the natural environment. Given these adverse conditions and 
the particular objectives of VMS, the members of VMS clearly send out a signal that they 
have proactive environmental intentions. As a result, VMS is a good proxy for the proactive 
environmental intentions of a Belgian ornamental horticulture firm, despite discouraging 
institutional and market conditions. Furthermore, since VMS scores reflect the actual impact 
of firms based on its performance relative to best practices, they can be used as a proxy for 
VMS members’ realized strategy. Firms that achieve higher scores in the VMS system have 
evidently been able to realize their intentions. In contrast, firms with lower scores represent 
unrealized strategies. As a result, we decided to sample firms that were member of VMS.  
5.2.2. Data collection and analysis 
Proponents of case study methodologies recommend researchers to “triangulate” 
multiple sources of data with the purpose of increasing the richness and quality of the findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Yin, 2003):  
“any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and 
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information, following a 
corroboratory mode” (Yin, 2003). 
In this dissertation, I therefore drew on five types of data. Data were collected through key 
informant interviews, grower interviews, observations, archival data and round table 
discussions. Importantly, not all data sources were used for the same level of analysis. 
Following the logic of an “embedded case study” (Yin, 2003), in which multiple embedded 
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levels are analyzed, I first set out to assess the general context of the ornamental horticulture 
industry in a pre-stage, before engaging in the actual case study research, which consisted of 
four stages in total. Table 5.1 provides an overview of these five data sources and the 
particular objective for which they were used. In the following subsections, I will provide an 
overview of each of these data sources. 
Table 5.1 - Data sources used in the empirical study 
Data source Objective Means 
Key informant interviews Context assessment 15 interviews 
Case study interviews Case study research 43 interviews 
Observations Context assessment 
Case study research 
20 company visits 
2 VMS meetings 
1 Floraliën visit 
1 Dutch auction visit 
Archival data Context assessment 
Case study research 
Newspapers 
Verbondsnieuws 
Websites 
Academic papers 
Reports 
Roundtable discussions Context assessment 7 roundtables + 3 reports 
 
5.2.2.1. Context assessment 
In the pre-stage, I explored the challenges and opportunities associated with PES in the 
ornamental horticulture industry. Capturing this information required drawing on key 
informant interviews, observations, archival data and roundtable discussions. Next, I will 
describe each of the data sources used in this process. 
 
Key Informant Interviews. The goal of the interviews was to get an overview of the 
challenges and opportunities that the Belgian ornamental horticulture was facing, and to get a 
preliminary sense of the ways how growers could deal with them. Starting with a government 
consultant, responsible for extension services in the ornamental horticulture industry, and the 
director of VMS, I used a snowball sampling technique (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) to get in 
touch with new key-informants. I asked each new informant to identify additional informants 
that would be valuable to speak to and that would give additional or contrasting insights. I 
continued interviews until the point of saturation, the moment at which no new information 
emerged from the interviews (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). As a 
result, a total of 15 key informants were interviewed between October 2005 and January 
2006. Table 5.2 offers an overview of all key informants that were interviewed in this process. 
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Table 5.2 - Overview of key informants interviewed in sector analysis 
Key 
informant 
Job description Expertise 
K1 Independent consultant  Pot plants, Azalea and 
Arboriculture 
K2 Government consultant General expertise 
K3 President of professional organisation Mainly Azalea and Pot plants 
K4 President of professional organisation  Mainly Azalea and Pot plants 
K5 Independent consultant  Pot plants and Azalea 
K6 Professor in Agricultural / Horticultural 
Economics and Management  
General expertise 
K7 President of subsector professional 
organisation  
Arboriculture 
K8 President of subsector professional 
organisation  
Arboriculture 
K9 President of traders association  Pot plants 
K10 Quality manager in trade business  Pot plants and Azalea 
K11 Credit responsible for agricultural 
projects in a bank 
General expertise 
K12 Director of research institute in 
ornamental horticulture 
General expertise 
K13 Government official General expertise 
K14 Professor in Agricultural / Horticultural 
Economics and Management 
General expertise 
K15 Director of professional association General expertise 
 
An overview of the questions that were used to aid in the interview process is provided 
in appendix A1. After each interview, I made a contact summary form (Miles & Huberman, 
1994), in which I listed all new and recurring findings that had emerged. I also made notes 
during the interview about impressions and details that would not be recorded in the 
interview. All interviews, lasting between 60 and 150 minutes were recorded, transcribed and 
subsequently manually analyzed using the Atlas.ti software package.  
Observations. In addition to the interviews, I had the opportunity to visit a number of 
firms, meetings and market places, where I could see several aspects of the ornamental 
horticulture in action. Although I did not take any notes during these visits, the observations 
helped me to get a better understanding of ornamental horticulture, its culture and the nature 
of its activities. 
Archival data. Besides the interviews, I collected and consulted several archival data 
sources. Table 5.3 provides an overview of these sources. The sources can be subdivided into 
three groups: databases, non-academic and academic sources. For the databases, I did a search 
of Mediargus, a database that collects all general Belgian newspaper and magazines, and of 
www.vilt.be, the Flemish Information centre for Agriculture and Horticulture, using key 
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words that probed the databases for information on the ornamental horticulture, its subsectors 
and their relationship with environmental and institutional issues. Furthermore, I scanned all 
issues of “Verbondsnieuws”, the bi-weekly magazine of AVBS, the largest professional 
association in ornamental horticulture, that were published between 2003 and 2006, the period 
prior to the interviews. I scanned with similar key words as the other two databases, but 
specifically assessed the discourse developed towards members and towards societal and 
regulatory issues. The non-academic sources included a set of reports and statistics that were 
published as reports or documents from banks, professional associations, governments and 
related institutions. The academic sources consisted mostly of the studies executed at the 
former government research group, the Centre for Agricultural Economics and the present 
Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research. These studies are mostly based on data from 
the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), a panel data set that is collected every year to 
supply information to the European Commission with regards to the economic impacts of its 
subsidies.  
Roundtable discussions. A fourth and final data source for the sector analysis was 
derived from a series of roundtable discussions within a project called “Ornamental 
Horticultural Strategy 2020”. The aim of this project was to develop a number of scenarios for 
the future of the Belgian ornamental horticulture industry, in order to then derive the 
implications for government, professional associations and all interested alike. The group 
consisted of 17 persons, with selection based on a good representation of the diverse 
subsectors (pot plants, cut flowers, azalea and arboriculture) and of all parties involved in the 
industry (production, trade, professional associations, government and services). The efforts 
put in by the members culminated to a scenario planning weekend in February 2008, which 
took the most important lessons from these sessions and of EROV (2004) to develop future 
scenarios of the sector. Prior to the weekend, the participants were asked to submit the way 
they envisioned the ornamental horticulture sector in 2020 in its most and least optimal 
presentation, and what factors they considered key in the development towards these 
scenarios. In order to analyze the roundtable discussions and the scenario planning weekend, I 
used the reports of the sessions, the submitted scenarios and my own notes. 
5.2.2.2. Case study research 
After the context assessment, I met again with the director of VMS and the 
government consultant. Since both were knowledgeable about VMS members, I engaged 
them in the processes of selecting appropriate firms for the research and gaining access to 
  
Table 5.3 - Archival data sources used in sector analysis 
Data source References Additional comments 
Databases 
 
Mediargus: Database of general Flemish newspapers and magazines 
Verbondsnieuws 
Period: 2003- 2006 
Key words1 included in search: 
- “Ornamental horticulture” 
- “Ornamental horticulture” + “Environment” 
- “Ornamental horticulture” + “Tradition” 
- “Ornamental horticulture” + “Responsible” 
- “Azalea” + “Environment” 
- “Arboriculture” + “Environment” 
- “Pot plants” + “Environment” 
- AVBS 
- VTU 
- VMS 
www.vilt.be: Government sponsored website providing news and 
information in the Agricultural sector 
Period: 2003-2006 
Key words1 included in search: 
- “Ornamental horticulture” 
- “Ornamental horticulture” + “Environment” 
- “Ornamental horticulture” + “tradition” 
- “Ornamental horticulture” + “responsible” 
- “Azalea” + “environment” 
- “Arboriculture” + “environment” 
- “Pot plants” + “environment” 
- AVBS 
- VTU 
“Verbondsnieuws”: Bi-weekly professional association publication  Period: 2002-2005 
Key words1 included in search:  
- Environment 
- Regulation 
- VMS 
- Interviews with growers 
- Professional association opinions about environmental issues 
- Discourse towards society and government 
Academic papers (Taragola, Van Huylenbroeck, & Van Lierde, 2000; Carels & Van Lierde, 2000; Paulitz & Belanger, 2001; Taragola, Van Huylenbroeck, & Van Lierde, 2002; 
Saiyed et al.,  2003; Korner, Bakker, & Heuvelink, 2004; Taragola, Van Lierde, & Van Huylenbroeck, 2004; Daughtrey & Benson, 2005; Rappe, 2005; Fravel, 
2005; Wood, Burchett, Alquezar, Orwell, Tarran, & Torpy, 2006; Brethour, Watson, Sparling, Bucknell, & Moore, 2007) 
Non academic 
reports and data 
(MPS, 2001; Taragola et al., 2002; MPS, 2002; Verspecht, Van Lierde, & Van den Bossche, 2003; MPS, 2003; EROV, 2004; MPS, 2004; KBC, 2005; MPS, 
2005a; MPS, 2005b; EROV, 2006; MPS, 2006)  
1original key words were in Dutch 
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individual firms. I thereby followed a structured approach of “theoretical sampling” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), with the particular goal to find the best possible sample that would 
capture the phenomenon of interest (for similar approaches in recent studies, see Uzzi, 1997; 
Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Zott & Huy, 2007). After screening all 127 VMS members 
based on short descriptions of both informants, I asked them to select 20 firms that (1) 
together made a good representative sample of the diversity of firms within the sector, (2) 
included both very high performing firms and very low performing firms as polar types in the 
continuum of VMS scores, and (3) included some firms that had recently left VMS, to have 
exit as an alternative emergent strategy as well. Table 5.4 provides an overview of the firms 
that were included in phase. We used pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality. The data 
collection and analysis for the case study research then consisted of four consecutive stages. 
Table 5.4 - Overview of firms in sample 
ID Type of firm Firm's 
birth 
year 
Number 
of 
employees
Score† Number 
of 
interviews
Panamarenko Potplants 1999 6 99 (A) 4 
Magritte Arboriculture 2000* 4 98 (A) 3 
Fabre Arboriculture 1975 7 96 (A) 4 
Ensor Azalea 2003* 5 95 (A) 4 
Memling Azalea 1995* 5 92††(D) 1 
Bouts Potplants 1970 7 90 (A) 1 
David Potplants 1989 5 86 (A) 1 
Van Eyck Arboriculture 1970* 19 84 (A) 1 
Permeke Potplants 1988* 9 77 (A) 1 
De Corte Azalea 1993 4 76 (A) 1 
Delvaux Azalea 1990 5 74 (A) 1 
Broodthaers Azalea 1993* 3 73††(D) 1 
De Boeck Azalea 1974* 3 71 (A) 1 
Alechinsky Arboriculture 1965 26 70 (B) 1 
Rombouts Potplants 1965* 10 60 (B) 2 
Brueghel Azalea 1985* 4 58 (C) 3 
Rubens Potplants 2000* 4 57 (C) 3 
Minne Arboriculture 1990* 9 49 (C) 3 
Jordaens Potplants 2001* 4 32 (C) 3 
Van Dyck Arboriculture 1970 7 - (D) 4 
Total     43 
Firms in bold are firms used in round 2 
*= acquisition or extension of family firm 
† =  scores after period 7 in 2005 
†† = last available score if period 7 in 2005 was not registered 
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Stage one involved semi-structured interviews, which consisted of a set of open-ended 
questions set out to understand the functioning of the firms and their approaches to social and 
environmental concerns. A list of the questions asked can be found in appendix A2. I 
conducted interviews carefully, and asked questions about “Why did you become member of 
VMS?”, “How are you able to achieve your score?”, and “What difficulties did you 
experience in obtaining your score?” In so doing, I was also able to identify firms for which 
VMS membership did not reflect the intention to have a high VMS score. In addition, detailed 
notes were taken during the interviews because, although the interview protocol was an 
important guide, each interview spawned emergent and interviewee-specific questions and 
topics (McCracken, 1988; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Interviews were taken on site with owner-managers between December 2005 and March 2006 
and typically lasted 120 minutes, with extremes ranging between 60 and 160 minutes. All 
interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
In stage two, I manually coded the transcripts for constructs that emerged as 
explanatory factors for the particular performance of the firm (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998). Furthermore, I collected additional archival material for each of the firms by 
looking for firm references (1) on the internet, (2) in the biweekly magazine of the largest 
professional association (Verbondsnieuws) and (3) in www.vilt.be. I used the material 
collected in this process to merge it with the interview data. After the coding of each 
interview, I combined all data sources and wrote a firm-specific case summary. This case 
summary acted as an ongoing stream of consciousness commentary about what was 
happening in the research (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and tracked whatever impressions 
arose, given that it is often difficult to know what will and will not be useful in the future. 
Questions such as, “What am I learning?” and “How does this case differ from the last?” were 
asked to push thinking in these notes.  
On the basis of this data analysis, stage three consisted of identifying eight extreme 
cases. These eight cases are highlighted in bold in Table 5.4. I focused on these eight firms for 
two reasons: (1) using restricted samples is in line with Eisenhardt’s (1989a) 
recommendations that appropriate theory building based on case studies usually includes 
anywhere between 4 and 10 cases, and (2) the theoretical saturation achieved after the 
analysis of these 8 extreme cases obviated the need for further in-depth analysis of the other 
12 cases. I selected these cases based on two criteria: that (1) having either extremely high or 
extremely low VMS scores within the sample of 20 firms, and (2) having made explicit 
references in the interview of striving for a high score within the VMS system, to be sure that 
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VMS membership reflected proactive environmental intentions. Based on this latter criterion, 
I excluded Minne, since it that had no intention to increase its performance and had only 
joined VMS to see whether the label could be used in the market. In order to diminish 
respondent bias by using only one interview for the case description, I did an additional 
exercise of triangulation of the interview data by interviewing multiple parties about one case 
firm. To this purpose, I used the case summaries of each of these eight firms and read them 
out loud to a number of people that were knowledgeable about the firm. In so doing, I was not 
only able to assess the accuracy of our report and correct it for misinterpretations, but I also 
encouraged the interviewees to provide new reflections and extra information to enrich my 
understanding of the cases. While I engaged the VMS director and the government 
representative for each firm in this process, I also interviewed employees or firm consultants 
whenever my search for archival material about a firm had yielded too little material. I used 
this information to revise the case summaries when necessary. With the corrected case 
summaries, I then went back to the owner-managers for final follow-up interviews, in which I 
asked again to verify the accuracy of the account and to supply additional material whenever 
possible. The case summaries where then written in their final version, to include the few 
corrections and additions that had emerged in the interviews. Again, all interviews lasted 
around 120 minutes and were gathered between May and November 2007. Table 5.5 provides 
an overview of the data sources that were available for the 8 investigated firms. 
In the fourth and final stage, I set out to develop an organized interpretation of the data 
together with the co-author of chapters 6 and 7. To ensure accuracy and reliability of theory, 
that is, a theory with a close fit to the data, one tactic involved the selection of pairs or groups 
of cases to identify similarities and differences between cases (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). As a second tactic, given that my co-author was not able to understand the 
language of the interviews, he probed me for explicit and convincing quotes or examples that 
would substantiate the differences and similarities found. This process allowed me to diminish 
subjective researcher bias and make the findings as objective as possible. We began with our 
within-case analyses of each case to identify preliminary explanations of the phenomenon of 
interest. We then conducted cross-case analyses using pairs and groups of cases to further 
generalize these descriptors and enfolded extant perspectives in the literature to assess the 
external validity of our thinking. Our goal was to isolate a meaningful set of capabilities so 
that implications could be drawn for future theory testing. It was important, therefore, to 
identify a set of constructs that were theoretically meaningful, internally consistent, robust, 
and distinct. Reverting back and forth between the case analyses and the literature, we raised 
  
Table 5.5 - Overview of data sources collected for case study companies 
Firm Emplo- 
yees 
VMS 
score 
(label) 
Inter-
views 
1st 
round 
2nd round 3rd 
round 
Archival documents 
Panamarenko 6 99 
(A) 
4 o/m production manager, VMS 
representative, 
government consultant 
o/m Company website, magazine interview, 
published books, internet references, VMS 
registration 
Magritte 4 98 
(A) 
3 o/m VMS representative, 
government consultant 
o/m Magazine interviews, VMS registration 
Fabre 7 97 
(A) 
3 o/m VMS representative, 
government consultant 
o/m (2) Company website, VMS registration 
Ensor 5 95 
(A) 
3 o/m VMS representative, 
government consultant 
o/m + 
wife 
Magazine interviews, internet references, 
company website, VMS registration 
Bruegel 4 58 
(C) 
4 o/m VMS representative, 
government consultant, 
private consultant 
o/m VMS registration 
Rubens 4 57 
(C) 
4 o/m VMS representative, 
government consultant, 
private consultant 
o/m VMS registration 
Jordaens 4 32 
(C) 
3 o/m VMS representative, 
government consultant 
o/m Magazine interview, VMS registration 
Van Dyck 7 - 
(D) 
3 o/m VMS representative, 
government consultant 
o/m Magazine  report, company website, VMS 
registration 
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the descriptive concepts up one level of abstraction to second order themes where each theme 
encapsulated a number of underlying subcategories. Each time that we identified a second-
order theme, we went back through the cases to confirm that it was consistent across 
successful companies yet inconsistent across unsuccessful companies. From these analyses, 
we created tables to facilitate further comparisons and compared successive pairs of cases for 
similarities and differences in how these firms overcame constraints to develop the emerging 
constructs and theoretical logic. 
 Before presenting the findings of the case studies and discussing their contribution in 
providing answers to the research questions posed, I will first present a contextual description 
of the research setting. 
 
5.3. Contextual description of the Belgian ornamental horticulture and its 
relation with the natural environment 
In the following sections, my goal is to present the background against which the 
findings of chapters 6 and 7 should be interpreted. As such, this presentation and description 
of the research context addresses the recent concerns in the literature to ground empirical 
findings in a thorough description of the context in which they emerged (Weick, 2007; Zahra, 
2007; Tsui, 2007): 
“Contextualization is essentially adding one more level to theorization by accounting 
for the effect of contextual characteristics on the behaviour of and within 
organizations.” (Tsui, 2007: 1358) 
In order to present the context in a systematic way, this section first provides a general 
description of the activities of ornamental horticulture firms and its particular interaction with 
the natural environment. Given the importance of VMS for the methodology of this 
dissertation, the next section explains the principles and status of this organization in the 
Belgian ornamental horticulture industry. Finally, I will move to a description of the sector in 
terms of general demographic characteristics, the economic context, and the institutional 
context. 
 
5.3.1. What is ornamental horticulture? 
The ornamental horticulture is the sector that unites all firms that grow plants for 
mainly ornamental purposes (vs. edible human consumption purposes) and includes 
arboriculture (the production of trees and woody products), floriculture, pot plant nurseries 
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(including azaleas and indoor plants), perennial plants nurseries and young plant nurseries (in-
vitro propagation of new plants). The focus in this dissertation is on production firms in the 
ornamental horticultural sector. Whereas firms may be active in this sector for trading, 
consulting, research or other activities, our focus lies with firms that have at least part of their 
activities in the production of plants.  
A typical ornamental horticulture firm or nursery starts with base plant material (a.o. 
seeds, cuttings or bulbs) which is either grown or propagated at the firm itself or bought from 
external firms. The plant base material is then grown to larger flowers, plants or trees, which 
are subsequently sold to end consumers or other firms that either continue the production in a 
new phase or market the plants further downstream in the value chain. The essential inputs for 
growth are soil (or another matrix in which the plant can root), nutrients (nitrogen, 
phosphorous and minerals), water, sun, heat and CO2.  
 
Figure 5.1 - The ornamental horticulture market structure 
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Diverse production methods can be used to nurture the plants. The plants are either 
grown outdoors or indoors. Outdoor production is carried out in fields or beds, on large 
containers that are filled with soil, lava or gravel and then covered with cloth (the “container” 
system) or the plants may be set into pots recessed into the ground. Indoor production takes 
place in greenhouses, which are made of glass, fibreglass or plastic poly film. The choice for 
either production method depends on the optimal thermal conditions for plant growth. 
Whereas outdoor production is the most natural type of production, greenhouses are used for 
plants that need a constant temperature or a higher supply of heat than outdoors. Greenhouses 
also allow for a more “controlled” environment (Paulitz & Belanger, 2001): the 
environmental conditions in the greenhouse (air temperature, humidity, insolation, CO2-
concentration and potential infections can be more or less controlled through technological 
means).  
The market structure of the ornamental horticulture industry can essentially be divided 
into two sets of companies: those companies that operate upstream of the firm and those that 
operate off stream of the firm. Figure 5.1 depicts both parts of the ornamental horticulture 
market structure. Companies that operate upstream of an ornamental horticulture firm include 
all firms that provide the essential inputs to a firm. In addition, government and services 
(banks, consultants, research institutes, etc) provide the human, financial and institutional 
resources needed to be able to run the business. Finally, a number of businesses provide the 
machinery and infrastructure (durable goods such as greenhouses, cool cells, etc) used as 
physical means to run the business. Downstream, the plants leave the firm through a number 
of ways. A very small fraction of plants is sold directly to the consumer. In Belgium, only 5% 
of all plants that are bought by people are bought at the firm (VLAM, 2006). Usually, plants 
are transported to either auctions or other market places, sold to a distributor or directly to a 
small or large retailer (chain). In this process, the majority of plants leave the country for 
export to France, Germany and the UK (VLAM, 2006). Auction sales take place 
predominantly in the Netherlands, where the largest auctions in Europe are installed. As will 
become clear further in the analysis, the presence of these auctions is a very important factor 
in the functioning of the Belgian ornamental horticultural market as well. The majority of 
plants in Belgium, however, are sold to either a distributor or merchant or directly to smaller 
or larger retail shops or chains. Distributors and merchants, as intermediaries, add value in the 
market by taking care of exports and distributing the produce to either auctions or retailers. 
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5.3.2. The natural environment and ornamental horticultural production 
In order to understand the environmental impact of ornamental horticultural 
production, it is necessary to understand the process of producing ornamental plants. The 
three most important issues which I will shortly develop in this context are: 
- Plant nutrition 
- Ensuring plant health and quality 
- Energy 
5.3.2.1. Plant nutrition 
 The metabolism of plants depends on the conversion of CO2, water and sunlight 
energy, to chemical energy (carbohydrates) for growing and executing the basic functions of 
the plant. Oxygen is released as a result of this process. In order for plants to grow, however, 
plants not only need chemical energy, but also require proteins and fats, as new building 
components for DNA, cell material and other plant components. In order to build these 
proteins and fats, plants can use some of the carbohydrates from the photosynthesis, but they 
require nitrogen, phosphate, and spore elements like magnesium, potassium and sulphur as 
well. In natural conditions, these products are mostly available in the soil as the debris of 
decomposed organic material. In agricultural or horticultural systems, however, the natural 
replenishment of these nutrients is not ensured, since they are taken away from the soil in the 
form of harvest. Applying either organic or synthetic fertilizer is then necessary to replenish 
the soil with nutrients for new plant growth. In some production systems, “soil” is replaced by 
a rooting substrate that is drenched in a solution of water and synthetic fertilizer. It is often 
argued that the growth in agricultural production is largely due to such use of synthetic 
fertilizers (Tilman, Cassman, Matson, Naylor, & Polasky, 2002). 
The problems of fertilizer application to the natural environment, however, are 
associated with excess nutrients leaching into the soil. In natural conditions, it is almost 
impossible to ensure horticultural production without loosing some fertilizer or nutrients 
through leaching or emissions. Over the last decades, however, the increased application of 
fertilizer has caused stress on the natural environment. 
“a significant amount of the applied nitrogen and a smaller proportion of the applied 
phosphorous is lost from agricultural fields. (…) Such non-point nutrient losses harm 
off-site ecosystems, water quality and aquatic ecosystems, and contribute to changes 
in atmospheric composition. Nitrogen loading to estuaries and coastal waters and 
phosphorous loadings to lakes, rivers and streams are responsible for over-
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enrichment, eutrophication and low-oxygen conditions that endanger fisheries” 
(Tilman et al., 2002: 673). 
 Ensuring an efficient and demand-based supply of fertilizer that minimizes excess losses of 
fertilizer to the environment is therefore a key objective for an environmentally friendly 
horticultural production. 
A number of innovations have been introduced that can help growers in realizing this 
objective. Fertilizers that allow for a controlled release of nutrients over the growing season 
bring nutrient supply and demand in line in the soil, thereby decreasing the chance of leaching 
nutrients to the groundwater. The increasing knowledge on the necessity of organic material 
in the soil and its natural properties of slow nutrient release has also furthered the application 
of mulch and compost. Finally, “container fields” allows the leaching water to be captured in 
a tank, which can subsequently be treated in a reed bed before discharging in nature or even 
reused again in the production process. The application of these technologies, however, is 
often still new and not commonplace in the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector. 
5.3.2.2. Ensuring plant health and quality 
A typical characteristic of ornamental horticulture is a very strong emphasis on plant 
health and quality (Daughtrey & Benson, 2005). Although plant health is a concern for all 
agricultural producers, ornamental plants are mostly harvested and marketed as a whole, 
instead of cropping only its roots, vegetables, fruits or leaves. In addition, since price and 
saleability are directly related to the visual quality of the flowers, stems or leaves, carefully 
guarding ornamentals against any type of damage is a major concern for growers. Futhermore, 
chemical growth regulators can be used to promote, inhibit or modify physiological processes 
in plants that determine the physical aspect of the plant (Basra, 2000).  
Growers use both preventive and curative treatments to ensure plant health (Daughtrey 
& Benson, 2005). Preventive measures include the treatment of seeds, the development of 
transgenic crops that are genetically resistant to certain pathogens, good management 
practices that keep the environment free from pathogens (environmental and cultural control) 
and the preventive application of chemical controls to destroy any potential infection from the 
outset. In the event of a disease infestation, either natural (beneficial insects) or chemical 
(herbicides, fungicides, insecticides) curative treatments are used to destroy the pathogens and 
to protect the plant from further disease or damage development resulting from bacteria, 
funguses or insects. Traditional practices, however, mostly rely on a system of “preventive 
calendar spraying”, which is in fact the preventive application (in often excessive levels) of 
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curative treatments. Chemical pesticides are sprayed on plants on a regular time schedule, 
even when there is no threat of diseases, insects or other agents. Not only does this result in 
toxic emissions of chemicals in the natural environment, but such an injudicious use of 
pesticides also results in increasing resistance among harmful insects, resulting in the need for 
ever stronger products. 
Over the last decade, environmental regulations have progressively taken the most 
polluting toxic chemical controls off the market. Reminiscent of the early advocates against 
effective, yet highly toxic and lasting effects of some pesticides like DDT on the natural 
environment (Carson, 1962), governments around the globe have grown concerned with the 
effects of certain pesticides. Pesticides may have detrimental effects to the environment 
because they may destroy biological life besides the target for which the pesticide is applied. 
For example, DDT was not only effective in capping the growth of insects; it also killed bird 
populations in the areas surrounding the locations where the DDT was applied. Pesticides 
may be toxic to humans as well. Studies have revealed the carcinogenic effects of DDT on 
humans, making it very toxic for both animals and humans. One other example is Endosulfan, 
a very popular product in ornamental horticulture which has only recently been taken of the 
market in Europe. Owing its popularity due to its low price and high effectiveness against 
aphids, leafhoppers and other pathogens, it proved very toxic to aquatic organisms life, caused 
autism with children born from women that were pregnant in areas where Endosulfan was 
often used and is known to interfere with oestrogen hormones in humans (EPA, 2002; Saiyed 
et al., 2003).  
Minimizing the use of persistent chemicals or chemicals with broad biological impacts 
is therefore a major environmental objective for ornamental horticulture. Recently, over 90 
countries ratified the Stockholm Convention in 2004, which outlawed several persistent 
chemicals used as pesticides. As a result, both regulatory and technical innovations have taken 
place over the last decade that either force or help the ornamental horticulture industry to 
decrease the unfavourable effects of their production on the environment. Regulatory 
initiatives have banned the most toxic and persistent pesticides, predominantly by not 
renewing the product licences in the market. Technological innovations include biological 
controls and container fields, among others. Biological controls allow the use of biological 
means to control insect and disease damages to plants (Paulitz & Belanger, 2001; Fravel, 
2005). Container fields, concrete containers filled with equalised soil beds and covered with a 
heavy film, facilitate the drainage of water from the plant to a central collection point, which 
ensures that no water is leached into the environment and can be reused in the production 
Chapter 5 
 
125 
process (Van Lierde, 2000). In addition, plants are always in optimal draining conditions, 
reducing the chance of root fungus infestation.  
5.3.2.3. Energy 
 Energy is needed in ornamental horticulture through both direct and indirect ways. 
Direct energy is usually only provided in greenhouses. Some plants require stable 
temperatures or certain minimal temperatures to warrant optimal growth, which is supplied 
through gas, petroleum or coal-based heating systems (Korner et al., 2004). Indirect energy is 
associated with the production of fertilizers and pesticides or other chemicals and the use of 
machines (Hulsbergen, Feil, Biermann, Rathke, Kalk, & Diepenbrock, 2001; Pervanchon, 
Bockstaller, & Girardin, 2002; Meul, Nevens, Reheul, & Hofman, 2007). 
 Heating and industrial energy consumption impact the environment through the 
emission of CO2 and NOx in the atmosphere, which has been related to an increase in global 
temperature rises and general climate change (IPCC, 2007). In addition, the supply of fossil 
fuels is not unlimited and concerns have been raised about the sustainable use of these energy 
sources for heating. 
 Minimizing energy consumption is by switching from heavy fuels to natural gas or 
biofuels, using energy screens in the greenhouses and by using climate computers that adapt 
the energy use to the specific energy requirements (Carels & Van Lierde, 2000; Taragola et 
al., 2002; Korner et al., 2004). 
  
 Besides these several concerns that ornamental horticulture production raises with 
regards to negative impacts on the natural environment, it is probably better known for the 
many good impacts it has for the social and natural environment. These beneficial impacts are 
the subject of the next subsection.  
5.3.3. Beneficial impacts of ornamental horticultural production and products 
From an environmental perspective, the application of fertilizer, chemicals and energy 
are the most important challenges to the ornamental horticultural industry. But representing 
the production of ornamental horticultural products only by means of its challenges would be 
inappropriate with regards to the beneficial value of ornamental horticulture, both in social 
and environmental perspectives. Specifically, the sector adds value in two major ways (for an 
excellent review of the beneficial effects of ornamentals, the reader is referred to Brethour et 
al., 2007):  
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- The photosynthesis process fixes CO2 and produces oxygen. As such, it aids in the 
reduction of greenhouse gases and produces a fundamental resource for humans and 
other living systems. Besides our dependence on plants for consumption, we thus also 
need all the non-edible, ornamental plants for our basic provision of oxygen. 
- The presence of plants adds to human well-being. Not only do people buy ornamental 
plants for their aesthetic value, but several studies have shown that people indirectly 
benefit from the presence of plants in their environment (Brethour et al., 2007). 
Through its influence on air quality and the general perception of the working 
environment, the presence of plants has been demonstrated, among other things, to 
improve the health and reduce symptoms of discomfort in office personnel (Fjeld, 
Veiersted, Sandvik, Riise, & Levy, 1998) and among elderly living in long-term care 
(Rappe, 2005). Recent surveys of the literature indicate that ornamental plants clean 
the air of toxic pollutants and discomforting chemical substances such as volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) (Wood et al., 2006) and would also reduce noise levels. 
Other studies have shown how plants influence the well-being of people and their 
psychological and physiological stress levels through various underlying mechanisms 
(Brethour et al., 2007). 
 
Given these contributions to society, the ornamental horticultural industry has a 
formidable value for the challenges of the world today. It is clear however, that a legitimate 
attempt of this kind requires nurseries and growers alike to take the environmental and social 
effects of their production methods into account as well. One organization that will play the 
most important role in this perspective is VMS, which I will describe next. 
 
5.3.4. VMS – the Flemish Environmental Plan for Ornamental Horticulture 
On the 6th of February 1995, the Dutch auctions and traders association consolidated a 
growing local initiative that was essentially designed to counter the increasingly “critical 
social attitude towards cultivation processes” (MPS, 2006: 17). The project in fact originated 
three years earlier in the Westland region, a Dutch area north of Rotterdam often mockingly 
referred to as “the Glass City” (see box “History of MPS in a nutshell”).  With almost its 
entire surface covered with greenhouse buildings for horticulture (hence, “the Glass City”), 
concerns were raised about its high consumption of energy, fertilizers and pesticides and of 
polluting the nightly sky with a permanent orange glow emitted from the assimilation lighting 
in the greenhouses. Given the anticipated increasing public attention for the natural 
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environment in the Netherlands, it was also assumed that plants with a label that reflected 
specific efforts towards the natural environment would be able to interest environmentally 
sensitive market segments. As such, MPS (Milieuplan Sierteelt – Environmental Plan 
Ornamental Horticulture) was founded, with as its mission (www.my-mps.com):  
- To reduce the environmental impact on participating companies;  
- To improve or maintain the image of the floriculture industry;  
- To provide a one-stop window for registration and certification. 
 
 
 
Two years later, in 1997, the Belgian traders association NAVEX, together with a 
number of proactive growers, realised that the Belgian market could not lag behind in this 
new initiative and founded VMS as a sister organization of MPS. VMS decided to use the 
administrative backing of MPS and use the same methodology as was designed by MPS. 
Since then, growers from all over the world have joined MPS, mostly as a result of their trade 
with Dutch auctions or traders. Table 5.6 displays the distribution of certificates per country 
and qualification within the MPS system. As is instantly visible, the Dutch membership 
figures exceed those of other countries by far. Although several explanations are possible, the 
History of MPS in a nutshell 
MPS began as a regional project in the Westland region in 1993. Various pilot groups consisting of 
growers, information providers and researchers laid the foundations for the current MPS system. They 
developed a certification scheme to reduce the environmental impact of the floricultural sector and to 
improve the image of the sector. The founders looked at the registration method and the standards in order 
to give shape to the scheme. This led to the creation of a registration system based on everyday 
horticultural practice. At the end of 1994, around a thousand growers were already registering their 
environmental data. As of 1 January 1995, points were awarded regarding the use of crop protection 
agents, fertilizers, energy and the way in which waste is dealt with. These points were processed according 
to a calculation formula to convert them into a company qualification, namely MPS-A, -B or -C. In 
February 1995, MPS was transformed into a national foundation comprising all the Dutch flower auctions, 
LTO Nederland (the Dutch Organization for Agriculture and Horticulture) and LTO Glastuinbouw (the 
LTO branch for greenhouse horticulture). From that point, the number of participants outside the Westland 
region began to increase rapidly. Growers therefore played an important role right from the start of MPS, 
particularly due to their role in the pilot groups which served to set the standards per crop. This meant a 
high level of commitment and the mission of “small steps for a large group” was fulfilled. 
(MPS, 2006: 18) 
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most important one is a covenant between the Dutch government and the greenhouse 
horticultural sector in 1997, which set a number of target objectives with regards to the impact 
of the sector on the natural environment. All Dutch horticultural growers are required to 
register their use of energy, fertilizer and pesticides and report them to the government. The 
registration requirements were designed such that growers could use MPS as a reporting tool. 
This is in contrast with the situation in Belgium and all other countries that have members in 
MPS, where such a registration is entirely voluntary.   
Table 5.6 - MPS certificates per country and qualification in 2005. Source: MPS, 2006 
Country/region MPS-A MPS-B MPS-C Total
Netherlands 2042 78% 321 12% 262 10% 2625 
Belgium 70 73% 21 22% 5 5% 96 
Denmark 34 76% 6 13% 5 11% 45 
France 7 78% 1 11% 1 11% 9 
Spain 8 42% 6 32% 5 26% 19 
Kenya/Tanzania 21 64% 4 12% 8 24% 33 
Central and South 
America* 25 68% 4 11% 8 22% 37 
Other international 12 63% 5 26% 2 11% 19 
Total 2219 77% 368 13% 296 10% 2883 
*Ecuador, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Colombia 
 
At the heart of MPS is the MPS-ABC certification. Firms that become a member of 
VMS/MPS are granted an A, B, or C label based on their relative performance with regards to 
environmental impacts (see below). Over time, MPS has created a number of additional labels 
that allow for more advanced criteria to be included in the registration and further develop 
new market segments. These labels include: 
- MPS-GAP (a worldwide scheme for compliance with demands from the retail sector) 
- MPS Socially Qualified (a scheme including social aspects, such as safety, health and 
working conditions)  
- MPS Quality and ISO9001:2000 (quality focused certificates) 
- MPS-Florimark (“a top certificate for top companies with top products”) 
 
In this dissertation, my focus remains with the MPS-ABC label. Given that only three Belgian 
firms had an MPS-GAP certificate and none of the other, I decided to focus only on 
environmental performance. 
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5.3.4.1. The MPS system 
In order to assess firm specific environmental performance, each firm is required to 
collect information with regards to four elements: its waste treatment, energy use, fertilizer 
use and crop protection products use. Every four weeks, this information is to be submitted to 
MPS, who then apply specific calculation rules to attach a score to the products used and 
waste treated by the firm. The label is awarded every 4 weeks and takes the last 13 
registration periods into account in its calculation. A minimum of 13 registration periods is 
thus needed in order to receive a label.  
The calculation rules follow a scheme that compares the firm data with a firm-specific 
norm. This firm-specific norm is one of the most interesting characteristics of the MPS 
system, since it takes a number of contextual variables into account when assessing the firm’s 
impact on the environment, which are the following: 
- the environmental hazard of the product used (toxicity, degradation speed, …);  
- the spatial characteristics of the firm (distance to open surface water, depth of 
groundwater, soil type, annual rainfall, geographical location in the world…); 
- the structural characteristics of the firm (greenhouse or open ground); 
- the type of production cluster of which it is a part (potplants, azalea, …).  
 
The firm-specific norm serves as a benchmark of what can be expected from the best 
and the worst production methods (in environmental terms) within a specific production 
cluster and geographical location. The best production methods are indicated by a lower 
bound of product use, the worst production methods with an upper bound of product use.  
These upper and lower bounds are determined by a careful follow-up of a pilotgroup, an 
expert committee and a subsequent investigation of the best available practices. The 
environmental hazard of pesticides is determined by acute and chronic toxicity for both 
human and animal life, its decomposition rate and the mobility in terms of spreading by air 
and water. Based on the simultaneous assessment of these factors, MPS developed a colour 
code for pesticides, called MPS-Mind. The most toxic pesticides are assigned a red code, the 
least toxic a green code. Intermediate toxicity gets an amber code. Again, these codes are also 
made firm specific, depending on its location and product sector. The toxicity for aquatic life, 
for example, is punished less for firms that operate in areas where there is no aquatic life 
around. Similarly, energy use will be more important for firms with greenhouses than for 
firms that operate in open ground.  
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Firms that report product uses below or equal to the firm-specific lower bound get 
maximum points, product uses which are above the upper bound get minimum (zero) points. 
Between the upper and lower bounds, points are assigned in a linear relationship. In total, 
firms can earn a maximum of 100 points. Figure 5.2 and Table 5.7 show how the use of the 
same product can result in different scores depending on the sector in which the firm is active. 
Figure 5.2 - The assignment of scores in the MPS / VMS system 
 
Table 5.7 - Maximum point that can be acquired depending on cultivation type 
 Covered cultivation  Outdoor cultivation 
Crop protection  maximum of 40 points maximum of 50 points
Green max. of 12 points  max. of 15 points 
Amber   max. of 16 points   max. of 20 points 
Red   max. of 12 points   max. of 15 points 
   
Energy   maximum of 30 points  maximum of 10 points
   
Fertilisers   maximum of 20 points maximum of 30 points
Nitrogen   max. of 10 points   max. of 15 points 
Phosphorus   max. of 10 points   max. of 15 points 
   
Waste   maximum of 10 points  maximum of 10 points
Separation of paper/cardboard max. of 2 points  max. of 2 points 
Separation of plastics  max. of 2 points max. of 2 points 
Separation of organic waste max. of 6 points max. of 6 points 
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Subsequently, firms are assigned a qualification and a corresponding label, which is 
based on the total amount of points collected: 
- MPS-A: points total of at least 70.0 and maximum of 100 
- MPS-B: points total of at least 55.0 and maximum of 69.9 
- MPS-C: points total of at least 10.0 and maximum of 54.9 
- MPS-Participant: points total of at least 0 and maximum of 9.9  
Figure 5.3 shows each of these labels. 
Figure 5.3 - The MPS A, B, C and D-labels 
 
 
In order to achieve credibility of the certification, independent audits are executed in 
three different situations: 
- Initial audit: Similar to the desk audits, an initial audit is carried out as soon as the 
participant becomes eligible to receive a calculated qualification (MPS-A, -B, -C) for 
the first time. All new firms are subjected to this initial audit. 
- Desk audit: In order to make sure that participants provide correct information, MPS 
randomly selects a group of participants and subjects them to a desk audit. The audit 
looks for extreme deviations, the use of prohibited pesticides and the (improper) use of 
products which are not allowed for specific environmental clusters. 
- Company audit: Every year, MPS orders on-site audits on at least 30% of the 
participating firms. These 30% includes the companies which need to be audited as a 
result of the desk audit. The company audits are carried out by independent companies 
on the basis of a checklist. The company audits are conducted in the same way 
throughout the world. 
- Trademark audits: Random checks are executed in order to trace fraud and improper 
or incorrect use of labels.  
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Every three months, MPS members get their results sent to them by mail. Members 
can subsequently ask for a “group comparison” in which they get to compare their firm’s 
product uses with similar firms in the same product cluster and environmental location type. 
This system allows the firm to use the MPS/VMS system as management tool and to learn 
from its registration. 
In summary, the MPS rating system serves as an independently assessed proxy for the 
level of environmental proactivity that a firm deploys relative to firms that have a similar 
sensitivity to diseases/pests, temperature needs and use of fertilisers. Firms that achieve 
higher VMS rates reflect higher levels of environmental performance relative to what is 
considered possible for the firm.  
 
5.3.5. The Belgian ornamental horticulture sector 
The Belgian ornamental horticulture sector cannot be understood without taking its 
long tradition into account. Explaining this tradition is important for two reasons. First, the 
Belgian ornamental horticulture has always been associated with aristocracy and affluence. A 
well known botanist called Lobelius already wrote in the 16th century that the Flemish were 
among the best in Europe in growing both native and exotic plants (De Herdt, 1990). This 
prestigious reputation was the result of the special interests of a number of rich patricians and 
lords who employed botanists and “plant hunters” to find new and special plants in foreign 
countries and then grow them in their mansions. One effect of this evolution was the 
foundation of the Royal Agricultural and Botanic Society in Ghent in 1808, a prestigious and 
highly traditional organization which is still governed by an elite crowd and members of “old 
nobility” today. Until recently, ornamental plants were always perceived as a luxury, an 
expensive product for which there was always more demand than supply. As a result, markets 
were very predictable: growers only had to make sure that they grew their plants, because at 
the end of the growing season there would certainly be a customer willing to buy the firm’s 
plants. As a result, business was good in ornamental horticulture, its population was affluent 
and this showed in their housing. Around these villages surrounding Ghent, one can still see 
the remainders of these “florist” villas. 
Second, the ornamental horticulture sector consists mainly of family firms that have 
often been in families for centuries. Over the years, many of the original plant hunters and 
servants that worked for the aristocracy or on larger farms, “spun off” to begin their own little 
firms and sell their plants and flowers to markets and exports. These developments took place 
mostly around the city of Ghent, with a couple of villages specializing in pot plants (around 
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Merelbeke), azalea (around Lochristi) and arboriculture (around Wetteren). The firms were 
passed on from generation to generation, with several firms that still exist today going back 
over a century. The importance of tradition, the strong family firm characteristics and its 
connection to elite communities are still celebrated in the sector today. 
Unfortunately for many ornamental horticulture firms, however, the world has 
changed over time, and so has the ornamental horticulture industry. From the beginning of the 
1980’s and especially the 1990’s, increased competition from the Netherlands resulted in 
decreasing prices, shifts in market demand and a completely new market situation. Instead of 
a demand surplus, ornamental horticulture firms were suddenly facing a supply surplus, with 
tumbling prices as a result. Increased competition and decreasing margins pushed for 
restructuring of firms with more need for managerial skills, marketing, innovation, efficiency 
and scale enlargements than the traditional craftsman skills and small scale firm had (Taragola 
et al., 2000; Verspecht et al., 2003). Many of the firms, however, were passed on in the 
beginning of the 1980’s or the beginning of the 1990s from father to son, without taking these 
changing market conditions into account. Several interviewees pointed at the impact of this 
path dependency on the structural characteristics of many firms today. Many firms are still 
working on the smaller patches and the aged greenhouses that they inherited from the 
previous generation. 
“There are many firms like that. That had better never acquired their firm from their 
parents. (…) Too small, no space, badly structured. And then the father that says 
“well, I earned a living on this firm, so why wouldn’t you be able to earn a living on 
it.” So they ask a lot of money for the firm, because they think it’s worth a lot of 
money. But that’s simply not true.” (K2) 
The interviews made clear that the ornamental horticulture sector is a sector in 
transition, moving from a period of stability to a period of increasing competition, uncertainty 
and complexity. In the following subsections, we will show the most recent developments and 
characteristics of the Belgian ornamental horticulture industry as it has become today. More 
specifically, I will focus on the general demographic and socio-economic descriptives of the 
Belgian ornamental horticulture, the general business environment and the institutional 
environment in which it is embedded. 
5.3.5.1. General demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
The National Institute of Statistics (NIS) reported that in 2004, 2395 firms were active 
in the ornamental horticulture sector as producers. The entire Belgian ornamental horticulture 
sector generated an estimated total turnover of 552 million euros, which represents about 12% 
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of the total turnover in agriculture (€ 4,55 billion) (EROV, 2006). With this production, the 
ornamental horticulture sector realizes a net positive trade balance: while the imported value 
of ornamental horticulture products in Belgium amounted to 384 million euro in 2004, it 
assumes the third place (behind the Netherlands and Italy) as an exporter in Europe, with over 
500 million euro exported value. In total, the sector employed 11 213 people in 2005. Figure 
5.4 shows how, over the last decade, the ornamental horticulture in Flanders (representing 
90% of the Belgian production) combined a strong decline in number of firms with a steady 
growth in turnover. 
Figure 5.4 - The Belgian ornamental horticulture sector in demographic 
 
 
The decreasing number of firms in the sector and the strong traditional features as 
were described before, lead to a number of additional demographic characteristics of the 
Belgian ornamental horticultural sector. Table 5.8 shows the high average age of owner-
managers, the small general firm size and the low level of education of owner-managers and 
employees. Three things can be learned from this table. First, half of the owner-managers in 
the sector is over fifty years of age. This suggests a very high level of experience, yet also a 
very high level of potential inertia. The influx of new firms or the acquiescence of firms either 
within or from outside the family is very low. Both the increased financial capital 
requirements and the bad reputation of the agricultural sector as an unprofitable sector have 
deterred many young people from considering a career in ornamental horticulture. As a result, 
the remainder of owner-managers are members of an aging population, but are also stalling 
structural renewal and investments in the future. Unfortunately, this also has a negative 
impact on the general morale in the sector. Due to the increased competition and the low 
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investment in the future, the remaining owner-managers look back on the times when life was 
easier for them and hope that they will be able to survive with their firm until retirement.  
Table 5.8 - Demographic data on ornamental horticulture firms in 2006. Source: AMS, APS 
Age category Number of employees Highest education* 
Owner-
manager Employees 
% % % % 
20-29 1 0-1 25 Primary education 22 18 
30-39 19 1-3 51 Lower secondary 30 26 
40-49 30 3-5 12 Higher secondary 38 47 
50-59 29 5-10 9 Bachelors 7 6 
> 60 20 10-20 1 Masters 3 3 
20-30 1 
30-50 1 
50-65 0 
All 100 All 100 All 100 100 
*data for agriculture, hunting, sylviculture and fisheries in general 
 
“About 60 to 70 % of growers have a rough time these days. Those that have been 
able to save enough for their pension rather prefer to retire in the current conditions. 
(…) We are confronted with growers without a future every day, where the last spark 
of professional pride has been squeezed out. Almost no one has a successor.” (K4)   
Second, almost all firms are micro-enterprises, with most of them having less than 10 
employees. In fact, the majority does not have more than 3 employees. This reflects a highly 
fragmented landscape of small, autonomous, mostly family owned firms. Although firms are 
experiencing a strong push to grow their firm size, with substantial financial capital 
requirements as a result, only a small group of firms is investing in expansion. In addition to 
the reasons of decreasing influxes of new people in the sector, a much heard influence is the 
general “individualism” of the Belgian grower: 
“Some policy makers are dreaming of clusters like the Dutch model, where a number 
of facilities are shared. But the Flemish grower wants a piece of land with his own 
company on it and a shed around it. That is his territory where he makes a living.” 
(Representative of professional association, 2006) 
As a result, a 2004 study of the Centre for Agricultural Economics reported that only 5% of 
the firms were large enough to work in optimal circumstances (Verspecht et al., 2003). On the 
other hand, the smaller size and family based character is also mentioned as one of the major 
strengths of the Flemish firms. The dedication of a family to the firm is considered essential 
for the specific requirements of the ornamental horticulture industry. One consultant reported 
that: 
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“The fact that many firms are small to middle-sized family firms results in a 
tremendous flexibility with regards to commerce. If it’s necessary, people will work 
weekends and nights during the commercial season.” (Consultant in arboriculture) 
 Thirdly, the generally low education of both owner-managers and employees reduces 
the possibilities for innovation and absorption of new practices and technologies. Although 
the data on education in Table 5.8 reflect those of the primary sector in general, several 
sources confirmed that they are applicable to the ornamental horticulture sector as well. The 
generally low education of owner-managers has two main effects. First, several interviewees 
complained that they did not possess the skills and knowledge for management and 
marketing. One important hurdle in this perspective was the lack of language skills. Given 
that most of the plants were exported across Europe, many firms were unable to establish 
contacts across Europe and decrease their dependence on intermediaries. Second, many 
owner-managers encountered difficulties to understand new legal, technical and commercial 
requirements. As a result, they hold on to their traditional practices and follow the incremental 
changes that are introduced by peers. This mimetic behaviour is the strongest around the 
traditional epicentres and production clusters of specific products.  
“A lot of growers still work like their parents did. We are working in a sector under 
heavy pressure, and the reasons for that are mostly to be found in a lack of dynamism, 
entrepreneurship and management competencies. Yet the supply of training about how 
to run a company, for example from the Economic Council of Eastern Flanders, is 
quite good. But people don’t use it.” (grower) 
 Together, these demographic and socio-economic characteristics indicate that (1) 
firms are generally small, (2) firms generally have low levels of human capital in terms of 
employees and (specialized) knowledge, and (3) the high competition and little potential to 
sell the firm results in reduced financial resources and willingness to invest in new 
infrastructure. 
5.3.5.2. General business environment 
 Providing a description of the general business environment in quantitative terms is a 
complex task in the ornamental horticulture. Although a number of studies have investigated 
the ornamental horticulture industry from a public policy point of view, very few studies have 
made comprehensive overviews of the general attractiveness of the industry from a business 
point of view. From the multiple data sources that I collected, a general picture can 
nevertheless be sketched. For reasons of consistency with chapter 3, I will present the general 
business environment in terms of its munificence, complexity and uncertainty.  
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Munificence 
Recall that the munificence of a business environment is determined by an abundant 
supply of resources that may facilitate organizations to achieve their objectives (Dess & 
Beard, 1984; Castrogiovanni, 1991). Ornamental horticulture firms, for example, may benefit 
from the research and dissemination activities that are done by the government sponsored 
research institute, the Proefcentrum voor Sierteelt (PCS). Furthermore, both government and 
independent consultants provide extension services that provide advice and disseminate 
knowledge throughout the ornamental horticulture community. The government also supports 
investments at the firm by providing capital subsidies if the investment meets certain criteria. 
Over the last years, environmentally friendly investments have thus been favoured in these 
subsidy schemes. Finally, the close presence of the Netherlands, a highly munificent business 
environment in terms of supporting institutions, consultants, machinery, construction and 
many more, is a great source of resources for many Belgian ornamental horticulture growers 
as well. Although the general business environment is thus not entirely devoid of supporting 
resources, the overall picture is nevertheless one of hostile competition and a decreased 
willingness of constituents to supply critical resources to cope with it.  
A first indicator for the low munificence in the Belgian ornamental horticulture is the 
fierce price competition and decreasing margins. Instead of the several market regulation 
instruments (subsidies and production quota) that protect arable and dairy farmers from price 
competition, the ornamental horticulture industry has a free market in place which is no 
different from any other manufacturing industry. In recent decades, a number of (costly) 
technological innovations have allowed increasing levels of productivity and have also pushed 
firms to increase in size and to capitalize on the returns to scale that come with the costly 
technologies. Especially in the Netherlands, as a result of supportive government policies and 
the more collaborative nature of Dutch growers, this trend has facilitated the growth of firms 
to sizes that allow a cheap and standardized supply of products in larger volumes. Since 
market volumes subsequently grew faster than the increases in demand, prices have gone 
down over the years. With such decreasing prices, many firms that were unable to grow have 
stopped their activities, and the remaining firms have produced larger volumes (see Figure 
5.4). In addition, the downstream markets have undergone substantial changes as well. 
Besides fast consolidation of the classical distribution and trade channels, ornamental plants 
are now increasingly sold in supermarkets and large retail chains. As a consequence of the 
increasing size and bargaining power of these downstream players, prices were driven further 
down. As one distributor explained: 
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We’ve got a customer, well we lost him now, our largest customer, that had been 
acquiring a couple other of our customers of the years (…) and they made one large 
tender, saying, (…) “that is the required price”. So they tell us what the price needs to 
be and that price is 20% less than last year’s price. 20%! While we have margins that 
are far from 20%! (K9) 
Second, at the same time markets are pushing firms to grow and capitalize on scale 
advantages, Belgian firms face increasing difficulty in getting access to the critical resources 
to make this possible: financial resources and space. With the growing financial recourses in a 
competitive and unpredictable ornamental horticulture industry with decreasing margins, 
banks have become hesitant to provide financial resources. Furthermore, expansion and 
growth of the firm requires physical space. Over the last years, however, local spatial 
planning policies have tended to oppose the building of new glasshouses in new or existing 
firms out of fear of destroying valuable landscapes (Verspecht et al., 2003; EROV, 2004), but 
also because many spatial planning specialists lack the specific knowledge to assess the 
specific needs of the ornamental horticulture industry. This places the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture industry in a disadvantageous position compared to the Dutch industry, where 
spatial planning was designed in way that fostered larger scale and new glasshouse 
infrastructures. 
A third factor decreasing the munificence of ornamental horticulture is that its too 
small as a market to influence public policies in their favour, or to interest the chemical 
industry to invest in products that satisfy their specific requirements (Daughtrey & Benson, 
2005):  
“owing to the small worldwide market size for greenhouse and nursery fungicides and 
the high costs of product introduction, new chemical control products are usually 
developed for agricultural uses and then trickle down to ornamental uses” (Daughtrey 
& Benson, 2005: 158).  
Ornamental horticulture firms thus benefit from the R&D investments that are done for the 
entire agricultural sector, yet lack the clout to push the chemical industry for research and 
product development for their own specific needs. 
A final factor inducing low munificence is the bad reputation and morale the 
ornamental horticulture sector has acquired. The traditional and old-fashioned reputation, 
together with the earlier mentioned high financial risks, hamper the access to human and 
financial resources for innovation and firm expansion and function as a high entry barrier for 
starters. In the longer term, this is described as a one of the main threats for the future. A 
critical mass of growers is needed to sustain the attractiveness of the sector towards customers 
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and suppliers and the current state of the sector does not give hopeful signals that this critical 
mass can be maintained in the future. Furthermore, increasing regulatory requirements and the 
diminishing returns have made many owner-managers pessimistic about the future. These 
complaints further discourage incumbents, as well as potential new entrants to invest in the 
future of ornamental horticulture: 
“I have a problem with the eternal complaining of many colleagues. Those that inform 
themselves in a positive way and approach the sector in a flexible way, keep their 
heads above the water. What our sector lacks is a healthy dose of optimism.” (grower) 
In sum, the ornamental horticulture industry shows many of the characteristics of a 
declining industry (Grant, 2008): excess capacity, a declining number of competitors, a high 
average age of both physical and human resources and an aggressive price competition. 
 
Complexity 
 Complexity is determined by the number and variety of factors that influence the 
general business environment (Smart & Vertinsky, 1984). As a result, the more factors owner-
managers have to deal with in order to manage the success of their organization, the more 
complex the environment. The complexity of ornamental horticulture can best be described by 
highlighting the most important factors that were mentioned in the interviews: operational 
factors, market and management factors and regulatory factors. 
 First, in purely operational terms, ornamental horticulture growers have to deal with a 
number of factors that determine the success of their operations and which are very hard to 
predict. Plant growth and quality depend on natural conditions, such as weather conditions 
(temperature, precipitation, nutrients, sunlight, etc) and the presence of diseases. It is often 
said that growing plants requires a “green thumb”: the specific skill to keep plants healthy and 
grow well. Acquiring such a skill entails learning-by-doing, which is a time consuming 
process given the slow growth of plants. Recently, however, the operational difficulties have 
been increasing. Imported base material and plants in general have brought new pests that 
require new techniques and solutions from growers. At the same time, however, several of the 
most effective, yet also most toxic, pesticides have been taken off the market. Whereas 
production was easily controlled by “broad spectrum” pesticides (killing several diseases at 
the same time), growers now have to be more aware of disease specificities and search for 
appropriate solutions. As a result, the technical complexity has increased substantially. In 
recent decades, however, a number of technologies have allowed to better control each of 
these factors. Within the confined setting of a greenhouse, for example, almost all of the 
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mentioned factors can be managed through computer-controlled heating, CO2 provision, and 
monitoring-based plant control. In addition, many, although certainly not all, growers now 
hire independent consultants that help them in following up on these new products and 
technologies. 
 Second, a recent, yet substantial source of complexity relates to marketing and 
managerial factors. Several interviewees mentioned that, until the late 1980’s, operational 
problems were the only worries owner-managers had. The same plants were grown every year 
and no particular efforts had to be made to sell the plants. From the beginning of the 1990’s, 
however, the typical craftsman suddenly had to have management and marketing skills as 
well. Having a successful business now required him to follow up and anticipate new market 
demands, new technologies, new product requirements, internet retailing, managing personnel 
and the like: 
“Everything has become too big now, large scale, depending on too many indicators 
and then you become vulnerable. (…) It’s very difficult for these guys [growers], also 
for those that are making a good living. Why is it difficult? They constantly have to 
watch out, constantly look after their business, weekdays, Sundays, always, constantly 
calculating everything. Your greenhouse may become your prison at some point.“ 
(K4) 
The complexity is further increased by shifts in consumer preferences and especially the 
changing requirements in the new market channels. Traders now have specific requirements 
related to size, packaging, presentation and delivery speed, which were completely absent in 
the past. Since it is becoming almost impossible for owner-managers to combine all these 
responsibilities, they also have to hire more employees. Yet planning, dealing with personnel 
and delegating responsibilities is an additional complexity that many owner-managers find 
hard to handle. 
“The biggest problem is that these firms are used to work hard and that they find it 
difficult to take into account that new personnel still needs to learn. They are slower 
and they become nervous because of this” (K1) 
 Finally, owner-managers also increasingly have to deal with several regulatory 
requirements. The complexity not only results from the existence of these requirements, but 
also that they stem from different policy levels. For example, although regulatory 
requirements with regards to pesticides are decided at European Union level, differences may 
nevertheless exist between countries. Similar differences also exist with regards to the 
regulatory requirements for exporting plants. Whatever the country differences, however, the 
general trend is that firms need to take these regulatory requirements into account in their 
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production and marketing practices. For many owner-managers, these regulatory requirements 
are a problem, since they do not always know where to find the right information about them. 
 
Uncertainty 
 The uncertainty is determined by perception of the owner-manager of the 
predictability of the future of the business environment in general, its impact on the firm, and 
the predictability of the outcomes of a firm’s decisions (Milliken, 1987). Although this 
perception will differ between growers, the interviews and especially the roundtable 
discussions revealed that there are nevertheless some general conclusions to be drawn,  
 First, the two most important uncertainties that came out of a scenario-planning 
analysis were (1) the speed of consolidation of the downstream market, and (2) the “goodwill” 
from society to allow expansion and development possibilities in the market. If the 
consolidation speed would be too fast, and if public policies would not be willing to grant 
expansion possibilities to the firm, then the sector fears that only very few firms will be able 
to survive. Only firms with specific niche markets or firms that already have a sufficient scale 
in the market will be able to survive. However, it is feared that if the number of firms goes 
below a certain threshold level, there will no longer be enough to justify the research centres, 
independent consultants, traders and transport companies that currently still provide the low 
levels of munificence needed for the survival and growth of the existing firms. As such, the 
general business environment of the ornamental horticulture sector was considered very 
uncertain (EROV, 2004). 
Second, most people in the ornamental horticulture industry are convinced that there 
will always be a demand for plants, Yet, determining which plants will be popular and/or 
profitable is an increasingly difficult task. Whereas particular flower colours can be very 
popular in one year, they can be almost impossible to sell in another. However, since the 
production cycles can sometimes take up several years (in the case of arboriculture, for 
example), this makes production decisions almost a gamble.  
Thirdly, the requirements for environmentally friendly production remain uncertain to 
date. Whereas it has been suggested for the last ten years that environmental labels would 
become a necessity in the market, or would become a regulatory requirement through 
compulsory registration, such requirements still do not exist.  
 
Taken together, the current business environment is characterized with low 
munificence, increasing complexity and high uncertainty. Given that high levels of 
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munificence, and low levels of complexity and uncertainty are associated with higher 
probabilities of finding proactive environmental strategies among firms (Aragon-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003), it is no surprise that only a small amount of firms have become member of 
VMS. In order to have a complete picture of all the contextual factors that could impact the 
adoption of proactive environmental strategies in the ornamental horticulture, the next section 
is dedicated to describing the external institutional environment. 
 
5.3.5.3. External institutional environment 
 DiMaggio and Powell defined an organizational field as a set of organizations that “in 
the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products.” (1983:148). Organizations in an organizational field share unilateral or 
multilateral influences that guide their behaviour through regulative (formal rules), normative 
(social obligations) or cognitive (taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviours) pressures 
(Scott, 2001) and which centre around a particular issue (Hoffman, 1999). Both Scott and 
DiMaggio and Powell warn anyone interested in investigating an organizational field that 
“the structure of an organizational field cannot be determined a priori but must be defined on 
the basis of empirical investigation.”(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). More specifically, it is 
important to assess how the organizational field is structured around one particular issue 
through each of these three “pillars” of institutional order (Scott, 2001). To this purpose, 
Table 5.9 provides a summary of the institutional pressures with regards to environmentally 
friendly “green” production in the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector. In contrast to 
earlier studies on organizational reactions to natural environmental issues (Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1996; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Bansal, 2005), 
proactive environmental strategies in the Belgian ornamental horticulture industry represent 
an act of non-conformity, rather than one of conformity. More specifically, we found that the 
dominant institutional logic in the ornamental horticulture sector discourages proactive 
environmental strategies, and acts in favour of maintaining the status quo. Table 5.9 shows 
how the institutional pressures are distributed in favour of and against environmental 
strategies in the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector by drawing upon the three pillars of 
institutions: regulative, normative and cognitive.  
1. Regulative pressures. Since we are looking at environmental practices that go beyond 
legal requirements (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003), 
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regulative pressures are only of interest as far as they inform firms to go beyond them. 
As such, the growing trend of environmental regulatory requirements could act as an 
implicit regulative pressure for firms to go beyond current legal expectations and 
anticipate future ones. However, it conflicts with the explicit regulatory requirements 
that exported plants should be pest-free when they are sold for export. As such, the use 
of pesticides on exported plants is essentially required by law.  
2. Normative pressures. Whereas it is generally expected that firms are under normative 
social and market pressure to improve their environmental performance, this does not 
seem to be the case in the ornamental horticulture sector. On the one hand, individual 
neighbours, civil society organizations and end-consumers display little interest in 
ornamental horticulture firms and complaints are therefore rare. On the other hand, the 
conservative and reactive discourse of professional associations conveys normative 
messages that discourage green production. Like most agricultural sectors around the 
globe, the ornamental horticulture sector is embedded in a highly institutionalized 
environment, with strong forces for within-industry isomorphism and resistance to 
external pressures (Coleman, 1998; Montpetit, 2000). Given that environmental 
regulation increasingly constrains the discretion growers have in their regular use of 
fertilizer and crop protection products, the general feeling is that the government is 
making it impossible to have a profitable business. The professional associations thus 
react by stating that environmental regulation is too fast and that it does not take the 
economic reality of growers into account.   
“Give the sector the space where firms can further expand. This is our most 
important priority, and it shouldn’t be immersed in an amalgam of concurrent 
priorities for sustainability, optimal energy use, registration systems, … An 
owner-manager first has to be able to start a company, before he can speak 
about sustainable production, or before optimizing pesticides, nutrients and 
energy.” (professional association representative, 2003) 
Such resistance exists among individual firms as well, and in particular with regards to 
initiatives like VMS. Since VMS discloses the use of pesticides and fertilizers, some 
growers worry that this would encourage the government to establish new laws and 
requirements. For example, one grower told me: 
I get criticized sometimes and then other people tell me “you just disclose all 
those things! They [the government] don’t have to know all that. You just show 
it to them and next thing you know they’ll be putting taxes on that!”. (Ensor) 
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In addition, many firms are relying on independent advisors that guide the production, 
who are paid first and foremost to secure the quality and maximize yields. As a result, 
environmental criteria are rarely on their radar screen and advice is thus rarely given in 
these terms. 
“If there are products available in Belgium that are not on the VMS list, then 
I’ll say: “guys, go ahead and take those products, please, what is the 
problem!” VMS is not going to determine your profitability, right?” (K5) 
3. Cognitive pressures. Given the increasingly hostile environment and the few new 
entrants in the sector, the remaining firms rely on traditional practices that evade the 
risk and uncertainty of new techniques and technologies. For example, the traditional 
production methods favour a system of “calendar spraying”, which involves the 
preventive application of pesticides not based on necessity, but based on predefined 
calendar planning. It is generally accepted in the sector that doing otherwise would 
unnecessarily increase the risk of having plant damage. Even with the capital subsidies 
that favour environmentally friendly production methods, the additional (perceived) 
costs and risks that are associated with environmentally friendly production techniques 
or investing in more environmentally friendly technologies are attributed a low 
priority in the growers’ decisions making: 
“Growers work according to a system of preventive calendar spraying.(…) 
Among ornamental horticulture growers, it [guided protection] still encounters 
a lot of resistance. They don’t know what it’s about, their knowledge of 
parasites is inadequate, they fear the system will be too expensive because it is 
rather labor intensive.” (government official)  
One other typical characteristic for the Belgian ornamental horticulture is the strong 
individualism of growers. Whereas collaboration between firms and their various 
constituencies is very common in the Netherlands, the Belgian owner-manager wants 
to remain in charge of his own operations and is very reluctant to let anyone intervene. 
“Some policy makers are dreaming of industrial clusters like the Dutch model, 
where a number of facilities are shared. But the Flemish grower wants a piece 
of land with his own company on it and a shed around it. That is his territory 
where he makes a living.” (professional association representative) 
 
  
 
Table 5.9 - Institutional pressures regarding environmental production in the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector 
Institutional 
pressure 
Organizations 
involved 
Pressure against green production and 
registration 
Illustration 
Regulative Legislative 
bodies  
‐ All plants for export should be pest-free ‐ European Council Directive 2000/29/EC 
Normative Society 
Professional 
associations 
Independent 
advisors 
Consumers 
VMS 
Media 
‐ No pressure or interest from neighbors or 
societal organizations regarding production 
methods  
‐ Professional associations taking conservative 
positions on environmental regulation 
proposals 
‐ There is no market demand for green products 
‐ Few distributors are interested in green 
products or promote them 
‐ Independent advisors focus on plant quality 
and yields and are hesitant to provide advice 
on more risky environmentally friendly 
production 
‐ “If there would be one objective for professional associations, it would 
be to make sure (…) that you embrace sustainability. But I have never 
heard them say anything about it”(trader) 
‐ The consumer does not know VMS. Despite my efforts and registration, I 
never get a request what VMS certificate my plants have. Registering 
with VMS does not lead to financial added value.” (grower)  
‐ “When we ask the owner-managers why they don’t innovate, they 
answer that it’s because the market doesn’t ask them to innovate. The 
traders themselves aren’t really open to innovations 
either.”(government official) 
‐ “But fertilizers, if you want to produce decent products you have to 
make sure that you use enough, that you use good and appropriate 
proportions. And pesticides: you’re obliged to keep the plants free of 
pests.”(independent advisor) 
Cognitive Peers 
Cultural 
tradition 
 
‐ Environmental regulation makes production 
more difficult. 
‐ Not following a system of preventive calendar 
spraying results in higher risks of plant damage 
‐ Multiple sprays of less polluting products seem 
more polluting than a single spray of effective, 
but toxic product. 
‐ Green production requires more time and 
financial resources 
‐ Investing in new, greener production methods 
is pointless since there are no successors that 
would be interested in buying a profitable firm  
‐ “Everything is becoming impossible, what we have to face. We are 
unable to grow anymore. It is made impossible for us to produce, with 
all these laws and …” (VMS representative on growers 
‐ “Growers work according to a system of preventive calendar 
spraying.(…) Among ornamental horticulture growers, it[guided 
protection] still encounters a lot of resistance. They don’t know what it’s 
about, their knowledge of parasites is inadequate, they fear the system 
will be too expensive because it is rather labor intensive.” (government 
official) 
‐ “There are a lot of small businesses here with an owner-manager of 
about 50 years that don’t have a successor. They’re not going to enter 
VMS anymore. Their calculus really is ‘it’ll last my time’”(traders 
association president) 
  
Table 1 (continued) - Institutional pressures regarding environmental production in the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector 
Institutional 
pressure 
Organizations 
involved 
Pressure in favor of green production and 
registration 
Illustration 
Regulative Legislative 
bodies at EU, 
Belgian and 
regional level  
‐  (Indirect: toxicity based license requirements 
for chemical products) 
‐ Increasing environmental requirements in 
regulation 
‐ European Commission Regulation 1095/2007  
Normative Society 
Professional 
associations 
Independent 
advisors 
Consumers 
VMS 
Media 
‐ Increasing general social attention for the 
natural environment 
‐ Possibility that environmental production will 
improve the reputation of the sector 
‐ VMS as a sector initiative to promote 
environmentally friendly production in the 
ornamental horticulture sector 
‐  “Attention for the environment in general is necessary for the 
environment and good for the reputation of the sector. Commercially, 
however, it does not have any added value whatsoever.”(grower) 
‐ “Miss Dua [Flemish Minister of Agriculture between 1999 and 2003] 
(…) made the impression (…) that she wanted to take action to urge 
ornamental horticulture growers to start environmental registration. We 
responded to the administration that our profession, by establishing 
VMS, has clearly taken the initiative itself.(professional association 
representative) 
Cognitive Peers 
Cultural 
tradition 
 
‐ Signalling function from governmental 
subsidies favouring environmentally friendly 
production technologies 
 
‐ “Growers can receive subsidies from the Flemish government if they 
engage in VMS. This is a clear signal that the government believes in 
VMS.”(VMS representative) 
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In sum, these institutional pressures show how the organizational field is not in favour of 
environmental strategies that go beyond legal requirements. Table 5.9 summarizes these 
institutional pressures with illustrations from the data. 
A proof of the institutional inertia that exists with regards to green production in the 
Belgian ornamental horticulture sector is the limited membership of VMS. Only 127 growers 
were members of this organization at the time of the interviews, amounting to only 6% of the 
entire sector (MPS, 2006). This limited membership shows that neither proactive 
environmental strategies, nor disclosure about organizational impact on the environment has 
become institutionalized in the sector. As such, VMS can be considered to have achieved the 
level of a “proto-institution”: new practices, rules and technologies that question the dominant 
institutional logics in an industry, but have not been diffused sufficiently to become 
institutionalized (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002). 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 The objective of this chapter was to provide a comprehensive overview of 
methodological and contextual choices that were made in this dissertation. The striking 
conclusion that can be drawn from the contextual analysis is that neither of the factors that 
were reviewed in chapter 3 and that predicted the adoption of PES are present in the Belgian 
ornamental horticulture. As a result, it should come at no surprise that so few firms have 
become member of VMS. Whereas VMS has the potential to change some of the rules in the 
industry, the current institutional and general business environment is in fact more against 
than in favour of its principles. This has important implications for the analyses that will 
follow in chapters 6 and 7. First, a comparison between firms with higher VMS scores and 
firms with lower VMS scores will allow determining whether particular resources and 
capabilities facilitate small firms to realize proactive environmental strategies. Second, the 
very presence of firms that have become member of VMS already presents an anomaly to 
some of the theoretical predictions in chapter 3. Although it has mostly been suggested that 
small firm size inhibits proactive environmental strategies, the high performing VMS firms 
clearly demonstrate that this is nevertheless possible. Furthermore, these same firms realize 
these strategies, despite   the institutional and general business conditions that were set against 
having one. As such, the Belgian ornamental horticulture, and in particular VMS members, 
presents an appropriate setting to do the research needed for answering research questions 2 
and 3 of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Against All Odds: Realizing Proactive 
Environmental Strategies in Small 
Businesses4 
 
“Del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho” 
(Spanish proverb) 
“There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip”  
(English proverb) 
“Want tussen droom en daad staan wetten in de weg en praktische bezwaren”  
(Willem Elsschot)  
 
Abstract 
While the literature finds that small businesses have positive attitudes towards the natural 
environment, proactive environmental strategies are rarely found among them. Although 
contributions embedded in the resource-based view of the firm have therefore related the 
realization of proactive environmental strategies with larger firm size, anecdotal evidence of 
small firms that have realized their proactive environmental intentions nevertheless exist. 
Using case study data of 8 small businesses, we develop a model that explains this theoretical 
inconsistency by identifying “organicity” and “munification” as two composite and 
interacting dynamic capabilities that enable small businesses to create the conditions that 
foster the realization of proactive environmental strategies. 
                                                 
4 This paper is the product of a collaborative effort of myself and Dr. Michael Valente. Earlier versions of this 
paper were published as “Lepoutre. J. and Valente, M. 2007. Overcoming Calimero Complexes in Small 
Business Social Responsibility. Proceedings of the conference of the International Association for Business in 
Society, May 1-June 3, 2007, Florence, Italy”, and presented as “Lepoutre, J. and Valente, M. 2007. A resource-
based perspective on small business proactive social and environmental strategies.” at the Ivey School of 
Business Research Seminar Series 2007-2008, 1 November 2007, Ivey School of Business, London, Ontario, 
Canada. The authors wish to thank Aimé Heene, Erik Mathijs, Bart Nooteboom, Johan Lambrecht, Annick 
Willem, Tima Bansal, Oana Branzei, Eileen Fisher, Jessica De Boeck, the anonymous reviewers and participants 
of the IABS conference and the participants of the Ivey School of Business Research Seminar Series for their 
helpful comments in improving this paper. 
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6. Against All Odds: Realizing Proactive Environmental Strategies in 
Small Businesses 
6.1. Introduction 
The natural environment is high on the public and corporate agenda. A recent study 
reported that “environmental issues, including climate change” have soared to the top of the 
agenda of CEOs (McKinsey, 2007). Almost 50% of the surveyed CEOs believe that the 
natural environment will be the most important issue to impact shareholder value over the 
next 5 years. The same study, however, also sheds light on a gap between what CEOs think 
should be done and what they actually do. Whereas CEOs indicate that they should be 
investing in the development and implementation of corporate social responsibility policies 
and increasing the transparency of a firm’s impact on the environment, they reported that 
public relations and media campaigns, along with lobbying regulators and governments are 
still the most commonly used tactics instead. Although environmental concerns have been on 
the radar screen of CEOs for some time, studies as these indicate that many constraints remain 
in place that inhibit good intentions from turning into noble achievements. 
One context where the problem of unrealized environmental intentions seems 
particularly pervasive is among small businesses. A plethora of studies have demonstrated 
that although small business owner-managers have positive attitudes towards the natural 
environment, their good intentions are lost somewhere along the way and do not result in 
actual practice (Merritt, 1998; Tilley, 1999; Petts et al., 1999; Tilley, 2000; Schaper, 2002; 
Hitchens et al., 2005; Worthington & Patton, 2005; McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005). Despite 
concerns with the natural environment, small business owner-managers refer to a lack of 
internal resources and external support that constrain them to realize their environmental 
intentions (Merritt, 1998; Tilley, 2000; Ludevid Anglada, 2000; Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; 
Schaper, 2002; Vernon et al., 2003; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; Elsayed, 2006; Revell & 
Blackburn, 2007). As a result, research grounded in the resource-based view of the firm 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) has consistently found 
that the smaller the firm, the lower the likelihood of it having a proactive environmental 
strategy (e.g., Russo & Fouts, 1997; Aragon-Correa, 1998; Judge & Douglas, 1998; Sharma, 
2000; King & Lenox, 2002; Chan, 2005; Bansal, 2005; Elsayed, 2006). Such a finding is 
perplexing, since it is often argued that the likelihood of finding realized strategies that reflect 
the intentions of the firm can be particularly found among small ventures (Mintzberg & 
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Waters, 1982; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Given that firms build on the visions of their 
owner-managers and that these same owner-managers are fully in control of their firm and 
highly committed to the implementation of that vision, it is argued that small businesses are 
especially equipped to realize their intended strategies. As it seems, the internal and external 
constraining factors seem to inhibit owner-managers to realize their intentions, even though 
there are theoretical reasons to believe that the small business context would be particularly 
suited to this purpose. Although anecdotal evidence exists that shows that some firms seem to 
overcome these constraints and are able to realize proactive environmental strategies (BITC, 
2002; UNIDO, 2002; European Commission, 2003c), it remains unexplored how small 
ventures can overcome internal and external inhibiting factors and realize their intended 
proactive environmental strategies. 
This paper takes a descriptive view of proactive environmental strategies in the 
tradition that realized strategies do not always reflect intended strategies (Mintzberg, 1979; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Proactive environmental strategies are systematic patterns of 
voluntary environmental practices, not required to be undertaken “in fulfillment of 
environmental regulations or in response to isomorphic pressures within the industry as 
standard business practice” (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998: 776). The current literature on 
proactive environmental strategies (PES) has been mainly focused on the antecedents 
(Sharma, 2000; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003) and economic 
consequences of PES (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Aragon-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003). Few studies, however, have examined how intended PES are enacted and how 
firms with intended PES actually realize their objectives. Acquiring such knowledge is 
important, since it would provide insight into how businesses can be prevented from deviating 
from their well intended objectives and end-up with often pragmatic yet ineffective solutions.  
This paper addresses the research question how small businesses are able to realize 
their intended PES when the odds are set against having one. In particular, we are interested 
in the capabilities that enable them to deal with the constraining factors and realize their 
intentions. We drew on a qualitative study of a unique sample of small firms in the Belgian 
ornamental horticulture that signal both their proactive environmental intentions and their 
actually realized strategies in a setting that constrained firms to realize PES. By exploring the 
differences between a group of firms with unrealized PES and a group with realized PES, we 
found that firms with realized PES possessed two composite and interacting dynamic 
capabilities, munification and organicity, which enabled them to change the odds in their 
favor.  
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We structured our paper as follows. We first review theories on intended and realized 
strategies and the current knowledge on proactive environmental strategies in small firms. 
After discussing the methods used in this paper, we then move to present our findings. We 
conclude the paper with a discussion of these findings and indicate the implications for 
theory. 
6.2. Theoretical background 
6.2.1. Between intended and realized strategies 
 Opposing the assumption that strategies are solely the result of the cognitive exercises 
of CEOs planning and formulating the future trajectory of steps to be implemented by the 
firm, the descriptive work of Mintzberg and colleagues offered a more nuanced perspective 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982; Mintzberg & Mchugh, 1985; Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985). These studies endorsed a perspective of strategy where there may be a 
disconnect between the strategic intentions of a firm – the intended strategy – and what the 
firm actually does – the realized strategy. In the event that the intended objectives actually 
result in the desired pattern of actions, strategies are called deliberate, as opposed to 
unrealized strategies where the firm is unable to enact its intentions in the desired way. 
Realized strategies, however, may also be emergent, meaning that they reflect a pattern of 
actions that deviates from the intentions or has emerged as a result of a lack of intentions 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).  Figure 6.1 shows a summary of these different types of 
strategies.  
Figure 6.1 - Mintzberg's strategy types. (Based on Mintzberg, 1978) 
 
The notion of emergent strategies was important to the field of strategy, since it 
questioned the usefulness of strategic planning in the firm and advocated for strategists to be 
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more careful “readers of the environment” and to adapt to the demands that emerge from it 
(Sarasvathy, 2001; Farjoun, 2002). In addition, it also raised the question when and how firms 
can be successful in achieving their intended objectives. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) argued 
that in order for strategies to be deliberate, three conditions have to be met: (1) clear and 
precise definition of intentions; (2) a shared acceptance or conception of the intentions among 
all members of the organization; and (3) no intervening factors that hinder the implementation 
of the intentions. Although they argued that occasions where these three conditions would be 
met are rare, one type of organization stood out in its potential for deliberate strategies: small 
and new entrepreneurial ventures under the tight control of their owners. 
The main argument in support of the hypothesis that deliberate strategies will be found 
more frequently among small and new firms can be brought back to two of the earlier 
mentioned conditions for deliberate strategies. First, although the intentions of the firm may 
not always be articulated or formalized – in fact, more often than not, they remain concealed 
in the mind of the owner-manager – and that they may or may not be shared by the 
employees, the vision of the owner-manager and his or her control over the organization 
makes the likelihood of deliberate strategies in small organizations particularly high. Second, 
since he or she is the owner of the firm, the owner-manager has “a strong, long term 
commitment to his organization (knowing that, barring a natural disaster, it is he who will be 
there in the long run)” (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982: 496). As a result, the owner-manager is 
more likely to engage his employees in realizing the strategy he has envisioned for the firm: 
“so long as the business is simple and concentrated enough to be comprehended in 
one brain, (…) no other mode of strategy making can provide the degree of 
deliberateness and of integration of strategies with each other and with the 
environment.” (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982: 496)  
These assertions by Mintzberg and Waters were made, however, on a third condition: the 
environment needs to “cooperate” and should not intervene with the strategy. In other words, 
as long as the environmental conditions are in favor of the firm’s particular intentions, the 
likelihood of deliberate strategies in small firms is high. As soon as the firm is faced with 
changing environmental circumstances, it may have to adapt to these new circumstances.  
Furthermore, the previous studies have all assumed that the firm was able to draw on a 
resource base that enabled the firm to implement its intended strategy. Firms that encounter 
constraining internal or external conditions to implement their intended strategies, however, 
may also give up their intentions and adopt an alternative emergent strategy instead, even in 
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small entrepreneurial ventures. One field where this seems to be the case is the field of 
proactive environmental strategies.  
 
6.3. Proactive environmental strategies and small businesses 
Studies have found a number of factors that “cooperate” well with realizing proactive 
environmental strategies. More specifically, the likelihood that firms realize proactive 
environmental strategies increases with the presence of abundant organizational capital 
(Russo & Fouts, 1997; Sharma, 2000; Bowen, 2000; Bansal, 2005), a resource-abundant, 
predictable and simple external resource environment (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Aragon-Correa 
& Sharma, 2003; Sharma et al., 2007) and institutional pressures that foster organizational 
attention to the environment (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; 
Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Bansal, 2005). Figure 6.2 provides a schematic overview of these 
theoretical predictions.    
Figure 6.2 - Theoretical predictions on proactive environmental strategies 
 
 
Although a number of studies indicate that small firms have a positive attitude towards 
the natural environment (Holland & Gibbon, 1997; Merritt, 1998; Tilley, 1999; Petts et al., 
1999; Tilley, 2000; Schaper, 2002; Hitchens et al., 2005; Worthington & Patton, 2005; 
McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005), the most common finding is nevertheless that smaller firms 
rarely have a proactive environmental strategy in place (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Aragon-
Chapter 6 
 
155 
Correa, 1998; Merritt, 1998; Tilley, 1999; Petts et al., 1999; Tilley, 2000; Sharma, 2000; 
Schaper, 2002; Hitchens et al., 2005; Bansal, 2005; Worthington & Patton, 2005; McKeiver 
& Gadenne, 2005). The recurring explanation for such a lack of PES among small businesses 
seems to be that small businesses are unable to realize PES because of a lack of internal 
resource capital and external facilitating factors from the general business environment and 
society. First, small businesses lack the internal resource capital. Several studies have 
demonstrated that owner-managers succumb to the pressures of their everyday survival and 
lose their good intentions somewhere along the way (Tilley, 1999; Schaper, 2002; Vernon et 
al., 2003; Hitchens et al., 2005; Revell & Blackburn, 2007). More specifically, the lack of 
available time, knowledge, (financial) resources and power in the firm seem to be the most 
important inhibitors of PES in small businesses (Tilley, 1999; Tilley, 2000; Hillary, 2000a; 
Observatory of European SMEs, 2002; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; Elsayed, 2006; Revell & 
Blackburn, 2007). The abundance of resources in excess of what is needed in the firm – slack 
resources (Bourgeois, 1981; Sharfman et al., 1988) – has been identified as an important 
predictor of PES (Sharma, 2000; Bowen, 2000; Bansal, 2005), but are usually not available in 
smaller firms (Sharfman et al., 1988). As a result, a small firm constrained by a lack of slack 
resources will have shorter time horizons (Van der Stede, 2000) and will typically be 
“firefighting” problems that require immediate solutions to maintain firm survival. As a 
result, small business owner-managers argue that little time remains to think about appropriate 
environmental strategies (Revell & Blackburn, 2007). Furthermore, it is said that small 
business owner-managers lack “eco-literacy”, the knowledge to absorb and identify potential 
environmental practices for their firm (Tilley, 2000; Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000). 
Sometimes this may even make them “vulnerably compliant”: due to a lack of awareness and 
empathy with environmental regulations, non-compliance is often more a result of bad luck 
than bad intentions (Petts et al., 1999).  
Second, small businesses lack a supportive market environment for PES. Small 
business owner-managers frequently lament the lack of market incentives that would 
compensate the financial burden PES would place on their firm (Merritt, 1998; Tilley, 1999; 
Ludevid Anglada, 2000; Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; Hillary, 2000a; Observatory of 
European SMEs, 2002; Hitchens et al., 2005; Revell & Blackburn, 2007). Small business 
often lack the clout to impose their intentions on the very supply chain partners on whom they 
depend, or to lobby with the government for new regulatory requirements (Hillman & Hitt, 
1999; Revell & Blackburn, 2007). Since tackling environmental pollution is often a systemic 
and shared responsibility in the supply chain, small firms depend on the willingness of their 
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constituents to go along in their intentions (Spence et al., 2000). In addition, given that many 
small businesses already operate in uncertain and complex environments (Chen & Hambrick, 
1995; Merz & Sauber, 1995; Stone & Brush, 1996), they are hesitant to take up the additional 
uncertainty that comes with considering the natural environment (Lewis & Harvey, 2001).  
Third, small businesses lack the institutional support for PES. Small businesses rarely 
attract the same levels of scrutiny from stakeholders as larger firms (Greening & Gray, 1994; 
Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Bansal, 2005) and often do not receive any institutional pressures that 
drive them towards PES. Although the cumulative impact of small businesses on the 
environment is estimated to be higher than that of larger businesses (Hillary, 2000a), small 
business owner-managers and stakeholders alike consider the individual small business 
impact negligible (Merritt, 1998; Revell & Blackburn, 2007). Small firms may thus remain 
invisible to public scrutiny and only experience institutional pressure through legislation 
(Worthington & Patton, 2005; McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005). As a result, the adoption of 
environmental initiatives beyond legal expectations is more the result of a sense of 
environmental responsibility, than it is for reasons of competitiveness or legitimacy (Bansal & 
Roth, 2000).  
Taken together, these theoretical and empirical findings predict that finding realized 
PES in small firms is highly unlikely, even when the intentions to have them are there. A 
number of case studies, however, offer the contrasting perspective that PES are not impossible 
in smaller firms. In fact, in some instances, small businesses have championed PES well 
ahead of larger firms in their industry (BITC, 2002; UNIDO, 2002; European Commission, 
2003c; Jenkins, 2006). What remains unexplored, however, is how such businesses were able 
to realize their strategies, while the majority of firms were not.  
One explanation could be that these anecdotal firms did not have any of these 
constraints and that Mintzberg and Water’s three conditions for deliberate strategies were met 
as a result. The descriptive accounts of the PES champions in these studies, however, mention 
that these firms did experience constraints. Yet the firms “did not see them as an obstacle, 
merely a challenge to be overcome” (Jenkins, 2006: 252). As a result, another explanation 
could be that the theoretical model as depicted in Figure 6.2 needs to be adapted to the 
specific context of small businesses.  It has been argued before that “small businesses are not 
little big businesses” (Dandridge, 1979; Welsh & White, 1981) and that theories in large 
businesses will not necessarily apply to small businesses (d'Amboise & Muldowney, 1988). 
However, in a recent study on PES in small businesses, Aragon-Correa et al. (2008) took a 
number of capabilities that were found in larger firms and tested them among small 
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businesses, and found that very similar capabilities were needed in small firms and in large 
firms to successfully execute a PES. In sum, perhaps as a result of a general neglect of small 
businesses in the organizations and the natural environment literature (Worthington & Patton, 
2005; Clemens, 2006; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; Revell & Blackburn, 2007), the current 
literature does not provide convincing theoretical perspectives to explain the phenomenon of 
small businesses successfully realizing seemingly elusive proactive environmental strategies. 
This observation, together with the idiosyncratic challenges to empirically capture strategies 
in small businesses, led us to the inductive approach used in this study.  
6.4. Methods 
 This article draws on a qualitative multi-case inductive study in the tradition of theory 
elaboration (Lee et al., 1999), the purpose of which is to extend existing theory by contrasting 
it with observed events or conflicting findings (Gilbert, 2005; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
Although the reader is referred to chapter 5 for a full overview of the methodology used in 
this study, I will briefly reiterate the most important choices made and how they connect with 
the research question at hand in this paper. 
 The particular nature of our research question directed us to multiple case studies for 
two reasons. First, multi-case studies are an appropriate methodology for studies that have as 
their goal to build or elaborate theory when theory is absent or yields conflicting explanations 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2003; Siggelkow, 2007), as in our case. In particular, case studies are 
appropriate when the research question involves a “why” or “how” question, such as “how 
can small businesses realize PES when the odds are against having one?” Second, the 
particular research context of small businesses yields little secondary sources which could be 
used to build theory from larger samples of qualitative data sources. In addition, many of the 
behaviors and choices are unconsciously hidden even to the owner-manager. Assessing why 
and how a small business develops a certain strategy can thus best be observed by assessing it 
through various angles (Curran & Blackburn, 2001). 
 We theoretically sampled firms among VMS members in the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture sector. Within the context of this paper, we used VMS membership as a proxy for 
a firm’s proactive environmental intentions. As described in chapter 5, we excluded firms 
from our analysis when VMS membership did not reflect a firm’s proactive environmental 
intentions. Furthermore, we used the independently assessed VMS score as a proxy for 
whether the firm’s intentions were actually realized or unrealized. Table 5.4 provides an 
overview of the firms that were used in the multi-case study. 
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Table 6.1 - Overview of firms in sample 
ID Type of firm Firm's 
birth year 
Number 
of 
employees
Score† Number 
of 
interviews
Panamarenko Potplants 1999 6 99 (A) 4 
Magritte Arboriculture 2000* 4 98 (A) 3 
Fabre Arboriculture 1975 7 96 (A) 4 
Ensor Azalea 2003* 5 95 (A) 4 
Brueghel Azalea 1985* 4 58 (C) 3 
Rubens Potplants 2000* 4 57 (C) 3 
Jordaens Potplants 2001* 4 32 (C) 3 
Van Dyck Arboriculture 1970 7 - (D) 4 
Total     28 
*= acquisition or extension of family firm 
† =  scores after period 7 in 2005 
 
Confining the research setting within the geographical and sector limits of the Belgian 
ornamental horticulture allows controlling for potential alternative influencing factors besides 
organizational capabilities and resources (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Furthermore, as reviewed in 
chapter 5, the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector presents a particularly interesting setting 
to investigate PES, since none of the factors that have been associated with finding PES 
among firms (see Figure 6.2) are present. For convenience, these conditions are summarized 
again in Table 6.2.  
6.5. Findings 
In order to explain the theoretically aberrant finding that some small businesses in the 
Belgian ornamental horticulture sector were effectively realizing a proactive environmental 
strategy when the odds were against having one, we explored the differences between the 
higher and lower performing VMS firms. Foreshadowing our conclusions, we found that the 
higher performing firms were able to change their resource base and create a micro- 
environment that mimicked the conditions that normally foster a firm’s successful realization 
of a PES. As such, our findings contradict the assumption that small businesses merely accept 
their internally or externally imposed constraints. Rather, by leveraging the complex 
interaction between two dynamic capabilities, munification and organicity, they were able to 
create the theoretical conditions that foster the realization of proactive environmental 
intentions. Munification and organicity are dynamic capabilities, since they enable the firm to 
change their resource base and to adapt their organization the dynamic processes that realizing 
a PES may present (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). In the following sections 
  
Table 6.2 - Promoting factors of PES in theory and in the ornamental horticulture industry 
Theoretical 
requirement for 
PES adoption 
References Situation in 
ornamental 
horticulture industry  
Evidence 
Internal business environment 
Large firm size (high 
levels of slack 
resources and 
visibility) 
(Florida, 1996; 
Aragon-Correa, 
1998; Sharma, 2000; 
Chan, 2005; Bansal, 
2005) 
Small firm size  - Average firm has less than 10 employees 
- Report indicating that only 5% of all firms were operating at sufficient firm size (Verspecht et 
al., 2003) 
External business environment 
High munificence Russo and Fouts, 
1997; Aragon-Correa 
and Sharma, 2003; 
Halma, 2002  
Low munificence - Decreasing margins, due to fierce price competition and oversupplied markets. 
- Increasing numbers of failures downstream the supply chain  
- Consolidation of supply chain increases dependence on less players with larger market power 
- Market is too small for R&D in chemical industry to cater specifically to ornamental 
horticulture (Daughtrey & Benson, 2005) 
- Long payment delays from customers  
- Societal willingness to grant expansion possibilities (new greenhouses, new land) to ornamental 
horticulture is low due to high competition for land in Belgium 
Low complexity (Aragon-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003; Matos 
& Hall, 2007) 
Increasing complexity - Globalizing markets with new players and interests 
- Multiple levels of government decisions impacting production possibilities 
- Transport between countries brings in new diseases, while regulation takes traditional pesticides 
of the market 
- Questioned role of agriculture in Western societies 
- Skills required as owner/manager in firm shift from craftsman skills to general management 
skills 
Low uncertainty (Aragon-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003; 
Sharma et al., 2007) 
High uncertainty - Long production cycles (anywhere between several months and several years), together with 
unpredictable consumer demands make it impossible to predict returns. 
- Market information and trends are not shared between producers and retailers or traders, making 
many production decisions a gamble. 
External institutional environment 
High levels of 
institutional 
pressures for 
environmental 
strategies 
(Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1996; 
Buysse & Verbeke, 
2003; Bansal, 2005) 
Low levels of 
institutional pressures 
promoting 
environmental 
strategies 
- Generally low stakeholder interest due to low visibility of individual firms 
- Little market demand for environmental products and difficulty to establish brands in 
fragmented production markets. 
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we will first describe each of these dynamic capabilities and then develop how their 
interactive effect enabled firms to realize their proactive environmental strategies. 
 
6.5.1. Munification 
Despite the lack of a generally munificent and institutionally supportive environment, 
the high scoring VMS members had been engaged in a set of activities that, together, had 
resulted in a micro-environment that was more conducive to higher VMS scores. The 
capability through which this was possible, and which we have come to call “munification”, 
involved the development, exploration and exploitation of an organizational environment 
from which necessary resource and institutional capital could be derived. This high level 
umbrella construct encapsulated a set of three underlying themes that together composed the 
building blocks of munification: (1) “building and attracting networks rich with 
complementary resources and capabilities”, (2) “collaborating for the joint development of 
lacking resources and knowledge”, and (3) “institutional agency”. Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 
show how we coded these underlying themes in the data and how they varied across the 
sample firms. 
 
Building and attracting networks rich with complementary resources and 
capabilities. The success of small businesses has often been associated with the ability to tap 
into the resources and capabilities that exist in their networks (Donckels & Lambrecht, 1997; 
Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Greve & Salaff, 2003; Nooteboom, 2004). Yet one constraint that 
all firms in our sample experienced was that the traditional networks in the ornamental 
horticulture sector were inadequate to find the necessary means and institutional support to 
increase their environmental performance. For example, in order to get advice on which 
products to spray against certain pests, Jordaens relied on his local chemicals vendor. Given 
the little awareness of VMS requirements among his suppliers and advisors, however, he felt 
he did not get the proper advice: 
“For example, you’re stuck with a severe aphid infection and you call and ask “I’ve 
got an aphid infection here, what should I spray?” DDVP! Of course, what does the 
chemicals vendor know about VMS? Nothing! He just says “DDVP is the best 
product”. (owner/manager Jordaens) 
This finding is in line with Adler and Kwon’s observation that “in life, we cannot expect to 
derive any value from social ties to actors who lack the ability to help us” (2002: 26). 
  
Table 6.3 – Illustrations of high and low munification along its three constitutive dimensions 
Construct • Subcategories Example Counterexapmle 
Munification:
 
• Building and attracting 
networks rich with 
complementary 
resources and 
capabilities 
 
 
• Collaboration for the 
joint development of 
lacking resources and 
knowledge 
 
 
 
 
• Institutional agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“My two biggest competitors [in the Netherlands], I 
get along with them very well! (…) Because in the end 
you can learn a lot from them, you know.”(o/m 
Panamarenko)  
 
 
 
There’s a new project with a number of firms, with a 
focus on advice for when you’ve got problems with 
your plants. (…) Ghent University is also in it. (…) 
I’m very very small compared to the other firms. But 
you learn from that. When you stay home, then you 
don’t learn, you know. (o/m Panamarenko) 
 
 
“I get criticized sometimes [about VMS membership] 
and then other people tell me ‘you just disclose all 
those things! They [the government] don’t have to 
know all that. You just show it to them and next thing 
you know they’ll be giving us more taxes!’. Well I say, 
if you don’t do it, then maybe they’ll give us 
something we don’t want.”(o/m Ensor) 
 
“He’ll try to motivate people to join [VMS]. He’ll 
say: ‘Endosulfan, that’s crap, you can grow your 
plants without it! I’m doing it without it!’ 
(Government official on o/m Ensor) 
“In the past, they [traders] came to our 
company twice a year and now it’s all by 
phone or email (…). You don’t see anybody 
anymore. It’s the same everywhere. If you ask 
them “you should come and visit us”, they 
answer “no time”. (o/m Rubens) 
 
“Collaboration in the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture sector is impossible”(o/m 
Rubens) 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m aware that, also towards customers and 
other people, I’ll be more inclined to just 
listen to them, rather than to take steps… 
Yeah, I guess that’s how I am.”(o/m 
Brueghel) 
 
  
Table 6.4 - Variation of munification across sample firms 
 Panamarenko Magritte Ensor Fabre Brueghel Rubens Jordaens Van Dyck 
Network-building         
Professional association membership 
and activities 
99 999 999 99 999 9 9 99
SME professional association 
membership and activities 
999  999 999     
Innovation network membership 999 999 999 9 9 9  9
Meet customers 999 99 999 999  9  99
Visit international trade fairs 999 999 999 999  9  9
Visit local peers 9 9 99 99 9 9   
Visit international peers 999 999 999 999  9 9 9
Civil organizations 99 9  999     
Connected to most innovative firms  999 999 999 999 9   9
Top advisor at the firm 999 99 999 9 99 99  9
Others  9 999 999 9   9
Collaboration activities         
Joint development of production 
technologies 
999  99 99  9   
Joint development of commercial 
practices 
999  999      
Institutional agency         
Voicing dissatisfaction 999 999 999 9 9    
Crafting alternative institutional 
arrangements 
99 999 999 99     
Insensitive to prevailing institutional 
pressures 
999 999 999 999     
999 = multiple illustrations, 99 = few illustrations, 9 = singular illustration  
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As a result, we found that the higher performing engaged in an active and open search for 
both deliberate and unintended relationships that did possess the complementary capabilities 
they were looking for (Teece, 1986; Adler & Kwon, 2002). To do so, it was necessary to 
reach out to partners that were outside the usual arenas in which the Belgian ornamental firms 
are traditionally active. In other words, “networking” by itself was not sufficient. Typical for 
learning patterns that involve innovative organizational trajectories, we found that it was 
necessary to find and establish heterogeneous network relationships (Rodan & Galunic, 2004) 
that bridged “structural holes”, the gaps between normally disconnect clusters of 
organizations (Burt, 1992; Burt, 1997; Nooteboom, 2004; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). For example, 
when asked where they found their innovative equipment that allowed eradicating weeds with 
mechanical instead of toxic chemical means, Fabre’s owner-manager answered 
“In terms of mechanization, there’s not much too see around here. You can see those 
things in Germany, those modern companies, but not around here”. (owner/manager 
Fabre) 
They attributed such a lack of munificence of innovative solutions in their immediate 
environment to the fact that “here, everyone just copies everyone else”. Although this active 
search for innovative solutions in a broader network often necessitated going abroad, the 
higher performing firms also knew who to contact in their immediate surroundings. They did 
so by leveraging their connections with other innovative organizations in the sector, such as 
top advisors, emerging initiatives with the frontrunners in the industry and likeminded peers. 
For Panamarenko, who was particularly new in the sector, these connections were key: 
And when I’m looking for something, then I have to find it. Sometimes that can be 
quite annoying, my wife says that too, but when something has gotten in my head, then 
it has to happen. And connections are always interesting. Especially in the plant 
world. It’s only in [two innovation network initiatives in the sector], if you want to 
build something, that you meet people that work on the same level as you are. 
(owner/manager Panamarenko) 
In contrast, the four lower performing VMS firms displayed a far more passive 
approach to building relationships, resulting in a network that was limited to those contacts 
with which the firm had necessary direct relationships (peers, suppliers, customers, 
government). “It’s just that I don’t have the time for it” was an often mentioned constraint 
when we asked the firms about the reasons why they did not build contacts more actively. In 
addition, they complained that it was difficult altogether to maintain their existing networks 
because their traditional contacts no longer visited their firms. Whereas trading companies 
used to inspect the plants before they were bought at the firm, the increasing digitalization and 
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on-line retail chains resulted in decreasing face-to-face transactions that used to facilitate 
informal information exchange. The perceived need to always be present at the firm, and the 
perception that “a day without having had your hands in the soil is a day not worked” made 
firms reluctant to leave the firm and establish new contacts. 
Besides the active building of networks, the higher performing firms were also 
successful in efficiently exploiting them. Whereas the lower performing firms were reluctant 
to disclose information about the firm and feared that their practices would be copied by other 
firms, the higher performing firms experienced that they were able to substantially speed up 
the exchange of information, and in particular the type of information they were looking for. 
For example, Panamarenko argued that the reason why he was able to get information from 
competitors and international contacts was: 
“because I’m always open. I’ll always do that. I can never hold something back. And 
then you get reaction.” (owner-manager Panamarenko).  
Another beneficial consequence of this general tendency to be open to new contacts, 
exchanges and practices was that it made them attractive partners for other actors as well. As 
such, they were often approached by suppliers to test new products, by other innovative firms 
to discuss ideas or by customers to try out new products or business concepts.  
In sum, whereas the lower performing firms could only draw on the scarce knowledge 
and resources that were available in their direct contacts, the higher performing firms were 
able to increase the pool of external resources and capabilities that could be drawn from. By 
reaching out to alternative and complementary sources of knowledge and resources, the 
network of the higher performing firms mimicked a munificent environment, an environment 
that generated more resources and knowledge that was potentially valuable to realizing the 
PES. 
 
Collaborating for the joint development of lacking resources and knowledge. 
Through their networks, the higher performing firms were able to access the resources and 
knowledge whenever they were readily available. As such, they could passively derive value 
from their micro-munificent environment. However, we found several instances where the 
high performing VMS firms actively engaged in the joint development of resources and 
knowledge when these were generally nonexistent.  Building on the results of an enlarged 
network, they transcended their network ties and accomplished an organizational end that 
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could be better achieved collectively (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; 
Lavie, 2006).  
In our data, we mainly found instances of collaboration for the creation of new 
technologies and the joint creation of new market opportunities. For example, in line with the 
findings of McEvily and Marcus (2005), Panamarenko was able to build new resources for 
pollution prevention by engaging in joint-problem solving together with suppliers. For 
example, after having had multiple problems with pests in his plants and having discussed this 
with his advisor, Panamarenko’s owner-manager realized that they needed a specific type of 
pot soil which they could not find on the market. Committed to finding a solution, the owner-
manager decided to set up a meeting together with their pot soil supplier, their fertilizer 
supplier, the advisor and one of his employees. Together, they developed a new kind of pot 
soil that enabled Panamarenko to substantially reduce their pesticide use, even though this 
came at a great cost. Ensor shows a particular example of a collaborative endeavor to create 
new technologies through institutional support. Since he found himself unable to test a new 
and upcoming technology because the investments and risk were too large for one firm to 
carry, the owner-manager collaborated with peers in negotiating government-sponsored 
research on these technologies. Although there had not been any results from this research 
project, they were nevertheless kept informed on new potential production technologies that 
could provide breakthroughs in the future without having  to pay the costs of doing the actual 
research themselves. 
In addition to such direct effects of collaboration on reducing the organizational 
impact on the environment, both Ensor and Panamarenko had developed collaborations that 
also had indirect effects. More specifically, they had established collaborative commercial 
relationships that took away some of the competitive disadvantages of realizing a PES. 
Whereas it was often mentioned that it was “impossible to collaborate in the traditional and 
conservative Belgian ornamental horticulture sector”, both firms had bridged this 
insurmountable cognitive barrier and had succeeded in establishing partnerships with 
competitors. For example, Ensor had engaged in a joint venture with a number of big trading 
companies and other top-quality competitors, to market an exclusive top-quality flower in a 
niche segment with a limited supply and premium prices. Since the goal of the joint venture 
was already to position the product as being unique, new and exclusive, they decided together 
that only VMS-A labeled plants would be sold in the joint venture. As a result, Ensor was one 
of the very few firms that had been able to capitalize on its efforts to achieve a high 
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environmental performance. Although the label by itself did not result in higher prices, it was 
a necessary requirement for membership in the joint venture. 
These data show that, in the event neither the firm itself, nor a broadened network can 
yield the means that enable it to realize its proactive environmental strategy, a joint 
investment with network partners creates a new pool of market or institutionally based 
supportive resources the firm can draw from.  
 
Institutional agency. Institutional agency refers to the agility of the firms to defy or 
change the norms, beliefs and institutions in which they operate (Dimaggio, 1988; Rao, 
Morrill, & Zald, 2000). According to institutional theory, firms adjust their behavior 
according to prevailing norms and values (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). They do so to 
acquire a level of legitimacy in their organizational field for access to resources and for 
alignment with governing power structures (Suchman, 1995; Oliver, 1997; Lounsbury & 
Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). Whereas 
conforming to institutional forces has been identified as an important factor explaining 
environmental responsiveness (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003), we found in 
our cases that the institutional forces were more often hindering than promoting such 
behavior. The burden of being proactive is that it may go beyond or against these dominant 
institutional forces and require institutional structures which are not always compatible with 
prevailing beliefs and behaviors (Dean & McMullen, 2007; Cohen & Winn, 2007). Firms may 
thus need to create support and legitimacy for their business model or beliefs  in order to gain 
access to resources and to ensure the viability of these proactive business goals (Zimmerman 
& Zeitz, 2002). In other words, they need to develop institutional agency to find or create the 
institutions that support their intentions (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). It was quite apparent in the data that those firms experiencing hindering institutional 
forces engaged in this process.  
Although all firms experienced dissatisfaction with institutional forces, more 
successful firms had the sense that they could do something about it and acted accordingly. 
While Jordaens and Rubens were quite disappointed with the fact that their customers only 
wanted cheap products and did not care about whether they were environmentally friendly 
produced or not, they remained resigned about it. “What can we do about it?” was the reaction 
heard in these lower performing firms. The owner-manager of Panamarenko, on the contrary, 
criticized the farmer’s association (which has its own plant store chain) for not being 
consistent with their own policies to promote VMS and selling non-VMS plants in their 
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stores. “Such things I resist with tooth and nail”. As a result, he engaged in several 
discussions with the farmers’ union to change their buying policies and to give preference to 
plants from VMS members. Such voicing of dissatisfaction was often complemented with 
making suggestions and trying to get buy-in from stakeholders to collaboratively endorse the 
institutional support. Fabre, for example, advocated in an important symposium attended by a 
large majority of their peers that the professional association had to push local municipalities 
to buy trees only from growers with VMS-A labels. By endorsing governmental purchasing 
requirements he hoped to encourage more firms to adopt environmental practices, and thereby 
the production of new resources and knowledge that would be valuable to all VMS firms.  
Yet at the same time they were initiating changes within their institutional context, the 
four high performing firms seemed to have become “immune” to the institutionalized 
practices and expectations in the sector. By adopting nonconventional business models that 
created value in alternative ways, they were less dependent on traditional transactional 
relationships and therefore able to see beyond the traditional opinions that “environmentally 
friendly production does not pay off”. In contrast, the four lower performing firms followed 
the traditional business models that were often indeed incompatible with the sometimes costly 
and risky practices that would lower the impact on the environment. As a result, they 
remained highly embedded in the conservative cognitive logics of their organizational field. 
These examples show that the higher performing firms built further on their network-
building and collaboration capabilities to foster a micro-institutional environment that was 
more conducive to achieving higher VMS performance. Although their current VMS 
performance had not necessarily depended on this process, it reflected an investment in 
resource and institutional capital that would continue to spawn solutions and support for 
environmentally friendly production in the future. 
 
In sum, our data revealed that the process of munification through network-building, 
collaboration and institutional agency enabled the firms to create micro-munificent 
environments that mimicked the conditions which foster the realization of PES. Whereas each 
subtheme has its own specific impact in this process, our analysis nevertheless revealed that 
each subtheme is affected and reinforced by the presence of the other. For example, the 
greater the network of the firm, the greater its potential to collaborate or impact the 
institutional environment of the firm. Similarly, the more agents are involved in a 
collaborative effort of institutional agency, the greater the likelihood of generating a 
supportive institutional context. Taken together, these notions lead us to propose: 
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Proposition 1a: Organizations that are able to create external resource capital 
through the interdependent capability of network-building, collaboration and 
institutional agency will be more able to achieve their intended proactive 
environmental strategies than those that do not. 
Proposition 1b: Organizations that are able to create external institutional capital 
through the interdependent capability of network-building, collaboration and 
institutional agency will be more able to achieve their intended proactive 
environmental strategies than those that do not. 
Our data also revealed that both the development and appropriation of the benefits of 
munification hinged upon the presence of organicity in the firm. That is, the firm was only 
able to engage in the complex process of munification when it was flexible enough to dedicate 
managerial time and resources to its development, and remained prudent in how its precious 
resources were dedicated in this process. In addition, the firm needed to be flexible enough to 
adapt the firm to the valuable resources and knowledge that could subsequently be derived 
from the environment, while remaining particularly obstinate in achieving its objectives.  
6.5.2. Organicity 
We identified “organicity” as the ability of the firm to maintain cognitive and practical 
flexibility and to invest in an open, yet prudent development of the appropriate means to 
relentlessly achieve its objectives (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Mintzberg, 1978; Covin & Slevin, 
1988; Kickull & Gundry, 2002; Farjoun, 2002). In our data, the construct of organicity 
emerged as the interplay between “bootstrapping”, (2) “focused adaptability”, and (3) 
“disciplined scrutiny”. Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show an overview of how we coded these 
individual subconstructs in the data and how they vary across the sample firms.  
 
Bootstrapping. As mentioned before, small businesses are generally associated with 
the presence of lower levels of slack resources. Yet, recent studies have indicated how small 
businesses can develop “bootstrapping” capabilities that enable them to create higher levels of 
resources (Bhide, 1992; Winborg & Landstrom, 2001; Ebben & Johnson, 2006). By such 
practices as delaying payments to suppliers, minimizing stock or using subsidy finance, firms 
are able to reduce the financial pressures on the firm and create more slack resources. 
Although this process has been mostly investigated in the context of financial resources, we 
found a number of practices that resulted in bootstrapping human resources as well. Although 
all owner-managers spoke about long workdays and a general lack of time, the higher 
performing firms were able to find pockets of time and resources that enabled them to  
  
Table 6.5 - Illustrations of high and low organicity along its three constitutive dimensions 
Construct Subcategories Example Counterexample 
Organicity 
 
• Bootstrapping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Focused adaptability 
 
 
 
 
 
• Disciplined scrutiny 
 
“We meet every Friday, drink a beer or two 
and then we’ll go over everything that has 
happened during the week (…) I don’t know 
any other firm where they do this. (…) They 
[employees] think it’s so useful, that they ask 
“show us” [the VMS results] and then we see 
what we can do to improve. (…) We already 
did the weekly meetings, but it’s VMS that has 
made them more conscious about the products 
we use.”(o/m Fabre) 
 
“Use endosulfan once a year or three to four 
other products? I use the three or four other 
ones, which costs me more. But I’ve chosen 
for the system, so I stick to it.” (o/m Ensor) 
 
 
“it requires a lot of discipline, you know. VMS 
requires us to follow up on those things. But 
we learn a lot from that, we really do, it’s the 
most valuable source of information we have 
now.”(o/m Fabre) 
“When I’ve got the time, then I’ll go and try to find out 
which [crop protection] products are red [very 
polluting] here and which ones are orange [intermediary 
polluting]. But when I’m really in the busy season, then I 
skip that, then I’ll just take what I’m used to spray and if 
that is an orange product then, well yeah…”(o/m 
Jordaens) 
 
 
 
 
“In winter times, the plants are covered with plastic for 
six weeks. (…) Well, in that time you can have a full 
grown population [of pests] underneath that. That’s why 
we say: we spray it preventively. I don’t dare to give that 
up. There’s too much at stake.”(o/m Rubens) 
 
 “We’re growers, not accountants”(o/m Van Dyck) 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 6.6 - Variation of organicity across sample firms 
 Panamarenko Magritte Ensor Fabre Brueghel Rubens Jordaens Van Dyck 
Bootstrapping         
Ability to delegate key 
responsibilities to employees 
999 999 999 999 9  9 99
Engaging third party support in 
acquiring resources 
999 99 999 999 9 99 9 99
Dedicating time to strategic 
reflection 
999 999 999 999 99 9   
Focused adaptability         
Obstinate commitment to 
achieving excellence in VMS 
999 99 999 999  9   
Detaching from habitual 
practices and assumptions 
999 999 999 999     
Flexibility to integrate 
alternative and novel solutions 
999 999 999 999 9 99  999
Disciplined scrutiny         
Achieving control over the firm 
by careful monitoring 
999 99 999 999 99 999   
Critical reflection on internally 
or externally acquired 
information 
999 999 999 999  99   
Using knowledge-management 
to facilitate learning and 
improvement 
999 99 999 999 9 99   
Experimenting with novel 
solutions to acquire proficiency 
999 999 999 999  9  99
999 = multiple illustrations, 99 = few illustrations, 9 = singular illustration 
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nevertheless dedicate time and effort to both munification, as well as assessing the 
possibilities for improvement of their environmental performance. The lower performing 
firms, instead, were locked in their daily practices of everyday survival and only 
acknowledged that they would spend more time in munification practices “if there would be 
more time”.The most important way to build up human resources slack was by making sure 
that several people in the firm were able to temporarily take up the responsibilities of the 
owner-manager. Sometimes this was fairly easy, for example when the owner-manager could 
fall back on family to follow-up the firm during his absence. In other instances, this required 
the training of employees and the confidence of the owner-manager to delegate 
responsibilities to them. What we found in our data, however, was that the lower performing 
firms either did not want or were not able to delegate responsibilities. The same commitment 
an owner-manager has to his firm may constrain his mental ability to leave it in the hands of 
someone else. Rubens, for example, found it impossible to delegate tasks to his peers, 
convinced that the work would always be done better if he did it himself. He explained this by 
referring to the incompetence of his employees. 
I just can’t get away from here, that’s the problem. (…) That one kid that is permanent 
here, he’s nineteen or twenty years old, works a year and a half, two years here. 
That’s still young you know. And the motivation simple isn’t there. The other is 
Turkish, has been working here for twelve years or so, or even longer, but she still 
doesn’t speak Flemish. She can understand you, but she doesn’t learn you 
know.(owner-manager Rubens) 
When we asked the higher performing firms about this, they argued that finding good 
personnel was indeed difficult, but it was possible by paying higher wages than peers. As a 
result, Fabre, Panamarenko and Ensor all had been able to attract or maintain well-trained and 
dedicated employees they could trust the firm to. In addition, the higher performing firms had 
technologies or practices in place that enabled them to be confident enough to leave the firm. 
Panamarenko, for example, visited trade fairs or international colleagues because he could 
leave the firm to one of his employees and used the VMS system itself as a means to organize 
this type of slack. For him, the registration of product use for the VMS system acted as a log 
file that he could use in the event that the employee in charge of production would become ill.  
“I’m often away to trade fairs. And [with MPS] you always have an overview of 
what’s happened. And if [employee name] is ill, then I’ll know what has to be done. 
Everything is registered.”(o/m Panamarenko).  
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 Through these bootstrapping methods, the higher performing firms had been able not 
only to build internal resources, but also to increase the potential of the firm to use its 
munification capabilities for the creation of external resource and institutional capital.  
 
Focused adaptability. While they are determined to stick with their objectives, firms 
with organicity are able to harness more alternatives to achieve them. This “focused 
adaptability” is thus both a cognitive and practical flexibility to detach from habitual behavior 
and network contacts and to challenge the “taken for granted”. Despite the high levels of 
flexibility small firms are often attributed, their lower levels of slack sometimes results in 
cognitive myopia that makes them less flexible than they could potentially be (Van der Stede, 
2000; Minniti & Bygrave, 2001; Atherton, 2003; Ebben & Johnson, 2005). In contrast, the 
higher performing firms saw more potential uses for the resources and knowledge they had 
within the firm or were able to draw from their networks (Ward, 2004; Baker & Nelson, 
2005). For example, Fabre argued that everyone knew that the preventive calendar spraying of 
pesticides, a traditional and polluting production method, was useless, but said that most 
growers “just follow the user instructions that tell you to “repeat every fourteen days” instead. 
Rather, he argued, one could greatly reduce pesticide use by spraying based on temporary 
needs and careful monitoring. Interestingly, all lower performing firms stuck consciously to 
this method of preventive calendar spraying and were very reluctant to abandon it. Given 
Rubens’s extremely busy schedule, he lacked the time to really follow-up carefully and was 
too afraid of the risks of plant damage he could potentially have: 
“In winter times, the plants are covered with plastic for six weeks. (…) Well, in that 
time you can have a full grown population [of pests] underneath that. That’s why we 
say: we spray it preventively. I don’t dare to give that up. There’s too much at stake.” 
Fabre, on the other hand, had been open to experiment with some unusual alternatives to toxic 
practices. For example, they had acquired a machine from one of their foreign colleagues that 
allowed them to mechanically weed out herbs instead of using pesticides. Although this 
machine was widely used in French vineyards, their use of it in the arboriculture was unique. 
Similarly, while discussing with one of their customers, they had stumbled upon using 
harmless hot pepper sauce as a game repellant instead of toxic pesticides. While other firms 
had laughed at both practices in the beginning, it was such openness to use the solutions that 
were provided in their micro-munificent environment that had enabled them to reduce their 
impact on the environment. 
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 We saw the openness to alternative perspectives often reflected in the experiments 
that all successful growers engaged in when they found new techniques that became available 
through their networks. Magritte, for example, attributed most of his ability to lower the 
impact of his operations on the environment to his “integrated” pest control. When he started 
out, he had pushed the limits of what was possible and had eagerly accepted the offer of a 
government consultant to help him with this innovative technique. By combining the complex 
use of specific and less toxic pesticides, together with the natural pest control of beneficent 
insects, he had greatly reduced his pesticide use.  
“You only use those products that kill the bad insects and let live the good ones. 
That’s been quite a learning path. The first years, I was like… we have to spray as 
little as possible. But in the end that was at the expense of the quality. Because you do 
get infections from some insects, if you spray too little or intervene too little, you get 
damage. It’s been a learning path and now the last five years after an almost 
integrated production, I know what’s possible and what’s not. (owner/manager 
Magritte) 
It appears that this focused adaptability increased the internal resource capital because 
they saw more applications for the resources that were available both within and outside the 
firm. As such, the presence of focused adaptability also increased the value of munification: it 
acted as an increased “absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 
2002) to detect opportunities in their network and the applicability of products derived from 
it. 
 
Disciplined scrutiny. A consistent finding across our cases was also that, although the 
higher performing businesses developed broad levels of slack and adaptability, they were very 
punctual and strict in monitoring the dynamics of the firm and its environment. Flexibility 
was complemented with disciplined scrutiny to prevent the flexible form to turn into a chaotic 
form (Volberda, 1996). This finding is in line with some of the more pessimistic views on 
organizational slack that too much resources may result in managerial complacency, 
inefficiency and the pursuit of bad projects because of politics or lack of discernment 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Jensen, 1986). In addition, it resonates with the notion in entrepreneurship 
that risk-taking is not equivalent to foolhardiness (Schumpeter, 1934; Mintzberg & Waters, 
1982; Timmons & Spinelli, 2004). Rather, entrepreneurs tend to follow a “test-the-water” 
approach, always sensing an environment with minor probes before plunging in” (Mintzberg 
& Waters, 1982: 495).  
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The disciplined scrutiny was thus manifested as a frequent analysis of organizational 
performance, the strict follow-up of what was going on in the firm, but also the careful 
assessment and comparison of opinions that were drawn from their network. The owner-
managers of Fabre, for example, organized weekly reflection moments, another deliberate 
moment of slack time, to check on the past week and seek ways to improve on a matter of 
topics, including environmental issues:  
“In the past, I had to be very strict about [VMS], because I knew that they were going 
to come and check us. Now I don’t have to do that anymore. They [the personnel] 
think it is so useful, that they will say “show us” [the VMS-score] and then we try to 
think about ways to improve and set goals for the next year. We meet every Friday, 
drink a beer or two and then we’ll go over everything that has happened during the 
week, what has gone wrong and what the plans are for the next week. That’s very 
good. And fun. I don’t know any other firm where they do this. We’ve been doing this 
for years! (…) We already did the weekly meetings, but it’s MPS that has made them 
more conscious about the products we use.” (o/m Fabre) 
Also, although most firms had advisors, the higher performing firms were more prudent in 
following their advice. Since advisors were paid in the first place to maximize yield and plant 
quality, they were not always inclined to give advice on the risky methods of using less 
fertilizer and pesticides. Ensor, for example, considered his advisor “A second opinion on 
your business. It’s still me that has to do it.” In contrast, Van Dyck argued  
“It’s not my job to say “you have to spray with this or that”. They [advisors] know 
perfectly with what product you can spray against funguses, against pests, against 
insects. They have to present us the environmentally friendly products.” (o/m Van 
Dyck) 
Besides its role in scrutinizing and monitoring the firm and its environment, 
disciplined scrutiny created confidence and additional resources in its own way as well. 
Careful control and monitoring of the firm increased the knowledge about the firm and 
decreased the likelihood of having to jump from one problem to another. As such, there was 
more room for strategic assessment of the firm’s challenges and opportunities. As Ensor’s 
owner-manager put it: 
“It’s the same as in school. Why is one better than the other? You have to do your 
homework and you have to do good exams. Otherwise you don’t get your degree. So if 
you’re not disciplined as a grower and don’t monitor and assess everything 
carefully… (…) If you just say “we’ll see, maybe next week…” Well yeah, that’s how 
it [problems in the firm] starts. You have to be really disciplined. That’s what you see 
in all top firms, they’re all very disciplined. It’s because you’re disciplined that you 
have better quality, better sales and more room to do whatever.”(o/m Ensor) 
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As our data shows, the disciplined scrutiny allowed the firm to increase time and 
knowledge in the firm, and be more aware of the value of how to dedicate its resources and 
time to munification and the improvement of VMS performance. 
 
In sum, we found that the combined subconstructs of “bootstrapping”, “focused 
adaptability” and “disciplined scrutiny” allowed the higher performing firms to build up the 
internal resources that fostered the realization of their proactive environmental intentions. The 
data also showed how each subtheme complemented the other two in making the firm 
organic. For example, the focused adaptability allowed the cognitive stretch that was needed 
to engage in the bootstrapping of internal resources and rethink responsibilities within the 
firm. The disciplined scrutiny, in turn, resulted in the monitoring that was shown to be key for 
the owner-managers confidence to leave the firm in the hands of his employees and helped to 
identify the necessary and appropriate complementary capabilities and resources in the 
external environment. As a result, we propose: 
Proposition 2:  Organizations that are able to increase their internal resource capital 
through the interdependent capability of bootstrapping, focused adaptability and 
disciplined scrutiny will be more able to achieve their intended proactive 
environmental strategies than those that do not. 
 
6.5.3. Interaction effects  
Throughout the analysis of both the organicity and the munification constructs, it was 
clear that the higher performing firms were proficient in both capabilities while the lower 
performing firms were not. Given that the specific context predicted low presence of internal 
resource capital, external resource capital and institutional capital, one could expect that a 
concerted effort was needed on all three aspects to create the appropriate conditions for 
proactive environmental strategies. Yet, emerging from our data, we found that the presence 
of organicity had a positive effect on the effectiveness of munification in creating external 
resource and institutional capital. Similarly, we found that the presence of external resource 
capital had a positive effect on the effectiveness of organicity in creating internal resource 
capital. We explore these interaction effects in more detail below. 
We have mentioned several instances where the effectiveness of munification 
capabilities hinged on the presence of organicity. The firm was able to leverage its 
munification abilities when it was flexible enough to dedicate managerial time and resources 
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to its development, and remained prudent in how its precious resources were dedicated in this 
process. In addition, the critical scrutinizing of the resources and knowledge that could be 
derived from the environment, along with the flexibility to absorb them in the firm made the 
environment itself a more interesting source of opportunities and ideas. Similarly, the 
creativity and institutional detachment of the higher performing firms to envision alternative 
institutional spaces greatly increased the effectiveness of institutional agency in creating 
institutional capital. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 3a:  A firm will be more effective in leveraging its munification 
capabilities for the creation of external resource capital when it also possesses 
organicity capabilities. 
Proposition 3b: A firm will be more effective in leveraging its munification 
capabilities for the creation of external institutional capital when it also possesses 
organicity capabilities.  
As far as the influence of external resources on organicity is concerned, we see at least 
two effects. First, external resources create possibilities for developing externalized versions 
of slack. Earlier studies have hinted at the interplay between munificence in the environment 
of an organization and organizational slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Dess & Beard, 1984). 
In fact, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) conceptualized organizational slack as consisting of both 
internal as well as external sources. The latter type of slack, which they called “potential 
slack”, was defined as “the capacity of the organization to generate extra resources from the 
environment” (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983: 43). As such, munification itself can become a 
source of bootstrapping, in the sense that it invests in the creation of such potential slack 
resources in the external environment to maintain flexibility and adaptability (Boons & 
Berends, 2001). A good example in our data was the firm’s reliance on external advisors. 
Given that these advisors visited many firms, they acted as a source of “outsourced 
networking”. The knowledge that this advisor could acquire by visiting many firms was a 
valuable source of slack to individual firms as well. Second, a firm will be more able to use its 
ability to harness multiple perspectives and to assess potential alternatives when there are 
more perspectives and alternatives to consider. For example, it was only because a 
government consultant with integrated production experience existed, that Magritte was able 
to consider involving him in his production. The more diverse a firm’s network becomes in 
terms of valuable resources and knowledge that the firm can tap into (Van Wijk, Van Den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2003; Rodan & Galunic, 2004), the more it can be expected it will 
cognitively detach from taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviors (Brown & Duguid, 
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1991) and create more value in the firm’s internal resource capital (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). We 
therefore propose:  
Proposition 3c: The greater the external resource capital of the firm, the more 
effective a firm will be in leveraging its organicity capabilities for the creation of 
internal resource capital. 
6.6. Discussion 
 We began our paper by noting that many small businesses experience difficulty in 
enacting their proactive environmental strategies. More specifically, despite their generally 
positive attitude towards environmental strategies, small businesses point to the lack of  
internal resource capital and  lower levels of external resource and institutional capital both in 
general and in support of PES to explain the generally low penetration of environmental 
strategies (Merritt, 1998; Petts et al., 1999; Tilley, 2000; Gerstenfeld & Roberts, 2000; 
Hillary, 2000a; Schaper, 2002; Vernon et al., 2003; Worthington & Patton, 2005; Elsayed, 
2006). While the emerging literature on small business PES has mainly focused on the 
reasons why small businesses are unable to realize the positive intentions towards the natural 
environment, we found little research that looked at how small firms are able to realize PES, 
especially when the odds are against having one. In our empirical research, we exploited a 
unique data set that not only allowed capturing the proactive environmental intentions of a 
number of small businesses, but also showed whether these firms had been able to realize 
their intentions or not. Our findings show that those firms that had realized a PES, despite 
theoretical predictions, had been able to do so because they had developed and employed two 
interacting capabilities – munification and organicity – to create a micro-environment that 
mimicked the theoretical conditions fostering PES. Our data suggested that munification 
entailed a composite endeavor of building and attracting networks rich with existing 
complementary resources and capabilities, collaborating for the joint development of lacking 
market and institutional capital, and institutional agency to create an institutionally enabling 
context. This process was fostered and reinforced by the presence of organicity, the combined 
process of bootstrapping, focused adaptability and disciplined scrutiny. As such, we were able 
to reconfirm the theoretical model as laid out in Figure 6.2, and extend it with a set of 
propositions that help to better explain how small businesses can realize proactive 
environmental strategies. Figure 6.3 summarizes these findings.  
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Figure 6.3 - A model of realizing proactive environmental strategies in constrained environments 
 
Our study confirms the necessary presence of internal resource capital, external 
resource capital and institutional capital for firms to realize PES. It was clear in our data that 
the firms who had not been able to realize their intended PES had surrendered to the pressures 
that came with a lack of internal and external resource capital and institutional capital. Slack 
resources and the cognitive and practical flexibility to use it are necessary to “adapt 
successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy 
as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment.” 
(Bourgeois, 1981: 3). In particular, they give the firm the latitude to think longer term and to 
engage in the time-intensive search for resources and capital which are not readily available 
(Sharfman et al., 1988; Van der Stede, 2000) and to subsequently absorb the potential 
solutions derived from the environment (Volberda, 1997). Also, the abundance of resources in 
the environment is particularly important for small firms, since it enables them to compensate 
for the resources not possessed internally in the firm. Furthermore, munificent environments 
attract the investment of ever more organizations and supportive institutions with the 
objective of capturing some of the profit that is generated in such environments (Dess & 
Beard, 1984; Castrogiovanni, 1991; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry, & Pinch, 2004). Finally, 
institutional capital is needed to provide legitimacy to the firm’s endeavours (Suchman, 
1995). Institutions are important because they infuse resources and strategies with particular 
symbolic value which are needed to acquire resources (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zott & 
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Huy, 2007) but also to maintain survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002).   
6.7. Contributions and future research 
In this paper, we were concerned with extending theoretical predictions about 
proactive environmental strategies. More specifically, we identified a gap between the 
theoretical predictions that small businesses would be unable to realize proactive 
environmental strategies and the anecdotal findings that such phenomena are nevertheless 
taking place, including in our own data. By going through the interactive process of data 
gathering, data analysis and enfolding literature, we were able to identify the two composite 
dynamic capabilities of munificence and organicity. These findings contribute to a better 
understanding of resource-based perspectives on proactive environmental strategies and the 
understanding of entrepreneurial processes in constrained environments. 
First, our findings invite researchers to question the current resource-based 
perspectives on proactive environmental strategies that assume and have found that firm size 
has a positive effect on the adoption of PES. Resource-based perspectives assume that a 
firm’s above average performance depends on the possession of resources and capabilities 
that are rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Barney, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). In the literature to date, it has been assumed that 
small businesses lack such resources that allow it to successfully achieve environmental 
performance (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Sharma, 2000; Bansal, 2005). This assumption has even 
led scholars to exclude small businesses from PES research:  
“smaller companies, which were revealed in exploratory research to have neither the 
resources nor the motivation to go beyond minimum regulatory compliance, were 
excluded.”  (Sharma, 2000: 686).  
More importantly, our findings require reconsidering the assumption that small existing 
businesses will merely accept their situation and adapt to it as a result. Instead, our findings 
are in line with the critiques that the resource-based view “has focused only on those 
resources that are housed within the firm”, whereas “a firm’s critical resources may extend 
beyond firm boundaries” (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 660). Indeed, the firms in our study that were 
able to realize their proactive environmental strategies had a set of capabilities in place that 
allowed them to shape their environment in a way that they could derive the necessary 
external resources from it. The critical interplay between organicity and munification shows 
how these firms refused to enact the limitations of their environment and were able to exploit 
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the pockets of internal and external resources they created in this process. Taking this back to 
the theoretical predictions that small firm size inhibits the realization of proactive 
environmental strategies, our model suggest that the resource base of the firm, in terms of 
munification and organicity, is a better predictor of proactive environmental strategies than 
“firm size”, which may in fact cover up for a set of underlying processes.   
Second, our findings also contribute to the emerging literature on entrepreneurial 
processes in resource constrained environments (Thong, 2001; Kodithuwakku & Rosa, 2002; 
Baker & Nelson, 2005; Zott & Huy, 2007). Although we found fragments of our model 
reflected in the findings of each of these studies, we have found no model that has articulated 
the interactive process of both munification and organicity. For example, the study of Baker 
and Nelson (2005) among 29 small resource constrained firms showed how the process of 
bricolage – “making do by applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems 
and opportunities” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 333) – helps to “create something from nothing”. 
Resonating with “focused adaptability” in our study, they developed the notion that bricoleurs 
are able to do so, because they question institutionalized conceptions of the resource 
environment and came up with alternative perspectives for the resources at hand. However, 
while they make a short reference to the processes that bricolage may set in motion in terms 
of “social and network skills” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 354), Baker and Nelson did not 
consider how the development of external resource capital may enable firms to create 
something from nothing as well. Furthermore, the study by Kodithuwakku and Rosa (2002) of 
resource constrained Sri Lankan small farmers found other explanatory factors for firm 
success in resource constrained environments. More specifically, a combination of prudent 
consumption and managerial functions, which would speak to “disciplined scrutiny”, and the 
mobilization of resources and social value through social networks, which would speak to 
“building and attracting networks”, were the main differentiating factors between successful 
and unsuccessful farms. Despite their very rich accounts, no reference is made of how these 
separate constructs are related and how they influence each other in explaining the 
performance of the firm. With our model, we contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding of how firms are able to achieve their objectives in situations where the odds 
are against them. 
 Although we were careful to ensure a rigorous collection and analysis of the data, our 
research is limited in some ways. While confining our research setting to the Belgian 
ornamental horticulture industry allowed us to control for external sources of variation, this 
may have concealed other influences impacting the realization of proactive environmental 
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strategies in small businesses. For example, whereas the environmental problems most of the 
ornamental horticulture firms were struggling with were related to the production process, the 
environmental value of ornamental plant products is generally considered very positive. 
Ornamental plants contribute to the health and visual pleasure in work environments, help in 
fixing greenhouse gases from the air and have an important social function in signaling 
gratitude, joy or contempt (Brethour et al., 2007). As such, it was difficult for the growers to 
create a market that valued their proactive environmental efforts. Things might be different 
for firms that produce cleaning products, cosmetics, furniture, food or other products where 
markets have been shown to be more sensitive to environmental issues. For such firms, 
munification may require the typical processes required for gaining legitimacy in the market 
(Teece, 1986; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
 The specific context also raises new questions related to the debate between 
commitment and flexibility (Ghemawat & Del Sol, 1998). Our model suggests a dynamic 
interplay between the obstinate commitment to certain objectives and the flexible adaptability 
to emerging solutions. This resonates with Mintzberg and Waters’ contention that “strategy 
formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent” (1985: 271). In this study we 
have found examples where some were able to remain on both feet, absorbing emergent 
solutions to realize deliberate intentions. Yet the question emerges when commitment can be 
too obstinate and require too much flexibility from the firm to the point that no choices are 
made anymore. In such a situation, the firm may lose track of its ability to stay in the market 
and to survive in the first place. Given that environmental strategies are still embedded in a 
context of market failures (Dean & McMullen, 2007; Cohen & Winn, 2007), with many 
incentives for other firms too free-ride the benevolent moral strategies of proactive firms, the 
risk of losing the firm’s rent generating possibilities remains imminent.  A question that could 
be addressed in further research is therefore: how far can the firm go in being committed to its 
proactive environmental intentions? In other words, how proactive can a firm be given its 
particular circumstances? One potential answer may lie in the value that both organicity and 
munification can bring in terms of competitive advantage. Although our research design did 
not allow making inferences about the competitive value of either construct or its 
subconstructs, it was mentioned several times in the interviews that the higher scoring firms 
were also among the top performing firms in their industry. In line with the insights from the 
natural resource-based view of the firm (Hart, 1995), future research could therefore address 
how the abilities identified in our data helped to increase the competitive position of the firm. 
Chapter 6 
182 
 A final thought relates to the institutional position of PES. To date, the literature has 
mostly assumed that the adoption of PES would bring a firm more in line with stakeholder 
and general institutional expectations (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Fineman & Clarke, 
1996; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). 
Our findings indicate, however, that ornamental horticulture firms did not experience any 
stakeholder claims, and within-industry pressures normative pressures were certainly not in 
favor of PES. As such, PES were rather an act of institutional non-conformity than of 
conformity. Yet, since institutions grant a firm legitimacy and lead it to well accepted 
behaviors to deal with uncertainty (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
institutional non-conformity represents an act of considerable risk. Successful institutional 
non-conformity has therefore been mostly associated with larger firms (Haveman, 1993b; 
Miller & Chen, 1996; Sherer & Lee, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), that can use their 
clout to legitimize their deviant behavior. As a result, future research could further explore 
how the findings in this paper may help to explain institutional non-conformity in small 
businesses. 
 This article offers researchers and small business owner-managers alike a more refined 
understanding of realizing proactive environmental strategies when the odds are against 
having one. Given that a lack of time and market appreciation is the most common 
justification for not having a PES in small businesses, we can expect many small business 
owner managers will be familiar with this situation. Yet the remarkable results of the higher 
performing firms in our study show that firms can overcome these strategic hurdles. By 
recognizing that small businesses can change their environment too and create the conditions 
that are more conducive to having a PES, we hope that more small businesses will be able to 
go against all odds in realizing their proactive environmental intentions.   
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Chapter 7 
 
Fools Breaking Out: Explaining 
Successful Small Business Institutional 
Non‐Conformity5 
 
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world;  
the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself.  
Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man.  
(George Bernard Shaw) 
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses how small businesses implement strategies that do not conform to 
established institutionalized practices. The institutional non-conformity examined is the 
adoption of proactive environmental practices in an industry where institutional pressures 
exist against these practices. Using a qualitative multi-case study approach, we find that (1) 
the interaction scope with the organizational field, (2) the cognitive approach towards 
institutional non-conformity, and (3) the organizational conduciveness to institutional non-
conformity were associated with successful resistance to institutional practices. Furthermore, 
we identify underlying mechanisms that contribute to institutional theory, the resource-based 
view and the organizations and the natural environment literature. 
 
 
                                                 
5 This paper is the product of a collaborative effort of myself and Dr. Michael Valente. The authors wish to thank 
Aimé Heene, Erik Mathijs, Bart Nooteboom, Johan Lambrecht, Johan Bruneel, Marc Buelens, Seth Maenen, the 
participants of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Working Paper Series and three 
anonymous reviewers of the 2008 Academy of Management Conference for their helpful comments in 
improving this paper. 
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Preface 
The current chapter presents a further exploration of chapter 6, yet it is particularly 
focused on exploring the small businesses PES from an institutional theory perspective. While 
going through the iterative cycle of analyzing the cases, enfolding insights from existing 
literature and then back to analyzing the data in chapter 6, one finding that emerged as 
particularly inconsistent with earlier literature was that the proactive environmental strategies 
of the investigated firms presented an act of institutional non-conformity. Furthermore, we 
found no conclusive explanations in the institutional theory literature about the abilities of 
small businesses to negate the very institutions that grant them legitimacy or that provide 
predictable guidelines in uncertain realities. The current chapter therefore further probes the 
findings of chapter 6 and explores how they can contribute to better understand small business 
institutional non-conformity. 
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7. Fools Breaking Out: Explaining Successful Small Business Institutional 
Non-Conformity 
7.1. Introduction 
In 2006, Muhammad Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank, was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize for a business model that revolutionized the financial services sector by providing loans 
to the poor in Bangladesh. Today, a flurry of microfinance banks has emerged in developing 
and emerging economies adopting a similar model to the point where micro-finance is 
considered a global phenomenon. Thousands of miles away in Egypt in 1977, Ibrahim 
Abouleish instituted biodynamic farming in the desert outside Cairo. The firm, SEKEM, has 
revolutionized farming practices in Egypt and is now one of the leading producers of organic 
cotton worldwide, supplying directly from hundreds of small Egyptian farmers now adopting 
a biodynamic farming model.  
Stories like these have grown in number across a range of industries over the last 
decade. An important and rather prevalent characteristic common to these anecdotes is the 
entrepreneur’s ability to resist institutional forces that conflict with, or in some cases 
challenge, their strategic trajectory and personal ambitions. However, given that institutional 
theory predicts that firms deviating from institutional requirements will lose their legitimacy 
and may threaten the future survival of the firm (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Baum & Oliver, 
1991; Suchman, 1995), such risky non-conforming behaviors appear “foolish” (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994). This is especially so for small businesses who are typically not equipped to 
challenge the institutional pressures of their given sector (Haveman, 1993b; Miller & Chen, 
1996; Dewald, Hall, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2007). Because of the many constraints 
inherited by small businesses, it would seem in their best interests to conform to existing 
practices (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Yet there is growing 
evidence that small businesses are resisting these institutional norms and subsequently 
cracking the institutional code of their sector by creating new routines and practices. The most 
heroic examples of disruptive institutional change are often the exponents of very small 
ventures. Michael Dell of Dell computers, Richard Branson of Virgin, Ben Cohen and Jerry 
Greenfield of Ben & Jerry’s Home Made Ice Cream and Muhammad Yunus’s Grameen Bank 
all started their ventures as small enterprises that went completely against normative 
expectations and cognitive habits of the service they were providing. Although this 
phenomenon has surfaced in a range of contexts, few researchers have examined how small 
businesses overcome the institutional constraints inhibiting the implementation of particular 
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strategies that isolate them from the rest of the sector. How these seemingly powerless small 
entrepreneurs have been able to accomplish this feat is presently understudied, yet represents 
an important area of study related to the role of small business in the early stages of 
institutional change (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005; Cliff, Jennings, & 
Greenwood, 2006).  Therefore, the research question guiding this paper is as follows: “How 
do small businesses successfully implement strategies that do not conform to seemingly 
insurmountable institutional forces?”  
This paper explores small business institutional non-conformity using a qualitative 
study of 8 small businesses in the ornamental horticulture industry in Belgium, all of which 
have committed to proactive environmental strategies that are clearly at odds with the 
predominant institutional norm of the ornamental horticulture sector. Proactive environmental 
strategies are systematic patterns of voluntary environmental practices not required to be 
undertaken “in fulfillment of environmental regulations or in response to isomorphic 
pressures within the industry as standard business practice” (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998: 
776). Proactive environmental strategies act as an effective medium through which we can 
examine small business institutional non-conformity, because of the well-recognized inertial 
forces associated with an economic paradigm that discourage this approach to business 
(Gladwin et al., 1995; Newton & Harte, 1997; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Prasad & Elmes, 
2005), and more specifically in the highly institutionalized context of the ornamental 
horticulture industry. As environmental issues are increasingly finding their way onto public 
policy agendas, understanding how small businesses, as agents of social change, can disrupt 
institutional surroundings not favorable to the incorporation of environmental issues in 
business practice represents an important research agenda. 
The results reported here are a set of propositions that contribute to a better 
understanding of small business institutional non-conformity in a mature setting. The 
evidence suggests that small businesses are successful in such endeavors of institutional non-
conformity as a result of (1) their multiple roles in the organizational field and alternative 
institutional logic exposure, (2) their cognitive framing of the institutional non-conformity as 
an envisioned future and the resulting goal inflexibility and means flexibility, and (3) their 
non-conformity-conducive business model and multiple experiences with institutional non-
conformity. In addition, we find that these factors feed into a number of facilitating 
mechanisms which have implications for institutional theory, the resource-based view and the 
organizations and the natural environment literature. 
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This paper is structured as follows. We first review institutional theory and its 
implications for small business non-conformity and explain how we conducted our research. 
We then present our findings and conclude with a discussion on the implications for current 
and future theoretical and practical work. 
7.2. The problem of institutional non-conformity  
One central research question of institutional theory is to explain how organizational 
behaviors are institutionalized and how organizations and actors behave in response to the 
institutional environment in which they are embedded. Institutions are rules, norms, values, 
beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions surrounding economic activity that define or 
enforce socially acceptable economic behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jepperson, 1991; 
Scott, 2001). The basic assumption of institutional theory is that organizations need to 
conform to institutional pressures because "organizations that (…) lack acceptable 
legitimated accounts of their activities (…) are more vulnerable to claims that they are 
negligent, irrational or unnecessary" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 349 – 350). Without 
legitimacy, organizations will have difficulty gaining access to resources, making profits or 
even maintaining survival (Scott, 1987; Baum & Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995; Miller & 
Chen, 1996). Consequently, institutional theorists argue that organizational forms and 
behaviour will tend to converge to common standards, following the strong pressures for 
isomorphism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987), even when 
this leads to suboptimal behaviour from a purely economic point of view (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). Although some variation in organizational practices and forms is 
admitted, especially in the initial stages of organizational fields when there are hardly any 
dominant patterns or leaders to mimic (Haveman, 1993a; Maguire et al., 2004), this variation 
will be lost as the organizational field grows to more mature and established stages 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001).  
Institutional theory has been criticized, however, for being overly deterministic and 
static in its conception of institutions. Specifically, it has been oblivious in the past to the 
impact of managerial discretion and self-interest in explaining organizational behavior and the 
way economic agents can also influence their institutional contexts, even in mature fields 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Leblebici et al., 1991; Barley & Tolbert, 1997). In response, a 
number of scholars have developed theoretical explanations and empirical accounts of 
organizational strategies that involve non-conforming behavior. For example, organizations 
may resist institutional pressures because of pressures for competitive diversification (Miller 
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& Chen, 1996; Deephouse, 1999; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Norman, Kendall, & 
Martinez, 2007), especially when the institutionalized practice constrains the access to 
important resources on which the organization is dependent (Oliver, 1991; Leblebici et al., 
1991; Ingram & Simons, 1995; Sherer & Lee, 2002). Non-conformity also often occurs as a 
result of “institutional contradictions” (Seo & Creed, 2002): the “various ruptures and 
inconsistencies both among and within the established social arrangements” (Seo & Creed, 
2002: 225). As a result of disruptive events (Hoffman, 1999), changing social, economic or 
political conditions (Oliver, 1992; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996), or existing incompatibilities 
between institutional pressures, organizations may receive conflicting incentives that drive 
them to non-conforming behaviors. In the occurrence of such events, Oliver (1991) expanded 
the reactions that organizations can develop with respect to institutional pressures beyond 
mere conformity. Besides conforming entirely (acquiescence), organizations may balance the 
pressures of several institutional influences (compromise), disguise or escape them 
(avoidance), ignore or contest them (defiance) or influence and control (manipulate) the 
institutional environment in which they operate (Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994; Etherington 
& Richardson, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995; Clemens & Douglas, 2005).  
Given the risk and uncertainty associated with these latter non-conforming strategies, 
how and when firms can be successful institutional non-conformists arise as important 
questions. These questions are all the more pertinent for small firms, given that some of the 
literature expects path-breaking behaviors to emanate most likely from smaller firms 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Leblebici et al., 1991). However, whereas there is a growing literature on 
the conditions that lead organizations to non-conformity or that instigate institutional change, 
there is little and inconclusive research on the conditions that foster organizational success in 
this feat. In addition, the emerging literature has mostly focused on institutional non-
conformity among larger firms. Less fully explored is institutional non-conformity among 
small firms, an area where the extant literature has produced inconsistent findings to date as 
well. 
7.2.1. Small business institutional non-conformity 
In his “Theory of Economic Development”, Schumpeter (1934) proposed that the 
driving force in capitalism comes from small ventures that crack the codes of the institutions 
in which they operate. Although Schumpeter’s work has spawned a new school of inquiry into 
the conditions that facilitate organizational founding and the sources of innovation in new 
firms (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Davidsson et al., 2006; Cliff et al., 2006), the literature 
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remains inconclusive on whether existing small businesses possess the tools to engage in the 
complex social process of deviating from established institutional practices (Damanpour, 
1991; Haveman, 1993b; Camison-Zornoza, Lapiedra-Alcami, Segarra-Cipres, & Boronat-
Navarro, 2004; Barnett & McKendrick, 2004). A number of elements argue in favor of small 
firms. First, in the event that institutional non-conformity would require abandoning extant 
practices, strategies or organizational forms, small businesses are often not as committed 
(Ghemawat & Del Sol, 1998) as larger organizations to existing technological regimes and 
business models (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Hinings & 
Greenwood, 1988) and are more flexible in adapting to environmental changes (Fiegenbaum 
& Karnani, 1991; Chen & Hambrick, 1995). In its most extreme form, the small business as a 
new venture can even start without any commitment towards or association with the 
prevailing institutional context (Schumpeter, 1934; Cliff et al., 2006). Second, since small-
business managers are very often also the owners of the firm, they do not depend on the 
decisions and interests of stockholders. As a result, they have more discretion to enact their 
own envisioned reality (Johannisson, 1987) and are more committed to doing so as well (Gibb 
& Scott, 1985; Thompson et al., 1992). Third, small businesses are not as visible as large 
firms, and often operate at the fringe of an organizational field, which decreases the likelihood 
that they will be subjected to the same scrutiny as larger firms in the industry (Hinings & 
Greenwood, 1988; Leblebici et al., 1991; Greening & Gray, 1994). As a result, small firms 
have been found sometimes to act as the “bandwagons” for novel practices, which are 
subsequently adopted by larger firms (Haveman, 1993a; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Terlaak & 
King, 2007).  
In contrast, however, studies of institutional non-conformity in larger firms have found 
that successful institutional non-conformity depends on a number of factors that small 
businesses are generally not associated with (Haveman, 1993b; Miller & Chen, 1996; Sherer 
& Lee, 2002). For example, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) suggested that successful 
institutional non-conformity depends on the political, financial and organizational resources 
and power to influence a firm’s environment. Small firms are often dependent on more 
powerful customers and suppliers, who constrain them in the options that can be developed to 
challenge institutional pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Fligstein, 
1991; Frooman, 1999; Davidsson et al., 2006; Dewald et al., 2007). Furthermore, small 
businesses often lack slack time and resources which would be needed in the event that 
institutional non-conformity requires the development of new practices, contacts, business 
models and the like (Bourgeois, 1981; Sharfman et al., 1988; Damanpour, 1992). Specifically, 
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the introduction of novel and deviating practices and products requires “complementary 
assets” to ensure acceptance in the market and society (Sherer & Lee, 2002), which are often 
lacking in small businesses (Schumpeter, 1942; Teece, 1986). But most importantly, small 
businesses depend on networks to acquire information and exchange experiences (McEvily & 
Zaheer, 1999; Atherton, 2003; Nooteboom, 2004), which may be the same networks that 
impose and support the institutional logic they want to challenge (Johannisson, Ramirez-
Pasillas, & Karlsson, 2002). As a result, small business owner-managers have a tendency to 
get locked into path-dependent behaviors based on previously successful patterns of activity 
(Baron, 1998; Minniti & Bygrave, 2001), and thus continue their practices more based on 
cognitive habits and traditions, rather than on thoughtful and strategic reflection.  
Even though owner-managers may have the internal impetus to engage in institutional 
non-conformity, the literature is inconclusive about whether small businesses actually possess 
the means to be successful in this feat. The contradictory streams of evidence highlight the 
need for more explorative work on the factors that explain the success of small firm 
institutional non-conformity. In this study, we therefore move beyond the debate on whether 
small businesses have the organizational features to support institutional non-conformity, to 
ask more importantly about the factors that distinguish successful and unsuccessful 
institutional non-conformity in small firms. 
7.3. Methods 
As mentioned, the theoretical inconsistencies about the organizational features a 
business must possess for successful institutional non-conformity emerged as a result of the 
iterative process of analyzing the data and enfolding existing literature in chapter 6. In order 
to contribute to resolving these inconsistencies, the goal here is to further probe our data on 
the eight VMS cases and explore how the categories that emerged in chapter 6 may help to 
explain these theoretical inconsistencies uncovered in the introduction. Again, the reader is 
referred to chapter 5 for a full introduction to the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector as a 
research setting and the methodological choices made. That we can use the same 
methodology is justified for two reasons. First, the empirical research in this chapter remains 
an exercise of theory elaboration (Lee et al., 1999) with the aim of resolving a theoretical 
inconsistency (Siggelkow, 2007). In this perspective, also the use of case studies is 
appropriate, since these are best for addressing ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin, 2003), such 
as “how do small businesses successfully implement strategies that resist conformance to 
seemingly insurmountable institutional forces in mature fields?” Second, perhaps even more 
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than strategies and practices, the particular nature of institutions and their influence are 
unconsciously engrained in the assumptions and perceptions of the owner-manager 
(Jepperson, 1991). Revisiting the perceptions of an owner-manager through various data 
sources and multiple angles was therefore a necessary prerequisite to uncover the complex 
phenomenon of institutional non-conformity.  
Before engaging in a further analysis of the eight VMS cases, however, it is necessary 
to connect the research setting of VMS in the Belgian ornamental horticulture to the particular 
constructs of institutional non-conformity: (1) the choice of organizational field, and (2) the 
act of institutional non-conformity. First, institutional theorists argue that the institutions are 
enacted within an organizational field. An organizational field is a set of organizations that 
“in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource 
and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products.” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:148). In addition, the boundaries of an 
organizational field depend on a particular issue that elicits regulative, normative and 
cognitive expectations (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2001). Previous studies have used a 
combination of sector, geographical territory and issues to delineate organization fields. 
Greenwood et al. (2002) used the changes of organizational form in the accounting services 
sector in Alberta (Canada) from strict accounting firms towards multidisciplinary practice 
firms as their institutional field. Hoffman (1999) used the US chemical industry and the actors 
revolving this industry with regards to environmental issues. Maguire et al. (2004) chose the 
emerging practices of HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada as the dynamic boundary of 
their organizational field. In the current study, we use the Belgian ornamental horticulture 
industry and how it deals with the organizational impact on the natural environment.  
Second, the phenomenon of interest in this study is the presence of proactive 
environmental strategies among firms in the Belgian ornamental horticulture industry. As 
mentioned before (see Table 5.9), in contrast to earlier studies on organizational reactions to 
natural environmental issues (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; 
Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Bansal, 2005), PES in the Belgian ornamental horticulture industry 
represent an act of non-conformity, rather than one of conformity. More specifically, the 
dominant institutional logic in the ornamental horticulture sector discourages PES, and acts in 
favour of maintaining the status quo. As a result, by becoming member of VMS, Belgian 
ornamental horticulture firms not only reveal their proactive environmental intentions, but 
also their institutional non-conformity for several reasons. Since the goal of VMS is to 
stimulate firms to voluntarily disclose information on their environmental impact and to go 
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beyond legal requirements in green production, it runs counter to the strong regulative, 
normative and cognitive resistance to do so. Members that strive to minimize their 
environmental impact and be transparent about it, receive criticism for being too open, and for 
stimulating the government to install additional constraining regulations. Also, given that 
there are neither external stakeholder pressures, nor market incentives to adopt PES, such 
organizational postures represent a substantial deviation from the isomorphic pressures in the 
sector. Finally, the limited and decreasing membership of VMS in the sector shows that 
neither proactive environmental strategies, nor disclosure about organizational impact on the 
environment has become institutionalized in the sector. As a result, we used VMS 
membership as a proxy for institutional non-conformity. Furthermore, we used the VMS score 
as a proxy for whether the firm not only had the intention to go against the institutionalized 
expectations and practices in the sector, but had also been able to deploy the institutional non-
conformity into actual activities. 
When analyzing the cases, we first compared matched-pair polar types, one successful 
and one unsuccessful, and then used a replication logic to see whether the emerging findings 
were confirmed or refuted by the rest of the cases (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2003). We looked 
for similar constructs emerging from the data, using tables and charts to facilitate comparison 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). The iterative process between data analysis, literature enfolding 
and writing resulted in a number of propositions that explain successful institutional non-
conformity in small businesses.  
7.4. Findings 
7.4.1. Interaction Scope with the Organizational Field  
In chapter 6, we identified “the building and attracting of networks rich with 
complementary resources and capabilities” as an important predictor for a better ability to 
realize the proactive environmental intentions of the firm. In this section, we will further 
explore the specific function that these networks played in enabling the firm to go against the 
institutional expectations of the ornamental horticulture sector. Emerging from the reflection 
of our findings with the literature in this perspective was the particular interaction scope with 
the organizational field that a firm’s network yielded.  
Institutional theory assumes that organizations operating at the fringe location of an 
organizational field have fewer connections to other organizations in the field and will 
therefore experience fewer barriers for non-conformity than organizations operating centrally  
  
Table 7.1 – Interaction Scope with the Organizational Field 
Company Field 
location 
Roles in the organizational field # Roles Alternative Institutional Logic Exposure 
Panamarenko Peripheral ‐ Producer 
‐ Salesman 
‐ Retailer 
‐ Developer of new IP protected plant varieties 
4 ‐ Education as translator, no education in horticulture 
‐ Started as hobbyist while being a police officer  
‐ Took over a firm at later age 
‐ Various international contacts through international trading 
‐ Member of many organizations outside traditional bodies 
‐ Geographically isolated 
Magritte Central ‐ Producer 
‐ Local guild leadership 
‐ Professional association top representative 
‐ Sector representative in large government 
sponsored agricultural marketing service 
‐ Involved as jury member for education projects 
5 ‐ Started business alongside his father’s 
‐ Father is Dutch, considers himself Dutch as well 
‐ Education in ornamental horticulture 
‐ Sector representative in government body for product promotion 
‐ Emotionally detached: wouldn’t mind quitting his firm and do 
something entirely different 
Ensor Central ‐ Producer 
‐ Ex-trader 
‐ Ex-Salesman 
‐ Professional association top representative 
‐ Leadership role in new sector initiative 
5 ‐ University college education as car mechanic 
‐ Used to be a plant trader in family business of his wife 
‐ Travelled throughout Europe as a trader, visiting production firms 
‐ Has followed a number of business management courses 
‐ Active in many organizations within ornamental horticulture 
‐ Active in many organizations outside ornamental horticulture 
Fabre Peripheral ‐ Producer 
‐ Salesman 
‐ Trader 
‐ Politician 
4 ‐ Took over father’s business at young age, when father died 
‐ Travelled throughout Europe as traders, visiting production firms 
‐ Active in local politics  
‐ Are described as quite isolated, do their own thing 
Bruegel Central ‐ Producer 
‐ Local guild leadership 
‐ Represented in board of new sector initiative 
3 ‐ Took over his father’s business 
‐ High school education in ornamental horticulture 
‐ Spent 3 months in Germany before starting in father’s business 
Rubens Central ‐ Producer 1 ‐ Took over his father’s business 
‐ Education in ornamental horticulture 
Jordaens Peripheral ‐ Producer 1 ‐ Took over his father’s business 
‐ Education in ornamental horticulture 
‐ Spent 3 months in the Netherlands before starting in father’s business 
‐ Geographically isolated 
Van Dyck Central ‐ Producer 
‐ Local guild leadership 
2 ‐ Took over his father’s agriculture business 
‐ Education through professional organization meetings 
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in the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Leblebici et al., 1991; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Kraatz 
& Moore, 2002). On the other hand, centrally located organizations would be able to use their 
legitimacy to sell the deviance of the institutionalized practice to the stakeholders in their field 
(Sherer & Lee, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Consistent with Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006), our findings indicate, however, that it was not network location that 
determined the organization’s ability to go against institutional norms, but a lower 
embeddedness of the organizations in the organizational field. We found that both the 
adoption of multiple roles in the organizational field and the exposure to alternative 
institutional logics were important in this perspective.  
Table 7.1 summarizes the firm’s field location, their positions in the organizational 
field and its exposure to alternative institutional logics. We determined field location as 
“Central” when the firm was highly connected to, active or represented in the bodies that 
sustained and reinforced the institutional logic of the ornamental horticulture industry 
(especially traders and professional associations). In contrast, a firm was labelled “Peripheral” 
when it was – either deliberately or not – isolated from the core actors of the organizational 
field. We coded the interviews for the positions the owner-managers assumed in their 
organizational field by looking at the type of connections they had and with whom. 
Subsequently, we quantitatively measured the number of roles assumed by recording each 
unique role that was mentioned by the respondent. Similarly, we probed the interviews for 
exposure to alternative institutional logics, by looking at the firm’s history in the 
organizational field and with specific focus on how and when they had entered the 
institutional field.  
Multiple roles. As Table 7.1 indicates, the data suggest that the adoption of multiple 
roles in the organizational field was associated with higher VMS scores and therefore with 
successful institutional non-conformity. For example, the Panamarenko case illustrates the 
link between the adoption of multiple organizational field roles and successful institutional 
non-conformity in a peripheral field location. Panamarenko’s owner-manager was not only a 
producer of plants, but he also took up positions in the organizational field as retailer, 
salesman and product developer. Since part of the production was sold on site in the firm’s 
own garden center, he took up the position of a business-to-end-consumer retailer. Such a 
widened interaction scope was important to Panamarenko because a strict barrier is usually 
maintained between traders and producers, and information about consumer preferences and 
sensitivities is kept secret by traders and retailers in the industry. By acting as a retailer, 
however, Panamarenko had access to different perspectives on his product. For example, by 
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selling part of his plants directly to the end-consumer, he was exempt from the export 
obligation to chemically clean plants from any potential pest or insect. As a result, he could 
experiment with selling plants to customers that were not treated in this way, and with 
success. In addition, he served as the company’s own salesman for the part of the production 
that was exported from the firm to international customers and larger retailers. To this 
purpose, he developed the same practices as large trade businesses, by renting costly 
promotion booths on large trade fairs, looking for customers in the international market. 
Panamarenko’s owner-manager said that this was necessary due to the institutional tendencies 
of traditional traders: “they can sell an Azalea or a pot plant, but they don’t go further than 
that”, and “those people don’t get my plants sold, so I have to do it myself!” (owner/manager 
Panamarenko) As a result, he was a lot less dependent on the larger traders like most 
businesses in the industry and less constrained by their expectations. Importantly, although he 
encountered the same institutional resistance to green production in his various roles, he 
seemed insensitive to them:  
“when I go to [a famous trade fair], then I talk about it [about VMS], because I bring 
my sign, my VMS-sign. And then sometimes they say, ‘well, well, are you into that … 
it’s so much work and this and that. We just spray and we win a lot of time with it.’ 
But I don’t listen to them, because I’m convinced that that is the future.” (owner-
manager Panamarenko). 
Finally, he was involved in a program to support young plant businesses in their R&D for the 
production of new plant innovations with license protected varieties. The exposure to this 
multitude of roles in the organizational field made Panamarenko aware of how to position the 
firm in ways of which other companies were not aware. 
In contrast, the less successful firms were only active in a limited number of roles in 
the organizational field. Rubens, for example, was only active in the sector as a producer. All 
the plants that were grown at the firm were bought from larger suppliers and plant 
propagators, to whom he sometimes had to pay a license fee in return for the ability to grow 
the plant. Furthermore, the owner-manager of Rubens was very reluctant to assume multiple 
roles in the sector. He explained this by referring to his late father, who had been an active 
leader within the professional associations: “he put so much time into that, and when he got 
[terminally] ill, he didn’t get anything in return” (owner-manager Rubens). This made the 
existing owner very reluctant to take on leadership roles in local guilds and act more on his 
own.  
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Alternative institutional logic exposure. The exposure to alternative institutional 
logics emerged as a distinct, yet related feature from our data. Whereas the adoption of 
multiple roles acted as an exposure to multiple perspectives within the Belgian ornamental 
horticulture, the alternative institutional logic exposure brought firms into contact with 
alternative perspectives outside the Belgian ornamental horticulture. Table 7.1 shows that the 
alternative institutional logic exposure was an important factor in yielding the ability to 
successfully execute non-conformity. Again, Panamarenko is a particular example where the 
alternative institutional exposure made him less sensitive to institutionalized behaviors and 
expectations. Having essentially no training in the ornamental horticulture, and having 
acquired the firm at later age, he was not “born” in the sector as many other owner-managers 
in the sector that had acquired their firms from their family.  
“in the plant world, I’m sort of a maverick. (…) most here are generation to 
generation. (…) I’m glad that I have a neutral view on those things. (...) VMS, for 
example, they were not 100% in favor of it. Whereas I am all for it! And that I think to 
myself: environmentally friendly ornamental horticulture is so important! You have an 
overview of what you’re doing, and how you’re dealing with things. And you have a 
totally different view of this whole world.” 
Yet the owner-managers from Fabre, who did acquire the firm from their parents, are 
an example that alternative institutional exposure was possible in many other ways. Through 
their contacts with companies all over Europe, they were exposed to alternative technologies 
and practices that other firms did not see and therefore question the local institutionalized 
practices.  
In contrast, the unsuccessful firms mostly stayed within their own organizational field. 
As a result, they found little technical and technological support that could enable them to 
achieve their proactive environmental strategies. For example, Jordaens was aware himself of 
the limits of his embeddedness.   
“For example, you’re stuck with a severe aphid infection and you call and ask ‘I’ve 
got an aphid infection here, what should I spray?’ DDVP! Of course, what does the 
pesticide vendor know about MPS? Nothing! He just says ‘DDVP is the best product’. 
And there you go! (…) It’s something else when that pesticide vendor lives in the 
Netherlands, he’ll know ‘I can’t sell this product to florists, because it results in bad 
points for them.’ The whole system there works on MPS, so everybody has experience 
with it, same with suppliers and all…” (owner/manager Jordaens) 
Together, we propose: 
Chapter 7 
 
197 
Proposition 1a: Small businesses that assume multiple roles which are normally 
structurally separated in the organizational field will decrease the institutional 
embeddness that inhibits successful institutional non-conformity. 
Propostion 1b: Small businesses that are exposed to alternative institutional logics 
will decrease the institutional embeddness that inhibits successful institutional non-
conformity 
Why do the adoption of multiple roles in the organizational field and the exposure to 
different institutional logics enable firms to go against institutional pressures? We argue that 
both the development of absorptive capacity and the bridging of structural roles underlie these 
processes. First, the multiple roles and the exposure to alternative institutional logics uncover 
multiple ways of thinking and heterogeneous perspectives to the same problem, detaching 
them from the dominant logic in the field and opening the owner/managers up to different 
logics (Seo & Creed, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Although the taken-for-granted 
assumptions are consistent across institutional roles, the exposure to alternative viewpoints 
increases the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002) to 
absorb and discover new solutions and perspectives. Whereas institutional exposure has been 
used to provide the reasons why a firm would engage in institutional change, our findings 
show that it also exposes them to the tools to go against the institutional pressures in their own 
organizational field. Consistent with earlier findings that well-networked and central actors 
are more effective challengers of institutional logics when they have an unusual background 
(Palmer & Barber, 2001), and that knowledge heterogeneity in networks impacts managerial 
performance and innovativeness (Rodan & Galunic, 2004), we argue that the owner-
manager’s awareness of multiple logics and viewpoints enhances the organizational ability for 
effective institutional non-conformity.  
Secondly, both processes help to bridge structural holes that constrain unsuccessful 
firms in finding alternative perspectives and solutions (Burt, 1992). Structural holes are voids 
between organizational clusters in social networks where density of ties is low. Actors that 
can bridge these gaps in networks may benefit from preferential access to various resources 
and capabilities, thereby increasing their social capital (Burt, 1997). Institutional theorists 
have been looking mostly at firms as atomistic players in the organizational field, bridging 
structural holes mostly by establishing network ties between members of different 
organizational clusters. As there were abundant ties between the multiple clusters within the 
organizational field (e.g., growers and traders), the successful firms in our sample did not 
bridge the structural holes through network ties between them. Instead, by assuming different 
roles within the organizational field, they bridged the structural holes by overlapping the 
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clusters within the firm. As such, they bridged, within the boundaries of their own firm, the 
connections which are normally characterized by cognitive structural holes. Although 
intuitively one would expect that the adoption of several roles would increase the 
embeddedness in the field (Uzzi, 1997), our findings show in fact the opposite. Not only can 
organizations lower their embeddedness by bridging boundaries to alternative institutional 
arenas (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), as is also the case in our sample, yet this also happens 
as a result of bridging disconnected roles in the organizational field.  
Together, our findings reinforce the finding that it is not network position, but the 
lower embeddness of the firm as a result of its interaction scope with the organizational field 
that explains how firms can successfully go against institutional pressures. Negating 
institutional expectations and prescriptions requires the firm to become detached from them in 
the first place. Our findings indicate that the adoption of different roles within the 
organizational field and the exposure to alternative institutional logics were important in this 
perspective. 
7.4.2. Cognitive Approach Towards the Institutional Non-conformity 
Besides the role of the firm’s network interaction scope in enabling institutional non-
conformity, we also found that a further exploration of “focused adaptability” helped to 
explain small business institutional non-conformity. In particular, we were interested in 
whether a more fine-grained analysis of the firm’s cognitive approach towards the 
institutional non-conformity would shed light on why some firms had been able to develop 
the flexibility to realize their objectives and others not. To this purpose, we probed the data 
for the underlying reasons why the firms had wanted to become member of VMS and what 
they were willing to do in order to get a high VMS score. 
Table 4 summarizes the firm’s cognitive approach to the institutional non-conformity. 
We assessed the cognitive approach by coding the interviews for responses indicating the 
reasons each firm had to become a member of VMS and the sacrifices they were willing to 
make to achieve a high VMS score. We then followed a logic of “data reduction” (Lee et al., 
1999) to summarize our findings in three constructs that reflected the way the owner-
managers had framed VMS membership: “institutional theorizing”, “goal flexibility” and 
“means flexibility”. An institutional theorizing was called “Envisioned Future” when the 
owner-manager believed that green production should be the norm for ornamental horticulture 
firms in the future; “Inevitable Future” when the owner-manager expected that ornamental 
horticulture firms would be forced to use environmentally friendly practices in the future; and 
  
Table 7.2 – Cognitive Approach to Institutional Non-conformity 
Company Personal 
motivation for 
VMS 
membership 
Institutional 
theorizing 
Example Goal 
flexibility 
Examples Means 
flexibility 
Examples 
Panamarenko ‐ Pollution is 
irresponsible 
‐ Health of 
employees and 
customers 
‐ Independent 
assessment of 
environmental 
impact 
‐ Passion for 
nature 
Envisioned 
future 
“I think it’s really important, 
the environment. Especially 
towards the plant, in first 
instance towards the plant. 
And the people that work 
here, that is also very 
important. And towards the 
future, for the children that 
may one day take over the 
firm, I think it’s very 
important that we pay 
attention to the 
environment. Because you 
can just spray and …” 
(owner-manager) 
Persistent Abandoned 
calendar-spraying, 
no chemical plant 
growth control 
(low fertilizer and 
no growth retardant 
use), limited 
chemical pesticide 
use 
Proactive Integrated pest control, 
focus on plant health, 
developed their own 
special custom made 
pot soil mix, strict 
monitoring 
Magritte ‐ Modern 
management 
takes care of 
the 
environment 
‐ Independent 
assessment of 
environmental 
impact 
‐ Anticipating 
regulation 
‐ Attractiveness 
of newness 
Envisioned 
future 
“I also think there’s a future 
for ornamental horticulture. 
And also how, in the future, 
ornamental horticulture will 
deal with the things that are 
jumping towards it. The fact 
that we’re there is not 
because of nothing. (…) Still 
trying to secure that there 
will be some kind of a future 
in 
Belgium.(owner/manager) 
 
Persistent Abandoned 
calendar -spraying, 
limited chemical 
pesticide use  
 
Proactive Monitoring-based 
spraying, use integrated 
pest control and have 
pushed it to test its 
limits, use of cocodisks 
to replace herbicides, 
strict monitoring 
Ensor ‐ Openness to 
the 
Envisioned 
future 
“In the azaleasector, the 
climate is often to screen off 
Persistent Abandoned 
calendar-spraying, 
Proactive Use of less toxic, yet 
more expensive 
  
government 
‐ Independent 
assessment of 
environmental 
impact 
‐ Pollution is 
irresponsible 
‐ Anticipating 
regulation 
as much as possible. These 
days, a sector that is hiding, 
will sooner or later end up 
in marginality. And that 
would be undeserved. I am 
convinced that a lot of 
companies, with the 
appropriate efforts and 
discipline, can get an A-
label with these new 
norms.”(owner/manager) 
no use of 
endosulfan (widely 
used cheap and 
effective, but toxic 
pesticide) 
alternatives for 
endosulfan, monitoring-
based spraying, 
experimenting with less 
pest sensitive varieties, 
pushing research in 
more environmentally 
friendly technologies, 
strict monitoring 
 
Fabre ‐ Modern 
management 
takes care of 
the 
environment 
‐ Independent 
assessment of 
environmental 
impact 
‐ Potential 
future market 
opportunity 
Envisioned 
future 
“I think it’s the way to go for 
everybody, it’s useless to 
keep resisting and to say ‘I 
am not joining 
that’.”(owner/manager) 
 
Persistent Abandoned 
calendar-spraying, 
limited use of 
chemical 
pesticides, no use 
of toxic game 
repellents 
Proactive Monitoring-based 
spraying, use exotic 
machines for 
mechanical weeding, 
Tabasco as game 
repellant, strict 
monitoring 
 
Bruegel ‐ Anticipating 
regulation 
‐ Independent 
assessment of 
environmental 
impact 
 
Inevitable 
future 
“There are also colleagues 
that used to be a member 
and that have quitted, but I 
am convinced. Now with our 
new minister of agriculture, 
there’s going to be one, 
such a system of 
registration, but if we can 
show that there is already a 
good system, then we don’t 
have to make a new one.” 
(owner/manager) 
Relenting Persistent and even 
above average use 
of calendar and 
preventive 
spraying, keep 
using endosulfan 
Reluctant Have tried alternatives 
of endosulfan in 
combination with 
endosulfan 
  
Rubens ‐ Anticipating 
regulation 
‐ Independent 
assessment of 
environmental 
impact 
‐ Potential 
future market 
opportunity 
Inevitable 
future 
“I did it, actually out of 
curiosity, to keep up. 
Because I expect that 
registration will become 
compulsory sooner or later 
and then I hope they 
recognize VMS for that. I 
thinks so. I think it’s an 
organization that is well 
organized. And then we’re 
fine! Then we’re already 
used to it, up-to-
date.”(owner/manager) 
Relenting Continued use of 
preventive and 
calendar spraying, 
dependent on toxic 
growth retardants 
and high fertilizer 
use 
Active Has tried a new 
externally created pot 
soil mix, increased 
monitoring 
Jordaens ‐ Group 
comparison 
‐ Potential 
future market 
opportunity 
 
Potential 
trend 
“So you read about it, The 
Netherlands, you go to a 
seminar. Yeah, you like it 
and you get started with it. 
(…) I thought, it might be 
interesting to keep track of 
everything and then to 
compare or something…” 
(owner/manager) 
Relenting Continued use of 
preventive and 
calendar spraying, 
uses toxic growth 
retardants, little 
follow-up of new 
Reluctant None 
Van Dyck ‐ Potential 
future market 
opportunity 
‐ Attractiveness 
of newness 
Potential 
trend 
“[We became member] to 
follow along, to follow the 
pace of the frontrunners, so 
to speak. (owner/manager) 
Relenting Greatly reduced 
pesticide use in 
part of production, 
persistent use of 
chemicals for part 
of the production 
Active Have discussed with 
pesticide vendor about 
the possibilities for 
alternatives, use bark in 
part of the production 
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“Potential Trend”, when they believed that environmentally friendly production was a novelty 
that could be beneficial to the firm. In addition, we paid attention to the firm’s efforts and 
sacrifices to bring their actions in line with their aspirations. We therefore assessed the firm’s 
flexibility in their goals and the means to achieve these goals. The goal flexibility was 
considered “Persistent” when the firm followed through on its goals in a principled and 
obstinate manner. Goal flexibility was considered “Relenting” when the firm dropped its 
objectives as soon as hurdles or difficulties were experienced. We assessed means flexibility 
as “Proactive” when the firm proactively looked for or developed new practices themselves 
and tried alternatives when they were presented to them; “Active” when they mostly tried 
alternative practices presented to them, or “Reluctant”, when they were conservative in their 
practices. 
By further exploring the construct of “focused adaptability”, we found that it 
comprised a flexibility in the means how the firm achieved its objectives, but a resilient 
perseverance to achieve the goal of reducing the impact on the environment. Interestingly, 
firms that combined such means flexibility with goal inflexibility had theorized VMS as an 
idealized and envisioned future. All successful firms theorized VMS membership as part of a 
desired and envisioned future, were inflexible about their objectives, but flexible in the means 
to achieve them. Although nearly all firms were interested in the independent assessment 
service that the VMS system provided, the successful firms attached a higher goal to VMS. In 
fact, they considered the traditional production methods as outdated and had a strong desire 
that the entire sector, not just their own firm, would engage in more modern and socially 
legitimate production methods. For all four successful firms, VMS was an intrinsic and 
necessary element in that endeavour. Accordingly, they persistently refrained from 
environmentally polluting practices in line with their objectives and were either proactively 
engaged in a continuous active search for alternative production methods or experimenting 
with new practices when they were presented to them. 
An interesting comparison is the difference in behaviour between Ensor and Bruegel. 
Both companies grow the same plants and face the same type of pest risks. Both firms differ 
in particular in their approach of dealing with aphid infestations. The general practice in the 
sector is to use Endosulfan, a very effective, cheap, yet very toxic product that results in low 
VMS scores or even withdrawal of a firm’s label. A comparison of both firms shows how the 
approach towards VMS and the use of Endosulfan is very different. To Ensor, VMS was part 
of an envisioned future in which the sector would become more transparent to their various 
stakeholders, and to the government in particular:  
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“I also want to show the government, because we’re seen a bit by the world as ‘those 
poison sprayers, look at them again, how it stinks here’; Look! This is what I’m using, 
all registered, all official things, sometimes toxic, others less. I’ve got an A, for 
example, in VMS, because I comply with those things. I believe in it.” (owner-manager 
Ensor) 
Ensor also showed persistent goal inflexibility and proactive means flexibility. Given that the 
use of Endosulfan would result in a lower VMS score, he stopped using the product despite 
the substantial benefits in terms of cost and labour:  
“Use endosulfan once a year or three to four other products? I use the three or four 
other ones, which costs me more. But I’ve chosen for the system, so I stick to it.” 
(owner-manager Ensor)  
As a result, he was described as one of only three people in the entire industry that did 
not use Endosulfan and used a combination of intensive crop monitoring, with a number of 
alternative, but more expensive products. Although even experts reported the risks of these 
practices in terms of plant quality deterioration, Ensor pushed the limits of what was possible 
and explained his success as follows:  
“I began dealing with pesticides a lot more consciously now. Sometimes in a very 
extreme way, that I wait too long to spray, (...) until I get an attack from something 
(…) but I think it’s important.”  
In contrast, Bruegel’s VMS membership reflected the anticipation of an inevitable 
future in which registration of fertilizer and pesticides would be made compulsory. “Now with 
our new minister of agriculture, I’m sure it’s going to happen one day, such a [compulsory] 
system of registration”. In the event of this happening, he hoped that VMS would be 
recognized as a legitimate registration system. Yet, Bruegel’s owner-manager was described 
as very risk-averse and reluctant to reduce the traditional practices of preventive calendar-
based pesticide spraying, including Endosulfan, out of fear for having quality losses or plant 
damage. Whereas Ensor involved his independent advisor in the flexible improvement of his 
practices, Bruegel’s advisor reported a far more conservative and inflexible approach towards 
production methods. “I have to say that he sprays relatively more than I let other businesses 
do, also in Azalea. The question mostly comes from him.” (independent advisor of Bruegel)  
As a result of this inflexibility in adopting new means to achieve a high VMS score, he had to 
compromise his goal of lowering pesticide use and of achieving an A score in the VMS 
system. Recurring in the successful cases was a similar perseverance to question the taken-
for-granted and to find innovative solutions to their problems. Taken together, we propose: 
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Proposition 2a:  Small business owner-managers who theorize institutionally non-
conforming practices as part of an envisioned future will develop the means flexibility 
to adapt their practices in a way that enables them to persistently realize their non-
conformist objectives.  
Proposition 2b:  Small business owner-managers who theorize institutionally non-
conforming practices as part of an inevitable future or a potential trend will relent 
their non-conformist objectives to continue conforming practices. 
Why does the framing of VMS as an envisioned future, and the resulting combination 
of goal inflexibility with means flexibility increase the ability of small businesses to 
successfully engage in non-conformity? First, by framing VMS within a future perspective 
that was part of their vision or desire, the owner-managers seemed impelled to following 
through their engagement with VMS. As the owner/manager of Panamarenko stated, “passion 
is the key word for those who want to go for the non-conventional”, or like the 
owner/manager of Ensor expressed it:  
"It’s like quitting smoking. You have to be conscious first that you really want to quit 
smoking. If you say ‘yeah, I’d better quit’, yet are not really conscious of it, then it’s 
just not going to work.”  
Recent studies in psychology have shown that motivations which are framed as 
“ideals” induce a particular disposition in individuals which is called a “promotion” focus 
(Higgins, 1998; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). Within regulatory focus theory 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998), such a promotion focus induces a need among 
individuals to accomplish an idealized and desired state. Interestingly, experiments have 
shown that people with such a promotion focus will be more willing to abandon practices-in-
use and to switch to new ones (Liberman et al., 1999; Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 2004). In 
other words, by theorizing the proactive reduction of environmental impact as part of an 
idealized state, VMS induced a promotion focus among the successful firms, which enabled 
them to really engage in the institutional non-conformity that achieving a high VMS score 
required.  In contrast, regulatory focus theory states that motivations which are framed as 
“oughts” induce a “prevention” focus. Such prevention-focused individuals are driven by 
security and safety to realize their duties and obligations (Higgins, 1998), and are less likely 
to abandon safe and secure known practices. As such, the theorizing of VMS as an inevitable 
future or a potential trend the firm “ought” to follow induced a prevention focus among the 
unsuccessful firms which made them unable to really follow through on the institutional non-
conformity that achieving a high VMS score required. 
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Secondly, besides the effect of the institutional theorizing on the disposition of the 
owner-manager, the flexibility of the owner-manager to consider alternative solutions in the 
face of institutional pressures may indicate the presence of bricolage capabilities in the firm. 
Bricolage is the process by which a person is “making do by applying combinations of the 
resources at hand to new problems and opportunities” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 333). In their 
summary of the bricolage literature, Baker and Nelson found that a bricoleur is characterized 
by “a bias toward action and active engagement with problems or opportunities, rather than 
lingering over questions of whether a workable outcome can be created from what is at 
hand.” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 333), and that “bricolage typically appeared to involve a 
general awareness of existing practices and norms and a conscious willingness to abrogate 
them.” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 342). A commitment to question the taken-for-granted 
assumptions and a belief that one’s goals can be realized through the creative recombination 
of resources inside or outside the firm is central to the notion of bricolage. The 
owner/manager of Fabre reveals a striking example of bricolage in the way they dealt with 
game damage in their plants.  
“It sounds a bit stupid maybe, but game repellent, you know that right, plants are 
sometimes eaten by rabbits and all. Others will then spray with a product that is in 
fact totally forbidden or doesn’t look red [VMS indication for high toxicity], but 
purple of toxicity. And what do we spray our fruit trees with against game? Tabasco! 
Everybody laughs at you, you know, but it does give you the results, it’s 
environmentally friendly and it doesn’t cost you anything! It’s just, when a rabbit 
tastes it, you know yourself that it’s very hot. And what we do is adding a product that 
makes it stick to the leaves and the little trees.” (owner/manager Fabre) 
Taken together, the goal inflexibility and means flexibility fit the description of 
bricolage as Baker and Nelson found in their own research: “a conscious and frequently 
wilful tendency for firms in our sample to disregard the limitations of commonly accepted 
definitions of material inputs, practices, and definitions and standards, insisting instead on 
trying out solutions, observing, and dealing with the results.” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 333).  
 Overall, our findings indicate that the perseverance that results from theorizing the 
institutional non-conformity as a desired future was an important predictor for successful 
institutional non-conformity in the industry. As such, our findings may shed a new light on 
earlier studies where institutional non-conformity was the result of institutions constraining a 
firm’s access to necessary resources (Leblebici et al., 1991; Sherer & Lee, 2002). Based on 
our findings, we would argue that firms that successful firms theorized an alternative future in 
which these constraints were absent. Accordingly, they were driven to accomplish their 
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objectives and flexibly look for emerging solutions to their resource scarcities. However, 
whereas the large law firms in Sherer and Lee’s (2002) could subsequently diminish the 
legitimacy risk of their deviant practices by using the clout that came with their larger size, 
this was impossible among our small firms. The successful firms nevertheless possessed other 
organizational characteristics that helped to manage the risks of their institutional non-
conformity, which are the focus of the next section. 
7.4.3. Organizational Conduciveness to Institutional Non-conformity 
Even though the former two paragraphs uncovered how the firm’s embeddness and 
perseverance enabled it to detach from institutionalized practices and persistently find 
solutions that enabled them to follow through on their objectives, the question remains how 
the firms were able to deal with the risks in terms of lower certainty and legitimacy that 
generally come with such deviant behavior. In particular, we wondered why they were so 
insensitive to these risks and were even able to develop “institutional agency” to express their 
discontent with the current institutions. To this purpose, we honed in on how the institutional 
non-conformity related to other domains of the firm’s business model and how sensitive it 
was to the prevailing institutional practices. 
Given that institutional non-conformity incurs risks of reduced access to resources 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) or even decreasing financial returns (Haveman, 1993b; Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995; Miller & Chen, 1996; Deephouse, 1999; Norman et al., 2007), we expected 
a small business’s non-conformity to be a singular and exceptional endeavor. Our data 
suggest, however, that the institutional non-conformity with regards to green production 
methods was often not the only part of the business model that deviated from prevailing 
practice in the industry. A business model reflects how the firm will create value in the market 
through “an interrelated set of decision variables in the areas of venture strategy, 
architecture, and economics” (Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005). Venture strategy refers 
to the overall direction in the firm’s market positioning, the architecture includes the internal 
processes and decision of infrastructure that enables the firm to create value, and the 
economic model is the firm’s logic of profit generation. By comparing the firms’ business 
models, we found that the successful firms were not only different in terms of their proactive 
environmental strategies, but that they also deviated in other dimensions of the business 
model. Furthermore, we found that most of the firms had a track-record of non-conformist 
behavior, which seemed to desensitize them from the institutional risks as well. 
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Table 5 highlights the differences between the firm’s business models, their deviance 
from prevailing business models, and their conduciveness to high VMS performance. We 
assessed multiple non-conformity by probing the data for features in the business model that 
indicated firm deviation from practices other than green production. A business model was 
categorized as “Radically different” when it involved a strategy, architecture or economic 
model unique to the sector and in ways that questioned other institutional forces besides green 
production; “Moderately different” when the strategy, architecture or economic model 
deviated from the general practice in the sector, but other firms with similar business models 
could be found; and “Conform” when business model followed standard practice as defined 
by established institutional norms. We determined the conduciveness of a business model as 
“Conducive”, when the business model stimulated green production methods, “Neutral”, 
when the business model did not stimulate or discourage green production methods, and 
“Incompatible”, when the business model inhibited green production methods.  
As indicated in Table 7.3, successful non-conformity was associated with a business 
model that differed, at least moderately, in other perspectives than merely the proactive 
environmental strategy. However, the case of Van Dyck shows that this was not enough: the 
entire business model also needed to be compatible with the institutional non-conformity. 
Whereas Van Dyck’s profit generation logic through a cost leadership strategy and 
technological leadership deviated from most other arboriculture firms, their large scale and 
cost leadership was incompatible with the requirements for achieving higher scores in VMS. 
For example, for their large scale operations, they needed large amounts of land, which was 
not easily available in their surroundings. As a result, they increased the number of plants on 
the land and continued working on their own overexploited lands. Since the risk of pest 
infestation increases with the exploitation of land, they needed to spray pesticides more 
frequently. Given the high density of plants, they were also unable to use mechanical weeding 
and were therefore obliged to toxic chemical pesticides for pest control. Furthermore, the 
owner-manager of Van Dyck ridiculed the monitoring needs associated with VMS by saying 
that “we’re growers, not accountants!” In contrast, although growing similar plants and 
working in almost the same village, the owner-managers of Fabre had a business model that 
was far more conducive to achieving high VMS scores. Although they equally focused on 
eradicating costs in their business, they used a series of monitoring and measurement 
techniques to this purpose, including VMS. In fact, they found VMS to be “the most 
important source of information we have now”. In addition, they possessed enough land on 
their own, which allowed some parts to lay fallow and to reduce the risk of pest infestation.  
  
Table 7.3 – Organizational Conduciveness to Institutional Non-conformity 
Company Business model Conformity Conducive-
ness 
Example 
Panamarenko ‐ Combine niche strategy with differentiation 
strategy. 
‐ Niche involves on-site selling to hobbyists and 
plant-lovers with broad assortment, hobbyist 
courses and exhibitions and a generally inviting 
environment for enjoying plants and nature. 
‐ Differentiation strategy is based on the production 
of a rare and difficult plant.  
‐ Unique plant varieties are obtained through 
hobbyists, plant-lovers and their own R&D 
‐ Experience little competition in their niche 
Radically 
different 
Conducive 
 
‐ Polluting production methods would seem 
illogical for customers 
‐ Safety of customers wandering in greenhouses 
conflicts with pesticide use 
‐ Local sales are not required to be pest-free 
‐ Less growth retardant need due to focus on 
plant strength, rather than speedy growth 
‐ Want strict fact-based monitoring of plant 
health  
Magritte ‐ Niche strategy based on labour intensive 
production of specialized base material for 
international larger customers 
‐ Have created their own plant varieties 
‐ Best price/quality ratio in the market  
‐ Experience little competition in their niche 
Moderately 
different 
Neutral ‐ Wanted to have organic pest control anyway 
‐ Do as they please in their niche with stable 
customer base 
‐ Want strict fact-based monitoring of plant 
health 
‐ Modern infrastructure reduces pest infestation 
Ensor ‐ Combines differentiation strategy (50%) with a 
niche strategy (50%) 
‐ Top quality Azalea producer (“top 5 in the 
industry”), sells to traders in the mainstream 
competitive industry 
‐ Niche involves production of limitedly licensed 
innovative Azalea variety within joint venture with 
5 traders and 1 other production company. VMS-A 
label is required for the joint venture production 
companies. The plants are sold at premium prices 
to a niche of specific top quality small retail shops. 
‐ No competition in this niche 
Radically 
different 
Conducive ‐ VMS-A is required in joint venture they helped 
to set up 
‐ Want strict fact-based monitoring of plant 
health 
‐ Modern infrastructure reduces pest infestation  
Fabre ‐ Differentiation strategy through their vertical Moderately 
different 
Neutral ‐ Want strict fact-based monitoring of plant 
  
integration: are both producers and traders 
‐ Are very focussed on eradicating costs through 
incessant monitoring  
‐ Have their own land for their own production, rest 
is bought 
‐ Focus on more labour intensive crops with added 
value 
‐ Experience increasing competition 
health 
‐ Aim for cost reductions through pesticide use 
reductions 
‐ Have land they can use as fallow, to restore soil 
condition, leading to reduced pest infestation 
Bruegel ‐ Differentiation strategy by being the first in the 
season with Calluna and producing medium quality 
Azalea in pyramid and tree shapes which are sold 
to mainstream traders 
‐ No clear distinction from competitors, experience 
fierce competition 
Conform Incompatible ‐ Outdated infrastructure results in increased pest 
infestation 
‐ VMS-A increases costs and risk of quality 
deterioration 
 
Rubens ‐ Differentiation strategy involving a great variety of 
plants with high quality 
‐ Very tough competition in the industry 
Conform Incompatible ‐ VMS-A incurs risk of quality deterioration 
‐ Business model is based on speedy plant 
growth (to maximize yield) and visual quality, 
requiring high levels of toxic products 
‐ Structural characteristics of the firm are 
suboptimal, taking up all extra investment and 
time to get the firm up-to-date 
Jordaens ‐ Try to combine differentiation and cost leadership 
strategy, but strategy is lacking 
‐ Produce Chrysanths and pot plants, sold to traders  
‐ Very tough competition in the industry 
Conform Incompatible ‐ VMS-A incurs costs and risk of quality 
deterioration 
‐ Monitoring takes too much time 
Van Dyck ‐ Have a cost leadership strategy, involving the 
production of roses, buxus and taxus in large 
volumes to retailers 
‐ Need to rent land for large volume production 
‐ Very tough competition in the industry 
Moderately 
different 
Incompatible ‐ VMS-A incurs costs and risk of quality 
deterioration 
‐ Monitoring takes too much time: “we’re not 
accountants, we’re growers” 
‐ Have to use overexploited land that yields easy 
pest infestation   
‐ Bulk production makes it very difficult to use 
environmentally friendly products  
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The case of Ensor presents a particularly telling example of how the high VMS-score 
resulted from a radically different business model that was also conducive to green 
production. At the time VMS was launched, Ensor was involved in a radically innovative 
project in the Azalea sector to set up a joint venture together with 2 growers, 5 international 
traders and an R&D/production advisor. The unique economic model of the joint venture was 
to market a license-protected and unique Azalea variety that was to be grown only by top-
quality growers and then sold at premium prices in limited amounts to a niche of carefully 
chosen retail shops. As such, the business model itself presented a radical departure in 
multiple perspectives. First, it deviated from the usual production that differentiates only in 
plant size, shape or color and caters to bulk trade markets. Second, it involved a collaboration 
with trade companies that was deemed impossible in the sector. Third, the mission statement 
of the joint venture reads “only top varieties that can stand the severest quality controls and 
that are grown with respect for the environment are granted the [top quality label]”. In the 
process of setting up this radically innovative joint venture, the individual members had also 
decided that a VMS-A rating was required for the joint venture membership. Ensor’s business 
model was thus in fact more conducive to green production, than it was to conforming to the 
institutional pressures in the sector. As a result, Ensor bore no risks with achieving a high 
score in VMS.  
In contrast, the business models of Bruegel, Rubens, Jordaens and Van Dyck were 
incompatible with obtaining a high score in the VMS. Neither of them had a mechanism in 
place that would return a value for their efforts in VMS, either internally (cost reduction or 
control perception) or externally (commercially). The owner-manager of Jordaens, for 
example, had a rather intuitive and gut-feel type of strategy, and generally lacked the time to 
consider VMS related issues in his decision-making. He considered the registration a time 
consuming practice that took too much effort besides his everyday traditional practice, which 
made it difficult for him to adopt the monitoring and requirements of VMS. As a consequence 
of the time requirements, he also asked his pesticide vendor for products that had quick and 
lasting results:  
“when I’m really in the busy season, then I’ll just take what I’m used to spray and if 
that is an orange product [indication for medium toxicity in VMS] then, well yeah…”.  
In addition, he had outsourced part of his crop control to an external firm, that didn’t want to 
disclose what products were used for crop control. Given the time constraints and the lack of 
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financial compensation for green production, the efforts needed for achieving a high VMS 
score were in no way beneficial to Jordaens. As a consequence, we propose: 
Proposition 3a: Small businesses that have a business model that is conducive or 
neutral to institutional non-conformity will be more successful in institutional non-
conformity than those small businesses that do not. 
Proposition 3b: Small businesses that engage in institutional non-conformity in one 
domain of their business model will more likely have a business model that is 
conducive to this non-conformity when their business model is non-conforming in 
other domains as well.  
Why are multiple non-conformity and business model conduciveness important for 
successful institutional non-conformity? First, one reason may be that the institutionalized 
practices are embedded in more than just the practice, but have interdependent effects in the 
entire business model. Indeed, it is part of the particular nature of a business model that its 
various domains are interrelated (Morris et al., 2005). As a result, the isomorphism is active 
not only at the level of particular practices or strategies, but also results in certain expectations 
that relate to the profit generation logic behind them and the particular architecture that 
supports it. Deviating in one domain of the business model is therefore almost impossible 
without also changing part of the business model of the firm. The Grameen Bank could only 
successfully realize its elusive objective to lend money to the poor in Bangladesh because it 
adopted an entirely different business model of “banking”. Similarly, Virgin Airlines could 
only provide cheaper airline tickets to customers by rethinking the business model of how an 
airline makes money.  
Second, the effect of engaging in institutional non-conformity in multiple instances 
may make the owner-manager accustomed to resisting pressures for conformity. Instead of 
worrying whether non-conformity will result in a reduction of legitimacy, multiple 
institutional non-conformity acts as a mechanism of learning-by-doing. Each of the four 
successful companies seemed to be aware of their multiple non-conformity. “I’m sort of 
maverick in the sector”, “I always get into trouble”, “maybe they think I’m strange” was an 
often heard comment in the interviews with the successful companies. This even extended 
beyond behavior related to the firm. Magritte’s owner-manager, for example, had written a 
column in the weekly farmer’s union magazine, in which he came out and openly said he was 
gay. Within the highly traditional and conservative farmers’ environment, this reflected 
considerable institutional non-conformity.  
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Building on these explanations, we introduce the concept of “institutional immunity” 
as a facilitating mechanism for successful institutional non-conformity. Institutional immunity 
is the quality of an organization to challenge institutional pressures, as a result of its multiple 
exposures to institutional non-conformity or a business model which is more conducive to 
non-conformity than to conformity. Similar to the immunity to disease, this may or may not 
be the result of earlier exposures to non-conformity. Both the business model conduciveness 
and the multiple institutional non-conformity may make the owner-managers immune to the 
pressures for conformity.  
7.5. Discussion  
We started our introduction by highlighting the growing phenomenon of small 
businesses resisting institutional pressures for conformity despite predictions of existing 
literature that this jeopardizes the legitimacy of the firm. Using an in-depth investigation of 8 
small businesses in the ornamental horticulture industry in Belgium, we identified a number 
of factors that offer a more refined explanation of small business non-conformity. More 
specifically, we highlight the importance of occupying multiple roles and gaining exposure to 
alternative institutional logics. Doing so places the owner manager in a frame of mind that 
begins to recognize that there are alternative approaches through which firms in the 
ornamental horticulture sector could operate. But this needed to be combined with a degree of 
persistence resulting from owner-managers theorizing the proactive reduction of their 
environmental impact as part of an envisioned future. As a result, successful firms exhibited 
the persistence to uncompromisingly realize this aspiration by remaining flexible to the means 
how they did this. A persistent approach to the institutional non-conformity was integral to 
exercising the alternative logics presented to the owner-founder. Finally, owner-managers 
needed business models that were at odds with standardized business practice in multiple 
perspectives, and also aligned with the expectations of VMS. This finding implies that, while 
cognitive awareness of alternative logics and effort in the form of perseverance are pivotal 
owner-manager characteristics, full institutional non-conformance hinges on firm level 
structure and culture immune to the risks of negating existing institutions. In addition, it lays 
bare the formidable role that the individual owner-manager plays in this respect. Since the 
owner-manager not only bares the risk, but also all the responsibility for his company, he or 
she has the latitude to shape the business according to his or her own aspirations in return. 
While a process model is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear from the data that firms 
must engage in a radical strategic reorientation (Tushman & Romanelli, 1984) whereby their 
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business model provides the stimulant and legitimacy to follow through on the individual 
owner’s cognitive and personal ambitions. Together, these conditions make the “foolish” act 
of breaking out of the institutional structure of the industry a viable trajectory for small 
businesses. These findings have important implications for institutional theory, the resource-
based view of the firm and the organizations and the natural environment literature. 
7.5.1. Institutional theory 
As mentioned before, there has been disagreement about the extent to which 
organizations are able to go against the very institutions that grant them legitimacy. With our 
findings, we contribute to the notion that, under certain conditions, organizations are able to 
deviate from the pressures for isomorphism in their organizational field. However, whereas 
empirical investigations of Oliver’s (1991) model of responsiveness to institutional processes 
have assumed that conformance to social pressures is an inevitable task to maintain legitimacy 
(Goodstein, 1994; Etherington & Richardson, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995; Clemens & 
Douglas, 2005), our study highlights that normative and coercive social pressures may run 
counter to even stronger cognitive pressures. As a result, organizational strategies may be 
acquiescent to normative pressures on one side, but defiant or avoiding on another. 
Our study also sheds light on the internal histories and features that enable firms to achieve 
success once a strategy of institutional non-conformity is chosen or emerges. Whereas most of 
the literature has focused on the antecedents to institutional non-conformity (Oliver, 1991; 
Seo & Creed, 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) and its 
implications on organizational performance (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Haveman, 1993b; Miller 
& Chen, 1996; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; D'Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000; Durand, Rao, & 
Monin, 2007), this study adds to the more recent work that is focused on the factors that 
moderate and mediate the relationship between institutional non-conformity and 
organizational performance (Rao et al., 2005). However, our study is positioned beside an 
alternative stream within institutional theory that has investigated the processes of institution 
creation in institutional voids (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Maguire et al., 2004). Since the 
deviation from institutional logics may hold the seeds for the creation of new institutional 
arrangements, future work may investigate how the processes of institutional non-conformity 
can lead to or are akin to the processes at work in institution creation. The findings of such 
studies may be of particular relevance for social enterprises in developing countries. 
Deviating from corrupted and illegal practices may require the development of a new 
institutional fabric to support the survival of the social enterprise. 
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7.5.2. Resource-based view of the firm 
The resource-based view of the firm states that organizations achieve superior 
performance by exploiting complex resources and capabilities that are not easily duplicated 
by competitors, provided that they can produce value for the organization (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Such resources and 
capabilities are characterized especially by their limited availability or the difficult and 
ambiguous processes of acquiring them (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). Our findings 
have pointed to a number of such capabilities that have been previously identified as 
important predictors of competitive advantage. For example, absorptive capacity depends on 
the path-dependent acquiescence of knowledge, and is an important source of future 
opportunity recognition (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). The bridging of 
structural holes allows firms to acquire preferential access to rare and new information, 
resources and capabilities (Burt, 1992). Bricolage capabilities facilitate the creative 
recombination of available resources in the face of resource scarcity (Ward, 2004; Baker & 
Nelson, 2005). The resulting bootstrapping has been identified before as a major asset for the 
resource constraints small businesses are often confronted with (Winborg & Landstrom, 2001; 
Ebben & Johnson, 2006). Although the relationship between regulatory focus and 
entrepreneurial success remains unclear, it has been suggested that a promotion focus aids 
small business owner managers in the generation of novel ideas and opportunity recognition 
(Brockner et al., 2004). Finally, as a result of the demonstrated path-dependency of multiple 
non-conformity, and the success it seems to accrue to institutional non-conformity among the 
viable and more than successful firms in our sample, one can imagine that small firms may 
also benefit from institutional immunity. Given that it is in the nature of proactive firms to 
stay in the uncertain and risky space ahead of the curve, firms may thus avail of the 
experience in dealing with this uncertainty in different arenas. The findings presented in this 
study not only shed further light on how each of these valuable resources can be acquired, yet 
may also point institution challengers towards ways to capitalize on the byproducts of their 
followed strategies.  
7.5.3. Organizations and the natural environment 
Finally, our findings also have implications for the field of organizations and the 
natural environment. Specifically, it follows the criticism on the “evangelic” nature of much 
theoretical and empirical work on proactive environmental strategies (Newton & Harte, 1997) 
that is based on the “myth” that external stakeholder sensitivity is all pervasive and acts upon 
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all firms (Aragon-Correa & Rubio-Lopez, 2007). Our research shows that instead of 
institutional pressures driving firms towards more environmental proactivity, the dominant 
logic was in fact counter to such strategies. In addition, the general market conditions were 
not in favor of green products either. Given that both stakeholder pressures (Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1996; Fineman & Clarke, 1996; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999) and economic 
opportunities (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Banerjee, 2001; Bansal, 2005) are the main initial drivers 
for early environmental strategy adoption, our findings are an important account of 
organizational practices when neither of these external conditions are present. More 
importantly, they invite the organizations and the natural environment literature to look at the 
institutional context from a more dynamic perspective and to look at the capabilities that 
organizations develop to bring the external environment in line with their own aspirations. 
One reason why these findings have emerged so strongly, is that up until now, there 
has been very little research that has examined proactive environmental strategies of small 
business (Hillary, 2000a; del Brío & Junquera, 2003; McKeiver & Gadenne, 2005; Clemens, 
2006; Aragon-Correa et al., 2008). As such, our findings draw attention to the different micro-
processes that may be involved in small business proactive environmental strategies. Small 
businesses have often been associated with lower visibility and lower stakeholder scrutiny 
(Greening & Gray, 1994; Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Bowen, 2000). As a result, the within-
industry normative and cognitive pressures may be far more important than has been 
investigated to date. Whereas a capability of stakeholder integration may therefore be vital in 
larger firms, the development of practices of institutional non-conformity may be more 
important in small business contexts.  
We also contribute to the ongoing debate about whether the perception of the natural 
environment as a threat or an opportunity facilitates the adoption of a proactive environmental 
strategy (Sharma, 2000; Andersson & Bateman, 2000). Although all 8 firms in our sample had 
proactive environmental strategies, both threat-based and opportunity-based reasons were 
underlying their motivation. However, our findings show that a promotion focus was 
necessary to persistently follow through on their strategy and to develop the flexibility in 
finding the appropriate means for success.  
7.6. Limitations and research implications 
Despite our vigilant care on the rigor of the research process, our findings are not 
without limitations. Given that we chose to limit our study to one single industry, our findings 
may lack the power to be generally applicable to small businesses in general. One avenue for 
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future research may be to test whether our propositions hold in the entire sector, as well as in 
different contexts and organizational fields. However, the small business literature has 
identified the disparity of research outcomes as an inherent feature of its domain (d'Amboise 
& Muldowney, 1988; Curran & Blackburn, 2001) and has therefore asked for more 
contextualized research in theory building (Zahra, 2007). In this regard, we determine a 
number of contextual factors as important to our findings, opening up opportunities for related 
research. First, the ornamental horticulture sector in Belgium is experiencing high levels of 
competition and even hostility, and has a very traditional population. It may be interesting to 
see whether the same capabilities we identified will emerge in sectors where the business-as-
usual is in fact very profitable and does have interesting future perspectives. Second, the 
institutional logics that were surrounding the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector were able 
to provide the necessary tools that the proactive businesses were looking for. It might have 
been completely different if the institutional context surrounding the organizational field was 
less munificent in solutions or had similar institutional logics. In such contexts, the 
importance of collaborative efforts to create inexistent resources may become more important, 
similar to the creation of new markets or institutions (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & 
Glynn, 2001; Greenwood et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004). Third, the institutional non-
conformity that was used as a context here, involves mostly normative and cognitive 
pressures for non-conformity. This means that a deviance of the institutional requirements 
does not lead to illegal behavior as would be the case with institutional non-conformity 
against regulative (legal) pressures. Future research may want to investigate whether legal 
rule-bending as a result of an envisioned future may require different capabilities than the 
ones identified in the present study. 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
 Small businesses attract a growing interest from policy makers. Unfortunately, their 
beneficial role in society as the engine of economic growth and employment creation seems to 
come with substantial impact on the natural environment. In this dissertation, I therefore 
investigated how small businesses can successfully realize strategies that go beyond legal 
requirements in reducing their impact on the natural environment. Based on the finding that 
their small scale induces constraints that inhibit small firms to engage in PES (chapter 3 and 
chapter 4), I set out to assess how small businesses can overcome these constraining factors. 
To this purpose, chapters 6 and 7 report the findings of an empirical study in the ornamental 
horticulture industry that combine both resource-based and institutional theoretical lenses in 
the processes that are involved to this purpose. 
In this concluding chapter, I discuss the conclusions and limitations of the research. I 
will present this discussion in four sections. First, I offer a brief synthesis of the answers that 
this dissertation provided to the research questions identified in chapter 3. Second, I discuss 
the overall theoretical implications of this dissertation. Third, I discuss the methodological 
and theoretical limitations that derive from the choices made during the research process. 
Finally, I close this dissertation with avenues for future research and some brief concluding 
remarks. 
8.1. Conclusions  
8.1.1. RQ1: What is the impact of firm size on the adoption of PES in smaller 
firms? 
The literature reviewed in chapter 3 yielded an inconsistent picture on the impact of 
small scale on the willingness and ability of small firms to engage in PES. Whereas positive 
correlations between firm size and PES are almost consistently found on the one hand, 
anecdotal case studies demonstrating small businesses socially responsive strategies are 
reported on the other. This dissertation has provided new insights that clarify this 
inconsistency in two perspectives: (1) an in-depth literature review, and (2) a rich account of 
the phenomenon at work in an empirical setting. 
First, in order to resolve the inconsistent findings on the impact of small scale in the 
PES literature, chapter 4 was dedicated to a further fine-grained exploration of extant findings 
in the literature. Given the scarcity of studies on small business PES, we decided to use a 
broader, though still relatively limited, literature base and draw on contributions on small 
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business social responsibility in general. By distinguishing between the impact of firm size on 
(1) issue, (2) personal, (3) organizational and (4) context characteristics, three important 
conclusions could be made.  
1. The lack of proactive environmental (and social) strategies among small 
businesses is not the result of bad attitudes. Rather, the reduced visibility and 
perceived impact, and the resulting lack of scrutiny, makes that small business 
owner-managers simply do not recognize environmental issues. As a result, 
more attention is given to responsibilities towards employees and colleagues, 
with whom they encounter most social issues and responsibility dilemmas. 
2. In addition to the lack of recognition, a lack of time, knowledge, financial 
resources and power stands between a small firm’s positive attitudes and the 
realization of proactive environmental (and social) strategies. However, the 
literature also hinted at a number of factors that could mitigate these 
constraints and which were further empirically explored in this dissertation. 
More specifically, it was argued that a more dynamic and systemic view of 
small businesses could shed light on the capabilities and contextual factors that 
enable small firms to adopt proactive social and environmental strategies. 
3. Finally, more than larger firms will small firms depend on a supportive 
institutional and business environment. A culture of shared responsibility, 
installed by professional associations, peers, governments and partners in the 
value chain, and an abundant availability of resources in the environment of 
the firm will facilitate the realization of proactive environmental and social 
strategies. 
Second, chapters 6 and 7 were specifically designed to provide a richer, dynamic and 
systemic exploration of small business social responsibility, or more specifically proactive 
environmental strategy. Our findings indicate that a small business context provides 
constraints, but that they can also be managed. Whereas all firms in our empirical study in the 
Belgian ornamental horticulture industry had the intentions to go beyond legal expectations in 
reducing their impact on the natural environment, we found that those firms that had been 
able to deal with their specific constraints had also been able to realize their PES. In this 
respect, the impact of small firm size can be reinterpreted as a set of contingency factors that a 
firm has to deal with in order to realize its objectives. Furthermore, the findings led us to 
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identify the capabilities that were needed to this purpose, which was necessary to answer the 
remaining research questions in this dissertation. 
8.1.2. RQ2: What are the resources and capabilities associated with successful PES 
execution in small businesses? 
 Building on the suggestions of chapter 4, we drew on an empirical study of 8 case 
studies in the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector that were member of VMS, a voluntary 
member organization of firms with proactive environmental intentions, to identify the 
capabilities that differentiated between firms that had been successful and unsuccessful in 
realizing these intentions. Since VMS members receive ratings of environmental 
performance, we were able to compare high performing with low performing firms. First of 
all, our findings reinforced the theoretical importance of internal resource capital, external 
resource capital and institutional capital as enabling factors for realizing PES. Interestingly, 
however, none of these facilitating factors were generally present in the ornamental 
horticulture industry, and realizing a PES was thus “against all odds”.  
We found that a successful realization of the firm’s environmental intentions depended 
on the ability of the firm to create a micro-environment for the firm that mimicked the 
theoretical conditions favouring PES. More specifically, we identified munification and 
organicity as the two interacting and composite dynamic capabilities that enabled the firm to 
change its internal and external resource base. Munification entailed the building and 
attracting of networks rich with existing complementary resources and capabilities; 
collaborating for the joint development of lacking external resource and institutional capital; 
and the institutional agency to create an institutionally enabling context. Organicity consisted 
of bootstrapping, focused adaptability and disciplined scrutiny, together increasing the 
internal resource capital in the firm. In addition, we also found that both dynamic capabilities 
interacted with each other and further reinforced the potential of the firm to realize its 
objectives. The presence of organicity increased the effectiveness of munification in the firm, 
while the external resource conditions further increased the effectiveness of organicity in 
building internal resource capital.  
8.1.3. RQ3: How can small business be successful in PES when the (institutional) 
conditions are against having one? 
  Given that organicity and munification helped the firm to realize its proactive 
environmental intentions when not only the institutional but all conditions were set against 
having one, chapter 6 helped to explain the third research question as well. Yet one striking 
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observation in chapter 6 was that the firm’s PES went against institutionalized practices and 
prescriptions in their industry. Whereas PES are generally seen as an act of conforming to 
institutional pressures, the dominant institutional pressures in our study were strongly 
discouraging PES. As a result, achieving high VMS scores reflected an act of institutional 
non-conformity. Since current explanations in institutional theory offer contradictory 
explanations about how institutional non-conformity was possible in the small firms of our 
study, we therefore further explored how of the capabilities as identified in chapter 6 helped 
to explain institutional non-conformity in small business contexts. As such, chapter 7 took an 
institutional theoretical lens to zoom in on how small businesses can be successful in PES 
when the institutional conditions were against having one. 
Our findings uncovered three features that distinguished between successful and 
unsuccessful institutional non-conformity. First, the successful firms’ particular network 
characteristics lowered their embeddness in the organizational field. By assuming multiple 
roles within the organizational field and by being exposed alternative institutional logics they 
were able to detach from institutionalized prescriptions in the Belgian ornamental horticulture 
sector. Second, whereas successful firms theorized the institutional non-conformity as an 
envisioned future, the unsuccessful firms saw the institutional non-conformity as an inevitable 
future or a potential trend. Importantly, the cognitive approach of the institutional non-
conformity as a desired future resulted in flexibility to adopt alternative solutions to 
persistently realize their aspirations. Third, the successful firms seemed “immune” to the 
negative effects other firms would experience with institutional non-conformity. By drawing 
upon a business model that was not only deviating with regards to the PES, but was non-
conforming in different perspectives and in a way that was conducive to realizing a PES, they 
became insensitive to the uncertainty and legitimacy risks that other firms perceived. 
8.2. Discussion of the findings 
 To what extent do the findings in this dissertation invite a reconsideration of 
previously accepted perspectives? Besides the theoretical reflections and contributions that 
were already discussed in each of the previous chapters of part III, I believe the theoretical 
contribution of this dissertation can be summarized around three features. 
1. Advancing PES research in small businesses requires a translation of PES in its 
underlying processes. Although it would be unwise to ignore the compelling and 
consistent positive correlation between firm size and PES, the research in this 
dissertation warrants caution with deterministic predictions stating that PES would be 
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impossible in small firms. In particular, the evidence from both our literature review 
and empirical studies invites researchers to not just copy large business perspectives to 
small business PES. In order to understand the ability and inability of small business 
PES, it is necessary to look under the hood of PES and uncover the underlying 
processes that inhibit small firms from adopting them. For example, we found 
evidence both in the literature (Merritt, 1998; Hillary, 2000a; Worthington & Patton, 
2005; Revell & Blackburn, 2007) and in our own research that, in general, small 
businesses experience completely different institutional influences with regards to 
environmental issues. A large firm, as a result of its large absolute impact on the 
natural environment and its greater visibility, may receive normative institutional 
pressures from civil society that support a proactive reduction of the environmental 
impact of the firm. As a result, it is no surprise that PES induced the need for 
integrating stakeholder perspectives in the strategy of the firm (Hart, 1995; Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998). In contrast, our review in chapter 4 demonstrated that most small 
firms hardly recognize issues related to the natural environment as a result of their low 
visibility and (perceived) impact. As a result, normative pressures and opportunities 
are rarely received from the market or civil society. What we found in the literature, 
and especially in the research presented in chapters 6 and 7, is that firms may in fact 
experience within-industry conservative pressures that even discourages firms to stray 
away from the general industry approach to the natural environment. In our research, 
PES were thus manifested as underlying processes of institutional non-conformity, and 
therefore required different capabilities to tackle the challenges this presented. This 
conclusion is important, since it could inspire owner-managers, business associations 
and governments alike to redirect their attention from vague messages and “mythical” 
half-truths about the business case of PES (Porter & Kramer, 2006; Aragon-Correa & 
Rubio-Lopez, 2007) to the actual barriers and processes that small businesses 
experience for realizing their already present intentions. For example, governments 
could focus especially on ensuring that the most proactive firms within an industry can 
be successful in their PES. If the proactive firms are successful in their endeavours, 
they will act as bandwagons for both other small firms in the industry mimicking 
leading companies (Haveman, 1993a; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), as well as large firms 
that interpret the success of small firms as a reduced uncertainty for their success 
(Terlaak & King, 2007). However, whereas many policy initiatives hope to instigate 
this mimetic behavior through conveying messages about the positive consequences of 
Chapter 8 
 
225 
PES, it may be more important to disclose best practices on the mitigation of 
constraints that small businesses may experience. 
2. The need for combined outside-in and inside-out perspectives on proactive 
environmental strategies. Although my review of the strategy literature in chapter 1 
advanced a view that combines both outside-in and inside-out perspectives to strategy, 
most of the literature on PES has focused on only one from either of these 
perspectives. For example, some have used only resource-based perspectives (Hart, 
1995; Aragon-Correa, 1998; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Sharma, 2000; Christmann, 
2000), whereas others have only used an industrial organization (Porter & van der 
Linde, 1995a; Nehrt, 1996; Reinhardt, 1998) or institutional theory (King & Lenox, 
2000; Clemens & Douglas, 2005) and stakeholder theory (Henriques & Sadorsky, 
1996; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; Buysse & Verbeke, 
2003) lens. Only recently have studies begun to explore a combined inside-out and 
outside-in perspective on PES (Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Chan, 2005; Bansal, 
2005; Sharma & Henriques, 2005). The findings in this dissertation further reconfirm 
the need to analyse PES from a combined inside-out and outside-in perspective, and 
most importantly, their interactive influence (Bansal, 2005). For example, both 
chapters 6 and 7 present findings that resonate well with resource-based and dynamic 
capability perspectives, since we found that the proficiency of firms to realize their 
PES depended on the dynamic capabilities they were able to develop and employ and 
change their resource-base according to their needs. The results in chapter 6 even 
demonstrated that these dynamic capabilities enabled the firm to change the external 
environment in such a way that it would mimic the characteristics necessary to foster 
their realization of PES. However, explaining how these dynamic capabilities worked 
required the integration of institutional theory and contingency perspectives. For 
example, the capabilities in the successful firms were also necessary because the 
environment was not conducive to the firms having a PES. As soon as the proactive 
environmental intentions met the contextual constraints of implementing them, the 
firms had to engage in the dynamic search for a fit between their aspirations, the 
environmental conditions and their organizational resource base. As a result, one of 
the conclusions of chapter 6 was that our findings reconfirmed the necessity of having 
the contingency factors in place that foster a PES. Taken together, both chapters 6 and 
7 show how the internal and external resource-base of the firm and the institutional 
context interacted with each other to explain the ability of the firm to realize a PES. In 
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particular, chapter 7 showed how the resource base of the firm influenced the way the 
institutional context was experienced. The type of connections the firm had, its 
persistent commitment to an envisioned future, the resulting flexibility to incorporate 
emerging solutions, and the institutional immunity of the firm and its business model 
enabled it to ignore institutional boundaries other firms considered insurmountable. In 
sum, these findings reinforce the need for using an interactive institutional and 
resource-based perspective to understand PES (Bansal, 2005). 
3. Obstinate commitment towards goals, flexible towards means. The view that small 
businesses lack the resources, time and knowledge to engage in PES is a somber one. 
Yet, emerging in several places in this dissertation was a feature unique to many small 
businesses that acts in their favour. Small firm owner-managers have the unique 
potential to shape their organization according to their own visions and aspirations. 
Since it is really their organization and since a small size allows substantial control of 
what happens inside it, small firms may have more potential to engage in the path-
breaking changes needed for reducing business impact on the environment. Whereas 
this is not a new finding (Gibb & Scott, 1985; Gibb, 2000; Curran & Blackburn, 
2001), both chapters 6 and 7 shed light on the underlying processes that are involved. 
Firms achieving excellence in realizing their PES – despite conditions discouraging 
this feat – were able to do so because they visualized PES as part of a desired future 
and were therefore committed to accomplishing their aspirations. Furthermore, this 
commitment to shape the world according to their own aspirations does not restrict 
itself to the boundaries of their organization. In fact, where the firm’s resources and 
sphere of influence end, and where the outside world begins, becomes a difficult 
question to answer. Rather, the firm integrates resources and solutions emerging from 
both inside and outside the firm to obstinately shape the world within its sphere of 
influence. Such a finding is important, as it should inform small businesses owner-
managers about how to manage the risk associated with the uncertainty of natural 
environmental issues. Indeed, it has been shown before that firms should be wary of 
proactive environmental strategies that reduce the resource flexibility of the firm 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 1998). Yet it is only by balancing commitment to strategic 
objectives with a flexibility to integrate and abandon emerging solutions in the shorter 
term that most firms are successful in realizing their objectives (Ghemawat & Del Sol, 
1998). In particular, it requires the firm to adopt its business model to the institutional 
non-conformity and make it conducive to be institutionally non-conforming. Given 
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that business models consist of various interrelated domains, institutional non-
conformity may therefore require deviating in other domains of the business model as 
well. 
Together, the findings of this dissertation contribute to a better understanding of an 
underdeveloped domain of empirical inquiry: small business proactive environmental 
strategies. Given the formidable influence small businesses have on various domains of social 
life, and in particular on the natural environment, more fine-grained analyses of small firms 
are necessary to inform small business owner- managers, policy makers, professional 
associations and researchers alike on how small businesses can be better engaged in the quest 
for sustainable development. 
 
8.3. Limitations  
 Having the goal to answer the generic question how small businesses successfully 
execute proactive environmental strategies, this dissertation reported a literature review and 
two empirical studies that drew on one empirical multi-case study database. Whereas the first 
empirical study explored how firms in the Belgian ornamental horticulture sector were able to 
execute proactive environmental strategies when the odds were against having one, the second 
further explored how the firms had interacted with their institutional context in particular. 
Despite vigilant care on the design, execution, analysis and reporting of these two empirical 
studies, some choices inevitably had to be made that present limitations to our research 
findings. 
8.3.1. Methodological limitations 
 The quality of case study research depends on the level of richness it can bring in the 
account of the phenomenon of interest (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007; 
Weick, 2007). As such, case studies ideally assure a triangulation of multiple data sources and 
perspectives of the case (Yin, 2003). Earlier studies have therefore engaged in a process of 
combining interviews with the firm’s CEOs, board members, employees and external 
stakeholders knowledgeable about the firm or the phenomenon of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Isabella, 1990; Gilbert, 2005; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007). In our cases, 
however, sources for data triangulation were very limited. First, often only the owner-
manager was aware of the firm’s strategic decisions with regards to the natural environment. 
Employees are frequently low-skilled laborers that are not included in the strategy making 
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process. Second, little or no valuable archival material could be found that would further be 
useful for understanding the firm’s PES. Third, the profession of ornamental horticulture is 
rather solitary. As a result, the only constituents that are knowledgeable about a firm’s 
strategies and practices would be the independent advisors, supplier advisors and input 
vendors, government advisors that have frequent contacts with firms and, in the case of VMS 
members, the VMS directors. In order to maximize the number of perspectives and data 
sources of the firm, we employed four strategies. First, whenever archival material was 
necessary through internet or professional magazines, we included them in our case study 
analyses. Furthermore, when more people were in fact knowledgeable about a firm, we did 
additional interviews as long as this was needed to reach theoretical saturation. Second, we 
interviewed the owner-managers twice about their firms, with at least one year between each 
interview. Whereas we could have used these interviews for a longitudinal analysis of the 
cases, we maintained focus during the second interview on the time of the first interview. This 
process allowed not only to increase the depth of the data collected (by adding additional and 
new details that emerged on the discussions of the first interview), but also to assess whether 
the stories presented by the owner-managers had remained consistent over time. As a third 
means to increase depth of the data, I deliberately ended the formal part of the interview 
before really stopping to ask questions. During this time, the firms often gave additional 
impressions that had been left out of the interview, gave reflections on my approach or asked 
about other firms. Since there is a lot of information “out there” about the firm, these 
additional 15 minutes often yielded the most interesting and unexpected leads for new 
reflections about the data and the interview.  
8.3.2. Contextual limitations 
 The empirical research of this dissertation took place in the confined setting of the 
Belgian ornamental horticulture, and reflects the dealings of a small sample of firms active in 
this industry prior to the winter of 2005-2006. Besides reasons of a purely practical nature, 
confining the research to this sector and geographic area also presented theoretical 
advantages. First, establishing access to small business population is often a difficult task 
(Curran & Blackburn, 2001). As a researcher of a government-sponsored, yet independent 
university-based think tank, the Policy Research Centre for Sustainable Agriculture, I had 
been able to establish quick and trust-based access to a number of key informants in the 
sector. It was only with the help of these key informants that easy access with the interviewed 
firms could be established. Second, the restricted study area yielded a ceteris paribus 
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situation, holding the factors beyond the phenomenon of interest constant. In so doing, I was 
able to focus on developing the depth and richness required to generate some important 
research findings. Unfortunately, this contextual bias raises some relevant questions with 
regards to the generalizability of the study’s findings. In particular, our study was executed in 
a mature and traditional Belgian production sector that has mainly business-to-business 
transactions. Furthermore, the sector was clearly in a state of decline with many firms going 
out of business and producing in an increasingly uncertain environment. As a result, 
traditional practices and expectations not only had had a long time to settle in as taken-for-
granted assumptions, yet were also strongly embraced in the uncertain conditions the firms 
were operating in. These contextual factors inform to what extent our findings may be 
generalized to other contexts as well. 
 First, since the study was executed in Belgium, a Western and developed country, the 
implications of this study may be limited only to this specific context. However, we have 
strong indications that the validity of our findings may extend to other developed and 
developing country contexts as well. Firstly, the market for ornamental plants is a European 
and very integrated market. As such, the firms in this research do not experience any different 
market opportunities for environmentally friendly plants than those in most other European 
countries. Secondly, the regulatory requirement to keep exported plants free of pests is a 
European regulation and is therefore no different in Belgium than in any other European 
country. The only potential difference that may exist between countries is the national 
institutional support for environmentally friendly production. For example, MPS, the Dutch 
mother organization of VMS, has a far larger membership base in the Netherlands than in any 
other country in Europe. Interviewees and information we found in reports related this success 
to the Dutch regulatory requirement of having a registration system on the firm. Although 
growers are free to choose which registration system they wish to apply, the MPS system is 
accepted as an appropriate solution. As a result, the MPS system could have moved from a 
status of proto-institution to a well established institution in the Dutch sector. How this has 
had an impact on the capability requirements of the industry, however, is an interesting 
research question that would require further research. Thirdly, the findings in this dissertation 
may also be relevant for small firms in developing countries. Given that resources and 
institutional support in developing countries is lower in general, this should not come at a 
surprise. Yet, whereas the companies in our study had been able to engage in munification by 
tapping into networks that were available within Belgium or in the neighboring countries, 
companies in developing contexts may have to reach out to networks at much further distance 
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to realize the same result. As such, even though the same processes may apply in both 
developing and developed country contexts, additional research would be required to fully 
investigate the impact of the contextual differences.  
Second, questions can be raised with regards to the generalizability of this research 
across other industry contexts. The industry context was peculiar in nature as a result of the 
strong forces for isomorphism, institutional inertia and few opportunities for capitalizing on 
PES. Therefore, the findings of this dissertation will be particularly applicable to companies 
that find themselves in contexts with similar features. Although the cases in our own study 
may represent extreme cases, merely engaging in the uncertain process of questioning 
established practices for the sole improvement of a non-financial objective will encounter 
healthy skepticism from any investor or fellow owner-manager. As a result, it can be expected 
that the relative importance of organicity, munification and the multiple processes of 
institutional non-conformity may be different across industries - depending on the relative 
presence of internal resource capital, external resource capital and institutional capital – but 
will nevertheless be present in some way another. 
Third, the latter remark also presents a last contextual condition of our findings. The 
present study was focused on those types of environmental strategies that were proactive in 
nature. As soon as certain environmental practices and expectations become mainstream and 
become a kind of new Olympic minimum, we can expect entirely new capabilities to become 
important. As it has been shown in earlier research, environmental strategies require the 
policing and peer-pressure to keep firms from free-riding other colleagues’ environmental 
practices (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990) and will require communal strategies (Barnett, 2006) 
to keep firms from defecting to the established standards. Furthermore, given that it is not in 
their interest to be ahead of legal or normative expectations, firms without PES will not need 
to engage in the complex and intensive processes of developing alternative institutional logic 
exposure, engaging in multiple roles in the institutional field, collaborating with peers to 
create inexistent resources and the like. Rather, resources will have to be dedicated more to 
following up what the legal requirements are, and assessing solutions how proactive firms 
went about dealing with new environmental challenges. As such, the late adopters can benefit 
from the high risks that the proactive firms were ready to take (Rugman & Verbeke, 1998), 
yet they will also probably be too late to capture the early mover advantages that proactive 
firms could potentially have reaped (Nehrt, 1998). 
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8.4. Future research 
 Before concluding this dissertation, this section takes the opportunity to highlight 
some potential avenues for future research. Although I hope the research in this dissertation 
has contributed to answering some pertinent questions, it has also uncovered some new 
research questions. 
First, I repeat the call as made in chapter 5 to investigate the fine line between 
obstinacy and foolhardiness. For every company that has succeeded in persistenly wanting to 
realize its objectives, one can imagine that others have failed. Future research could therefore 
ask the question: how far can a firm go in being committed to its proactive environmental 
intentions? Are there any indications in the external environment firms can follow up to 
assess the likelihood of finding emerging solutions? In a similar vein, research may ask the 
question: how much non-conformity can a firm get away with when realizing a proactive 
environmental strategy? For example, the genetic modification of crops has been promoted as 
a beneficial environmental technology due to lower toxic pesticide need as a result of genetic 
pest resistance. However, since genetically modified crops remain mostly illegal in Europe, 
there are legal barriers to the institutional non-conformity a firm could develop in this 
perspective. Even if a firm has the best intentions to reduce the impact of pesticides on the 
natural environment by using genetically modified plants, the law requires the firm’s obstinate 
commitment to stop at some point. Yet the most path-breaking knowledge breakthroughs have 
come some obstinate non-conformists (e.g. Copernicus, Darwin and Vesalius). How firms 
may go about regulative institutional non-conformity (in other words, breaking the law) in 
order to realize their good intentions remains a question for future research. 
A second avenue for future research relates to the question how small businesses deal 
with environmental issues that require systemic changes. In chapter 5, we identified 
collaboration as the mechanism that enabled firms to create inexistent resources or 
capabilities. Yet in the event that a substantial reduction of a firm’s environmental impact 
would depend on the changes, or even replacement, of an entire system, then small firms may 
run into constraints that are truly insurmountable. The type of collaboration or influence 
processes required in this situation may then be of an entirely different kind (Bilimoria et al., 
1995). For example, small transport firms wishing to decrease their impact on the 
environment depend on the R&D efforts of truck constructors developing hybrid or hydrogen 
engines. Without the efforts of these truck drivers, transport companies are severely 
constrained in the way they can diminish their own impact on the environment. Researchers 
may therefore want to address the questions whether and how small businesses can effectively 
Chapter 8 
 
232 
set the processes in motion that result in the systemic changes that enable them to be more 
effective in realizing their own proactive environmental intentions.  
Third, how can governments and professional associations exploit the uncovered 
mechanisms to increase the probability that firms will realize environmental strategies beyond 
what is legally required? To date, most articles discussing environmental responsiveness 
among small firms have encouraged governments to take the lead and set a level playing field 
for requirements related to the natural environment. Furthermore, they advance the view that 
small firms should be informed about the potential benefits environmental strategies may 
have for the firm especially through very direct information initiatives (Palmer & France, 
1998). The research in this dissertation, however, would argue more in favor of initiatives that 
enable firms to develop munification and organicity, and that would support firms when their 
PES would entail institutional non-conformity. In particular, bringing information about 
different organizational fields and organizing network structures that enable exchanges 
between proactive firms may be particularly effective in this perspective. How such practices 
may effectively be organized, however, is open to further research. 
Finally, the former question hinged on the assumption that the higher the ability of 
firms is to engage in PES, the more likely they will be inclined to enact their proactive 
environmental intentions. Yet an additional research question is also whether firms that have 
the ability to successfully realize PES would be more likely to also be motivated to have one, 
and therefore also realize it. Future research could therefore investigate whether PES 
capabilities influence the motivation and intentions for having one as well. 
8.5. General conclusion 
How can small firms be successful in realizing PES? Our results reinforce the view 
that understanding PES requires looking at both the resources inside and outside of the firm, 
as well the institutional context that infuses these resources with value. Whether or not small 
firms will be able to realize their PES depends on how they can manage the interacting 
influence of both resources and institutions. In our data, for example, PES were manifested as 
processes of resource scarcity and institutional non-conformity. The research in this 
dissertation shows that, when firms combine an obstinate, yet prudent commitment to 
realizing their PES with the flexibility to creatively find and employ pockets of internal and 
outside resources, they will be able to engage in the process of building resources and 
institutional support that foster their realization of PES. Such an ability emerged in particular 
among those firms that framed the PES as part of a desired future, and who had a business 
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model that was both non-conformist in multiple perspectives and conducive to executing a 
PES. Yet such a capability of organicity needed to be combined with munification, the 
proficiency to create the micro-environment that mimics the theoretical external conditions 
that foster PES. By employing specific network contacts and positions rich with 
complementary resources and capabilities and that lowered the embeddness in the 
organizational field, by collaborating with external stakeholders to create inexisting resources 
and by actively managing their institutional environment, even small firms can be freed from 
the inhibiting resource and institutional pressures that would normally constrain their 
successful realization of PES. In this respect, small firms that effectively realize PES have to 
face the combined challenges of institutional non-conformity and the realization of a strategy 
in a resource constrained environment. We must be fortunate that some small businesses have 
the courage to engage in this complex and risky endeavour. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Interview guidelines with key informants 
Introduction of the interview:  
- Presentation of the interviewer:  
o Presentation Policy Research Centre for Sustainable Agriculture 
o Background 
o Why this research? 
- Sketch objectives to the interviewee 
o Part 1: Presentation of the expert: (why are you considered an expert?) 
o Part 2: Exploration of the context in the ornamental horticulture industry, past, 
present and future.  
o Part 3: Exploration of capability requirements for proactive environmental 
strategies in the ornamental horticulture industry in Flanders. 
 
Part 1: Presentation of the expert 
- Who are you? 
o What is your domain of expertise? 
o In what subsector? 
o Production? Management? Financial? 
o What is the nature of contacts you have in the sector? 
- How many years do you know the sector? 
- What is your education? 
 
Part 2: Exploration of the context in the ornamental horticulture industry, past, present 
and future 
 
- What does the market expect from a good entrepreneur: short term, longer term? 
o How would you describe the dynamics in the sector? 
o How innovative do you consider the sector? 
o What is your assesstment of the competitive rivalry in the sector? 
o What is the importance of quality, price, speed, …? 
o How do you envision the longer term viability of the sector? 
- Where is the sector heading? 
- What are the problems and challenges that growers are facing? 
o Technical 
o Technological 
o Financial 
o Governmental 
o Neighbours 
o Environmental organisations 
o Customers 
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o Suppliers 
o Distribution / Trade 
- What are the most pressing issues? What issues can be dealt with by the sector, what 
issues are beyond their control? 
 
Part 3: Exploration of competence requirements for sustainable business strategies in 
the ornamental horticulture industry in Flanders 
 
- According to you, what are the characteristics of a good, sustainable nursery with a 
future? 
- What do proactive environmental growers do different than other companies to deal 
with the requirements as set out above? 
- What do they have to do? 
o Stakeholder management 
o Organizational Learning: 
o Innovate? 
o Be informed, read? 
o Experiment? 
o Negotiate? 
o Take initiative at sector level? 
o Take risks? Wanting – daring – do?   
- What do they need to be able to do so? 
o What do you have to know? 
o What do you need to want? 
o What do you need to be able to do? 
- What is the value of education? 
- Communication? 
- Collaboration? 
- Discussions at the firm? 
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A.2. Interview guidelines for grower interviews 
Presentation of 
person and 
company 
 
Personal data - profession of father and mother? 
- how did you acquire this firm? 
- what is your education? 
- membership and participation in associations, councils, boards, 
religious groups, politics, policy?You? Your family?  
 
Firm - products? 
- history of the firm (large investments, changes in production, 
distribution channels used, etc) 
 
Strategie - If you look at decisions in the past, what did you use as a basis to 
make those decisions? 
- Do you have a vision where you want to take the company? 
- Have you written this vision down? Do you have a business plan? 
Do you have explicit targets / budgets? 
- If yes: what are the targets about? Only financial or others as well? 
- Where do you want to be with your company within 5 years? 
 
- Why did you become member of VMS 
- Why are you still a member / no longer member? 
- Do you employ any other quality systems? 
- How important is the environment for your company? Why? 
- Do you make more money because of VMS? 
- Are you stimulated by the market to become member of VMS? Is it 
important to have an A label? 
- Do you experience social pressures to produce sustainably / 
environmentally friendly or to be more socially responsible in your 
management? 
- What is a sustainable company to you? 
- What are the responsibilities of a ornamental horticulture company? 
- Do you actively look for sustainable methods for growing? 
 
Performance - In what perspectives have you improved over the last years? Do 
you have evidence for that? Do you know why you have improved? 
(Why are you so good?) 
- In what perspectives have you worsened over the last years? Do 
you have evidence for that? Do you know why you have worsened? 
- What VMS score do you have? How is it evolving? 
- If you would have to scale yourself with respect to financial 
performance, how would you score yourself on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 the top and 7 very loss-making? 
- Do you have a good reputation in the sector? 
 
Capabilities  
 - What to you is a paragon of an ornamental horticulture grower? Do 
Appendix 
 
269 
you know people that fit that model? Do you fit that model? What 
do you then? What should you be able to do? 
- What will a grower need to know / be able to do in the future? 
- What are the strongest hurdles that you have to bridge as a grower? 
- Is it important to have a good education? Or to be born in the 
ornamental horticulture sector? 
 
Higher Order 
Learning, 
systems 
thinking 
- Are there any things that you learned specifically because you are a 
member of VMS? By trying to produce more environmentally 
friendly? Skills? Knowledge? 
- Do you look differently at ornamental horticulture since you have 
become a member of VMS / started to produce more 
environmentally friendly? 
 
Gathering 
information 
- Do you acquire a lot of information? Formally / informally? 
External consultants? Professional magazines? Network 
organizations? 
- What do you do with your accounting information? 
- What do you do with VMS information? 
- Do you assess customer satisfaction? Supplier satisfaction? 
Neighbors? Personnel? 
- Know-why? Do you know why the environment is important? Do 
you know why it would be necessary to have a good relationship 
with your neighbors? Do you know why it is important to have a 
good relationship with your personnel? Do you know how to deal 
with that? 
 
Spreading 
information 
- Do you have an open culture in your firm? 
- What communication do you have? Labels? Website? Newsletters? 
Customer letters? Meeting days for customers, neighbors, 
suppliers? Commercials? 
- Do you talk about the information that you collect? With whom? 
 
Changes - Do you come back to decisions and change radically? 
- What type of changes do you find while looking for sustainability? 
What is the hardest thing to resolve? How do you resolve this? 
 
Innovation  
Innovation - Do you experiment with new products? New technologies? (water, 
light, energy, pesticides, closed greenhouses?) 
- Have you brought new products to the market? 
- Are you mostly the first to try new things or do you wait until 
something has been tried by other companies? 
- Do you take risks? How does your environment think about this? 
- Do you look for new business opportunities that are explicitly 
environmentally friendly or socially promoting? 
Stakeholder 
management 
 
Network - Do you use your network to collect information? 
- Do you know many people outside the sector? Entrepreneurs / non-
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entrepreneurs? 
- Do you try to check with governments how they can help you? 
- How do neighbors, family, etc react to the way you work? 
 
Collaboration - Do you try to work together with other firms? Why? 
- Do you take initiatives at sector level? Are you engaged in ensuring 
a future for the sector as a whole? 
 
Leadership - Are you among the first to comply with new legislations? 
Measures? 
 
Time 
management 
 
 - Do you take the time to think about your company and the future? 
- Do you have time to go to trade fairs, professional association 
meetings, read? 
 
  
  
 
